The only Christchurch street still closed following the 2011 earthquake will reopen later in 2018 only to close again in 2019 so the council can extend the route for the tram. The proposal has raised the ire of fledgling businesses along High st worried about the disruption the road works will cause them and wanting the work done now, before they open their doors to the public.
Background and methodology The Mw 7.8, 14th November 2016 earthquake centred (item b, figure 1) in the Hurunui District of the South Island, New Zealand, damaged critical infrastructure across North Canterbury and Marlborough. We investigate the impacts to infrastructure and adaptations to the resulting service disruption in four small rural towns (figure 1): Culverden (a), Waiau (c), Ward (d) and Seddon (e). This is accomplished though literary research, interviews and geospatial analysis. Illustrating our methods, we have displayed here a Hurunui District hazard map (figure 2b) and select infrastructure inventories (figures 2a, 3).
The 14 November 2016 Kaikōura earthquake had major impacts on New Zealand's transport system. Road, rail and port infrastructure was damaged, creating substantial disruption for transport operators, residents, tourists, and business owners in the Canterbury, Marlborough and Wellington regions, with knock-on consequences elsewhere. During both the response and recovery phases, a large amount of information and data relating to the transport system was generated, managed, analysed, and exchanged within and between organisations to assist decision making. To improve information and data exchanges and related decision making in the transport sector during future events and guide new resilience strategies, we present key findings from a recent post-earthquake assessment. The research involved 35 different stakeholder groups and was conducted for the Ministry of Transport. We consider what transport information was available, its usefulness, where it was sourced from, mechanisms for data transfer between organisations, and suggested approaches for continued monitoring.
Over 900 buildings in the Christchurch central business district and 10,000 residential homes were demolished following the 22nd of February 2011 Canterbury earthquake, significantly disrupting the rebuild progress. This study looks to quantify the time required for demolitions during this event which will be useful for future earthquake recovery planning. This was done using the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) demolition database, which allowed an in-depth look into the duration of each phase of the demolition process. The effect of building location, building height, and the stakeholder which initiated the demolition process (i.e. building owner or CERA) was investigated. The demolition process comprises of five phases; (i) decision making, (ii) procurement and planning, (iii) demolition, (iv) site clean-up, and (v) completion certification. It was found that the time required to decide to demolish the building made up majority of the total demolition duration. Demolition projects initiated by CERA had longer procurement and planning durations, but was quicker in other phases. Demolished buildings in the suburbs had a longer decision making duration, but had little effect on other phases of the demolition process. The decision making and procurement and planning phases of the demolition process were shorter for taller buildings, though the other phases took longer. Fragility functions for the duration of each phase in the demolition process are provided for the various categories of buildings for use in future studies.
Asset management in power systems is exercised to improve network reliability to provide confidence and security for customers and asset owners. While there are well-established reliability metrics that are used to measure and manage business-as-usual disruptions, an increasing appreciation of the consequences of low-probability high-impact events means that resilience is increasingly being factored into asset management in order to provide robustness and redundancy to components and wider networks. This is particularly important for electricity systems, given that a range of other infrastructure lifelines depend upon their operation. The 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence provides valuable insights into electricity system criticality and resilience in the face of severe earthquake impacts. While above-ground assets are relatively easy to monitor and repair, underground assets such as cables emplaced across wide areas in the distribution network are difficult to monitor, identify faults on, and repair. This study has characterised in detail the impacts to buried electricity cables in Christchurch resulting from seismically-induced ground deformation caused primarily by liquefaction and lateral spread. Primary modes of failure include cable bending, stretching, insulation damage, joint braking and, being pulled off other equipment such as substation connections. Performance and repair data have been compiled into a detailed geospatial database, which in combination with spatial models of peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity and ground deformation, will be used to establish rigorous relationships between seismicity and performance. These metrics will be used to inform asset owners of network performance in future earthquakes, further assess component criticality, and provide resilience metrics.
Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.
Farming and urban regions are impacted by earthquake disasters in different ways, and feature a range of often different recovery requirements. In New Zealand, and elsewhere, most earthquake impact and recovery research is urban focused. This creates a research deficit that can lead to the application of well-researched urban recovery strategies in rural areas to suboptimal effect. To begin to reduce this deficit, in-depth case studies of the earthquake impacts and recovery of three New Zealand farms severely impacted by the 14th November 2016, M7.8 Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake were conducted. The initial earthquake, its aftershocks and coseismic hazards (e.g., landslides, liquefaction, surface rupture) affected much of North Canterbury, Marlborough and the Wellington area. The three case study farms were chosen to broadly represent the main types of farming and topography in the Hurunui District in North Canterbury. The farms were directly and indirectly impacted by earthquakes and related hazards. On-farm infrastructure (e.g., woolsheds, homesteads) and essential services (e.g., water, power), frequently sourced from distributed networks, were severely impacted. The earthquake occurred after two years of regional drought had already stressed farm systems and farmers to restructuring or breaking point. Cascading interlinked hazards stemming from the earthquakes and coseismic hazards continued to disrupt earthquake recovery over a year after the initial earthquake. Semi-structured interviews with the farmers were conducted nine and fourteen months after the initial earthquake to capture the timeline of on-going impacts and recovery. Analysis of both geological hazard data and interview data resulted in the identification of key factors influencing farm level earthquake impact and recovery. These include pre-existing conditions (e.g., drought); farm-specific variations in recovery timelines; and resilience strategies for farm recovery resources. The earthquake recovery process presented all three farms with opportunities to change their business plans and adapt to mitigate on-going and future risk.