Presenting a selection of the aerated (or soda, if you prefer) water bottles that have surfaced so far on Christchurch archaeological sites. Brace yourselves: there may be water puns (although, honestly, most of the ones we could think of were simply too … Continue reading →
This week on the blog, we delve – or dive, even (sorry, I can already tell you that this post will be filled with water puns) – into the bitter waters of the 19th century, by which I mean mineral … Continue reading →
With the occurrence of natural disasters on the increase, major cities around the world face the potential of complete loss of infrastructure due to design guidelines that do not consider resilience in the design. With the February 22nd, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, being the largest insured event, lessons learnt from the rebuild will be vital for the preparation of future disasters. Therefore the objective of this research is to understand the financial implications of the changes to the waste water design guidelines used throughout the five year rebuild programme of works. The research includes a study of the SCIRT alliance model selected for the delivery that is flexible enough to handle changes in the design with minimal impact on the direct cost of the rebuild works. The study further includes the analysis and compares the impact of the three different guidelines on maintenance and replacement cost over the waste water pipe asset life. The research concludes that with the varying ground conditions in Christchurch and also the wide variety of materials in use in the waste water network up to the start of the CES, the rebuild was not a ‘one size fits all’ approach.
Pigeons sit on the remains of one of the tallest buildings in Christchurch that was 95% demolished two or three years ago. The basement (now filled with water) and the columns remain. Demolished due to damage from the Christchurch 2011 earthquake.
This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.
Resilience and community spirit have shone through in North Canterbury in the aftermath of the earthquake. With no active civil defence post in operation in Cheviot in the days after the 7.8 quake, a group of locals mobilised a task force to support those in need. Further north at Mendip Hills Station farm manager Simon Lee has been repairing broken water pipes and clearing slips in time for weaning, while on Ben Lissington's dairy farm near Waiau, milk tankers are having to go off the beaten track to get to the rotary shed after a six metre section of the road was destroyed.
ANDREW LITTLE to the Prime Minister: What are the priorities for the Government in assisting communities affected by yesterday’s earthquake? MATT DOOCEY to the Minister of Finance: What advice has he received about the economic impact of the Kaikōura earthquake? EUGENIE SAGE to the Minister of Transport: What updates can he give on the transport sector’s response to earthquake damage to State Highway 1 and the rail line between Seddon and Cheviot? GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister of Finance: What is his initial assessment of the fiscal impact of yesterday morning’s earthquake and what, if any, new or changed Budget allocations is he considering in response to the earthquake? PAUL FOSTER-BELL to the Minister of Civil Defence: How is the Government supporting people affected by the Kaikōura earthquake? RON MARK to the Minister of Civil Defence: Can the Government assure New Zealanders on our level of preparedness for all natural disasters? SUE MORONEY to the Minister of Transport: What roads and public transport services are currently not operational following damage from the earthquake yesterday and when is it expected access and services will be restored? BRETT HUDSON to the Minister of Transport: What action is the Government taking to repair damaged transport infrastructure following the Kaikōura earthquake? GARETH HUGHES to the Minister of Broadcasting: Will she join with me to acknowledge the work of all media in New Zealand, which is so important in times of natural disaster and crisis; if so, will she consider increasing our public broadcaster Radio New Zealand’s funding in Budget 2017? CLAYTON MITCHELL to the Minister of Civil Defence: What progress has been made, if any, on new civil defence legislation which focuses on large and significant events such as the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes? ALASTAIR SCOTT to the Minister of Health: What updates has he received on the Government’s health response to the Kaikōura earthquake? CLARE CURRAN to the Minister of Civil Defence: What actions have been taken by Civil Defence to ensure those people in the areas worst hit by the earthquake have enough food, clothing, water, and shelter?
Sewerage systems convey sewage, or wastewater, from residential or commercial buildings through complex reticulation networks to treatment plants. During seismic events both transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation can induce physical damage to sewerage system components, limiting or impeding the operability of the whole system. The malfunction of municipal sewerage systems can result in the pollution of nearby waterways through discharge of untreated sewage, pose a public health threat by preventing the use of appropriate sanitation facilities, and cause serious inconvenience for rescuers and residents. Christchurch, the second largest city in New Zealand, was seriously affected by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) in 2010-2011. The CES imposed widespread damage to the Christchurch sewerage system (CSS), causing a significant loss of functionality and serviceability to the system. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) relied heavily on temporary sewerage services for several months following the CES. The temporary services were supported by use of chemical and portable toilets to supplement the damaged wastewater system. The rebuild delivery agency -Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was created to be responsible for repair of 85 % of the damaged horizontal infrastructure (i.e., water, wastewater, stormwater systems, and roads) in Christchurch. Numerous initiatives to create platforms/tools aiming to, on the one hand, support the understanding, management and mitigation of seismic risk for infrastructure prior to disasters, and on the other hand, to support the decision-making for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery, have been promoted worldwide. Despite this, the CES in New Zealand highlighted that none of the existing platforms/tools are either accessible and/or readable or usable by emergency managers and decision makers for restoring the CSS. Furthermore, the majority of existing tools have a sole focus on the engineering perspective, while the holistic process of formulating recovery decisions is based on system-wide approach, where a variety of factors in addition to technical considerations are involved. Lastly, there is a paucity of studies focused on the tools and frameworks for supporting decision-making specifically on sewerage system restoration after earthquakes. This thesis develops a decision support framework for sewerage pipe and system restoration after earthquakes, building on the experience and learning of the organisations involved in recovering the CSS following the CES in 2010-2011. The proposed decision support framework includes three modules: 1) Physical Damage Module (PDM); 2) Functional Impact Module (FIM); 3) Pipeline Restoration Module (PRM). The PDM provides seismic fragility matrices and functions for sewer gravity and pressure pipelines for predicting earthquake-induced physical damage, categorised by pipe materials and liquefaction zones. The FIM demonstrates a set of performance indicators that are categorised in five domains: structural, hydraulic, environmental, social and economic domains. These performance indicators are used to assess loss of wastewater system service and the induced functional impacts in three different phases: emergency response, short-term recovery and long-term restoration. Based on the knowledge of the physical and functional status-quo of the sewerage systems post-earthquake captured through the PDM and FIM, the PRM estimates restoration time of sewer networks by use of restoration models developed using a Random Forest technique and graphically represented in terms of restoration curves. The development of a decision support framework for sewer recovery after earthquakes enables decision makers to assess physical damage, evaluate functional impacts relating to hydraulic, environmental, structural, economic and social contexts, and to predict restoration time of sewerage systems. Furthermore, the decision support framework can be potentially employed to underpin system maintenance and upgrade by guiding system rehabilitation and to monitor system behaviours during business-as-usual time. In conjunction with expert judgement and best practices, this framework can be moreover applied to assist asset managers in targeting the inclusion of system resilience as part of asset maintenance programmes.
Following the 22nd February 2011, Mw 6.2 earthquake located along a previously unknown fault beneath the Port Hills of Christchurch, surface cracking was identified in contour parallel locations within fill material at Quarry Road on the lower slopes of Mount Pleasant. GNS Science, in the role of advisor to the Christchurch City Council, concluded that these cracks were a part of a potential rotational mass movement (named zone 11A) within the fill and airfall loess material present. However, a lack of field evidence for slope instability and an absence of laboratory geotechnical data on which slope stability analysis was based, suggested this conclusion is potentially incorrect. It was hypothesised that ground cracking was in fact due to earthquake shaking, and not mass movement within the slope, thus forming the basis of this study. Three soil units were identified during surface and subsurface investigations at Quarry Road: fill derived from quarry operations in the adjacent St. Andrews Quarry (between 1893 and 1913), a buried topsoil, and underlying in-situ airfall loess. The fill material was identified by the presence of organic-rich topsoil “clods” that were irregular in both size (∼10 – 200 mm) and shape, with variable thicknesses of 1 – 10 m. Maximum thickness, as indicated by drill holes and geophysical survey lines, was identified below 6 Quarry Road and 7 The Brae where it is thought to infill a pre-existing gully formed in the underlying airfall loess. Bearing strength of the fill consistently exceeded 300 kPa ultimate below ∼500 mm depth. The buried topsoil was 200 – 300 mm thick, and normally displayed a lower bearing strength when encountered, but not below 300 kPa ultimate (3 – 11 blows per 100mm or ≥100 kPa allowable). In-situ airfall loess stood vertically in outcrop due to its characteristic high dry strength and also showed Scala penetrometer values of 6 – 20+ blows per 100 mm (450 – ≥1000 kPa ultimate). All soils were described as being moist to dry during subsurface investigations, with no groundwater table identified during any investigation into volcanic bedrock. In-situ moisture contents were established using bulk disturbed samples from hand augers and test pitting. Average moisture contents were low at 9% within the fill, 11 % within the buried topsoil, and 8% within the airfall loess: all were below the associated average plastic limit of 17, 15, and 16, respectively, determined during Atterberg limit analysis. Particle size distributions, identified using the sieve and pipette method, were similar between the three soil units with 11 – 20 % clay, 62 – 78 % silt, and 11 – 20 % fine sand. Using these results and the NZGS soil classification, the loess derived fill and in-situ airfall loess are termed SILT with some clay and sand, and the buried topsoil is SILT with minor clay and sand. Dispersivity of the units was found using the Emerson crumb test, which established that the fill can be non- to completely dispersive (score 0 – 4). The buried topsoil was always non-dispersive (score 0), and airfall loess completely dispersive (score 4). Values for cohesion (c) and internal friction angle (φ) of the three soil units were established using the direct shear box at field moisture contents. Results showed all soil units had high shear strengths at the moisture contents tested (c = 18 – 24 kPa and φ = 42 – 50°), with samples behaving in a brittle fashion. Moisture content was artificially increased to 16% within the buried topsoil, which reduced the shear strength (c = 10 kPa, φ = 18°) and allowed it to behave plastically. Observational information indicating stability at Quarry Road included: shallow, discontinuous, cracks that do not display vertical offset; no scarp features or compressional zones typical of landsliding; no tilted or deformed structures; no movement in inclinometers; no basal shear zone identified in logged core to 20 m depth; low field moisture contents; no groundwater table; and high soil strength using Scala penetrometers. Limit equilibrium analysis of the slope was conducted using Rocscience software Slide 5.0 to verify the slope stability identified by observational methods. Friction, cohesion, and density values determined during laboratory were input into the two slope models investigated. Results gave minimum static factor of safety values for translational (along buried topsoil) and rotational (in the fill) slides of 2.4 – 4.2. Sensitivity of the slope to reduced shear strength parameters was analysed using c = 10 kPa and φ = 18° for the translational buried topsoil plane, and a cohesion of 0 kPa within the fill for the rotational plane. The only situation that gave a factor of safety <1.0 was in nonengineered fill at 0.5 m depth. Pseudostatic analysis based on previous peak ground acceleration (PGA) values for the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and predicted PGAs for future Alpine Fault and Hope Fault earthquakes established minimum factor of safety values between 1.2 and 3.3. Yield acceleration PGAs were computed to be between 0.8g and 1.6g. Based on all information gathered, the cracking at Quarry Road is considered to be shallow deformation in response to earthquake shaking, and not due to deep-seated landsliding. It is recommended that the currently bare site be managed by smoothing the land, installing contour drainage, and bioremediation of the surface soils to reduce surface water infiltration and runoff. Extensive earthworks, including removal of the fill, are considered unnecessary. Any future replacement of housing would be subject to site-specific investigations, and careful foundation design based on those results.