Search

found 10 results

Images for vacuum; more images...

Images, UC QuakeStudies

Workers use a large water-blasting pipe to clear blocked drains. The photographer comments, "The Australian company Barry Bros Turned up very late at night to clean out our street drains of liquefaction".

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A worker uses a large water-blasting pipe to clear blocked drains. The photographer comments, "These guys worked really hard late at night to remove the liquefaction blocking our drains, but did not pre-warn people. Our elderly neighbour's toilet was drenched in water".

Audio, Radio New Zealand

The former Earthquake Commission minister, Gerry Brownlee, is defending EQC over claims its assessors in Christchurch were not properly qualified. A growing number of homeowners in the city are discovering EQC assessors have completely missed quake damage including broken foundations costing hundreds of thousands to repair. That's been disastrous for people who've bought homes with hidden damage who are sometimes finding private insurers unwilling to cover the cost of putting right mistakes made by EQC. The company hired by EQC to carry out repairs was Fletcher Construction. Its chief executive at the time, Mark Binns, told Checkpoint that EQC probably hired unqualified people to assess quake damaged homes. Gerry Brownlee refused to be drawn on the comments from Mr Binns. But when asked by RNZ Christchurch reporter, Conan Young, if it was acceptable to have retired policemen, school principals and vacuum cleaner salesmen carrying out assessments for EQC, he admitted finding enough people to do the job was a challenge.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This thesis focuses on the role of legal preparedness for managing large-scale urban disasters in Aotearoa New Zealand. It uses the Auckland Volcanic Field as a case study to answer the question: ‘is New Zealand’s current legal framework prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster?’. The Auckland Volcanic Field was chosen as the main case study because a future eruption is a low likelihood, high-impact event that New Zealand is going to have to manage in the future. Case studies are a key feature of this thesis as both New Zealand based and overseas examples are used to explore the role of legal preparedness by identifying and investigating a range of legal issues that need to be addressed in advance of a future Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Of particular interest is the impact of legal preparedness for the recovery phase. The New Zealand case studies include; Canterbury earthquake sequence 2010-2011, the Kaikōura earthquake 2016, the Auckland flooding 2018, and the North Island Severe Weather event 2023, which encompasses both the Auckland Anniversary weekend flooding and Cyclone Gabrielle. As New Zealand has not experienced a large-scale urban volcanic eruption, overseas examples are explored to provide insights into the legal issues that are volcano specific. The overseas volcanic case studies cover eruptions in Heimaey (Iceland), the Soufrière Hills (Montserrat and the Grenadines), La Soufrière (St Vincent) and Tungurahua (Ecuador). New Zealand’s past experiences highlight a trend for introducing post-event legal frameworks to manage recovery. Consequently, the current disaster management system is not prioritising legal preparedness and instead is choosing to rely on exceptional powers. Unsurprisingly, the introduction of new post-event recovery frameworks has repercussions. In New Zealand, new post-event legal frameworks are introduced swiftly under urgency, they contain broad unstructured decision-making powers, and are often flawed. As these exceptional new frameworks sit outside the ‘normal’ legal frameworks, they in effect create a parallel “shadow system”. Based on the evidence explored in this thesis it does not appear that Auckland’s current disaster management framework is prepared to deal with a large-scale urban event caused by an Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Following this conclusion, it is the submission of this thesis that New Zealand’s current legal framework is not prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster. To become legally prepared, New Zealand needs to consider the legal tools required to manage large-scale urban disasters in advance. This will prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the aftermath of disasters and the need for new recovery frameworks. Adopting a new attitude will require a change in approach towards legal preparedness which prioritises it, rather than sidelining it. This may also require changes within New Zealand’s disaster management system including the introduction of a formal monitoring mechanism, which will support and prioritise legal preparedness. This thesis has shown that not legally preparing for future disasters is a choice which carries significant consequences. None of these consequences are inevitable when managing large-scale disasters, however they are inevitable when frameworks are not legally prepared in advance. To not legally prepare, is to prepare to fail and thus create a disaster by choice.