On November 14, 2016 an earthquake struck the rural districts of Kaikōura and Hurunui on New Zealand’s South Island. The region—characterized by small dispersed communities, a local economy based on tourism and agriculture, and limited transportation connections—was severely impacted. Following the quake, road and rail networks essential to maintaining steady flows of goods, visitors, and services were extensively damaged, leaving agrifood producers with significant logistical challenges, resulting in reduced productivity and problematic market access. Regional tourism destinations also suffered with changes to the number, characteristics, and travel patterns of visitors. As the region recovers, there is renewed interest in the development and promotion of agrifood tourism and trails as a pathway for enhancing rural resilience, and a growing awareness of the importance of local networks. Drawing on empirical evidence and insights from a range of affected stakeholders, including food producers, tourism operators, and local government, we explore the significance of emerging agrifood tourism initiatives for fostering diversity, enhancing connectivity, and building resilience in the context of rural recovery. We highlight the motivation to diversify distribution channels for agrifood producers, and strengthen the region’s tourism place identity. Enhancing product offerings and establishing better links between different destinations within the region are seen as essential. While such trends are common in rural regions globally, we suggest that stakeholders’ shared experience with the earthquake and its aftermath has opened up new opportunities for regeneration and reimagination, and has influenced current agrifood tourism trajectories. In particular, additional funding for tourism recovery marketing and product development after the earthquake, and an emphasis on greater connectivity between the residents and communities through strengthening rural networks and building social capital within and between regions, is enabling more resilient and sustainable futures.
A pdf transcript of Pamela's second earthquake story, captured by the UC QuakeBox Take 2 project. Interviewer: Joshua Black. Transcriber: Maggie Blackwood.
A pdf transcript of John's second earthquake story, captured by the UC QuakeBox Take 2 project. Interviewer: Samuel Hope. Transcriber: Natalie Looyer.
This study analyses the Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) insurance claims database to investigate the influence of seismic intensity and property damage resulting from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) on the repair costs and claim settlement duration for residential buildings. Firstly, the ratio of building repair cost to its replacement cost was expressed as a Building Loss Ratio (BLR), which was further extended to Regional Loss Ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch by multiplying the average of all building loss ratios with the proportion of building stock that lodged an insurance claim. Secondly, the total time required to settle the claim and the time taken to complete each phase of the claim settlement process were obtained. Based on the database, the regional loss ratio for greater Christchurch for three events producing shakings of intensities 6, 7, and 8 on the modified Mercalli intensity scale were 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, small (less than NZD15,000), medium (between NZD15,000 and NZD100,000), and large (more than NZD100,000) claims took 0.35-0.55, 1.95-2.45, and 3.35-3.85 years to settle regardless of the building’s construction period and earthquake intensities. The number of claims was also disaggregated by various building characteristics to evaluate their relative contribution to the damage and repair costs.
This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
