Risk Management Plan
Articles, UC QuakeStudies
A plan which defines the risk and opportunity management activities to be applied by SCIRT to meet SCIRT objectives. The first version of this plan was produced on 12 September 2011.
A plan which defines the risk and opportunity management activities to be applied by SCIRT to meet SCIRT objectives. The first version of this plan was produced on 12 September 2011.
A document that defines the requirements and objectives of design activities for SCIRT's reconstruction of the city's horizontal infrastructure and describes how these activities should be implemented.
The increase of the world's population located near areas prone to natural disasters has given rise to new ‘mega risks’; the rebuild after disasters will test the governments’ capabilities to provide appropriate responses to protect the people and businesses. During the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes (2010-2012) that destroyed much of the inner city, the government of New Zealand set up a new partnership between the public and private sector to rebuild the city’s infrastructure. The new alliance, called SCIRT, used traditional risk management methods in the many construction projects. And, in hindsight, this was seen as one of the causes for some of the unanticipated problems. This study investigated the risk management practices in the post-disaster recovery to produce a specific risk management model that can be used effectively during future post-disaster situations. The aim was to develop a risk management guideline for more integrated risk management and fill the gap that arises when the traditional risk management framework is used in post-disaster situations. The study used the SCIRT alliance as a case study. The findings of the study are based on time and financial data from 100 rebuild projects, and from surveying and interviewing risk management professionals connected to the infrastructure recovery programme. The study focussed on post-disaster risk management in construction as a whole. It took into consideration the changes that happened to the people, the work and the environment due to the disaster. System thinking, and system dynamics techniques have been used due to the complexity of the recovery and to minimise the effect of unforeseen consequences. Based on an extensive literature review, the following methods were used to produce the model. The analytical hierarchical process and the relative importance index have been used to identify the critical risks inside the recovery project. System theory methods and quantitative graph theory have been used to investigate the dynamics of risks between the different management levels. Qualitative comparative analysis has been used to explore the critical success factors. And finally, causal loop diagrams combined with the grounded theory approach has been used to develop the model itself. The study identified that inexperienced staff, low management competency, poor communication, scope uncertainty, and non-alignment of the timing of strategic decisions with schedule demands, were the key risk factors in recovery projects. Among the critical risk groups, it was found that at a strategic management level, financial risks attracted the highest level of interest, as the client needs to secure funding. At both alliance-management and alliance-execution levels, the safety and environmental risks were given top priority due to a combination of high levels of emotional, reputational and media stresses. Risks arising from a lack of resources combined with the high volume of work and the concern that the cost could go out of control, alongside the aforementioned funding issues encouraged the client to create the recovery alliance model with large reputable construction organisations to lock in the recovery cost, at a time when the scope was still uncertain. This study found that building trust between all parties, clearer communication and a constant interactive flow of information, established a more working environment. Competent and clear allocation of risk management responsibilities, cultural shift, risk prioritisation, and staff training were crucial factors. Finally, the post-disaster risk management (PDRM) model can be described as an integrated risk management model that considers how the changes which happened to the environment, the people and their work, caused them to think differently to ease the complexity of the recovery projects. The model should be used as a guideline for recovery systems, especially after an earthquake, looking in detail at all the attributes and the concepts, which influence the risk management for more effective PDRM. The PDRM model is represented in Causal Loops Diagrams (CLD) in Figure 8.31 and based on 10 principles (Figure 8.32) and 26 concepts (Table 8.1) with its attributes.
A news item titled, "Parks and Reserves Update September 2011", published on the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre's website on Friday, 23 September 2011.
A document which outlines the purpose and processes associated with ECI at SCIRT.
This thesis investigates life-safety risk in earthquakes. The first component of the thesis utilises a dataset of earthquake injuries and deaths from recent earthquakes in New Zealand to identify cause, context, and risk factors of injury and death in the 2011 MW6.3 Christchurch earthquake and 2016 MW7.8 Kaikōura earthquake. Results show that nearly all deaths occurred from being hit by structural elements from buildings, while most injuries were caused by falls, strains and being hit by contents or non-structural elements. Statistical analysis of injured cases compared to an uninjured control group found that age, gender, building damage, shaking intensity, and behaviour during shaking were the most significant risk factors for injury during these earthquakes. The second part of the thesis uses the empirical findings from the first section to develop two tools for managing life-safety risk in earthquakes. The first tool is a casualty estimation model for health system and emergency response planning. An existing casualty model used in New Zealand was validated against observed data from the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and found to underestimate moderate and severe injuries by an order of magnitude. The model was then updated to include human behaviour such as protective actions, falls and strain type injuries that are dependent on shaking intensity, as well as injuries and deaths outside buildings. These improvements resulted in a closer fit to observed casualties for the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The second tool that was developed is a framework to set seismic loading standards for design based on fatality risk targets. The proposed framework extends the risk-targeted hazard method, by moving beyond collapse risk targets, to fatality risk targets for individuals in buildings and societal risk in cities. The framework also includes treatment of epistemic uncertainty in seismic hazard to allow this uncertainty to be used in risk-based decision making. The framework is demonstrated by showing how the current New Zealand loading standards could be revised to achieve uniform life-safety risk across the country and how the introduction of a new loading factor can reduce risk aggregation in cities. Not on Alma, moved and emailed. 1/02/2023 ce
A detailed presentation created in 2011, outlining the approach to the central city rebuild and associated risk management.
An entry from Roz Johnson's blog for 21 December 2011 entitled, "Loving Green".
A video of an address by Dr. Kelvin Berryman, Director of Natural Hazards and Principal Scientist at GNS, at the 2014 Seismics and the City forum. This talk was part of the Building Momentum section, and explored the question, 'What is acceptable risk and tolerable impacts of future hazard events like earthquakes and flooding?'
A plan which describes how SCIRT would manage the risks associated with rebuilding horizontal infrastructure within Christchurch's central city area. The first version of this plan was produced on 24 October 2013.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 8 October 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
Numerous rockfalls released during the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence affected vital road sections for local commuters. We quantified rockfall fatality risk on two main routes by adapting a risk approach for roads originally developed for snow avalanche risk. We present results of the collective and individual fatality risks for traffic flow and waiting traffic. Waiting traffic scenarios particularly address the critical spatial-temporal dynamics of risk, which should be acknowledged in operational risk management. Comparing our results with other risks commonly experienced in New Zealand indicates that local rockfall risk is close to tolerability thresholds and likely exceeds acceptable risk.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 1 October 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 22 September 2011 entitled, "Steady on Stilts".
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 11 June 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
The Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre's "Community Earthquake Update" bulletin, published on Friday 12 August 2011.
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 9 August 2011 entitled, "Sounding the Soil".
The "Lyttelton Harbour Review" newsletter for 5 August 2013, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 19 March 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
<b>New Zealand has experienced several strong earthquakes in its history. While an earthquake cannot be prevented from occurring, planning can reduce its consequences when it does occur. This dissertation research examines various aspects of disaster risk management policy in Aotearoa New Zealand.</b> Chapter 2 develops a method to rank and prioritise high-rise buildings for seismic retrofitting in Wellington, the earthquake-prone capital city of New Zealand. These buildings pose risks to Wellington’s long-term seismic resilience that are of clear concern to current and future policymakers. The prioritization strategy we propose, based on multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) methods, considers a variety of data on each building, including not only its structural characteristics, but also its location, its economic value to the city, and its social importance to the community around it. The study demonstrates how different measures, within four general criteria – life safety, geo-spatial location of the building, its economic role, and its socio-cultural role – can be operationalized into a viable framework for determining retrofitting/demolition policy priorities. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 analyse the Residential Red Zone (RRR) program that was implemented in Christchurch after the 2011 earthquake. In the program, approximately 8,000 homeowners were told that their homes were no longer permittable, and they were bought by the government (through the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority). Chapter 3 examines the subjective wellbeing of the RRR residents (around 16000 people) after they were forced to move. We consider three indicators of subjective wellbeing: quality of life, stress, and emotional wellbeing. We found that demographic factors, health conditions, and the type of government compensation the residents accepted, were all significant determinants of the wellbeing of the Red Zone residents. More social relations, better financial circumstances, and the perception of better government communication were also all associated positively with a higher quality of life, less stress, and higher emotional wellbeing. Chapter 4 concentrates on the impact of this managed retreat program on RRR residents’ income. We use individual-level comprehensive, administrative, panel data from Canterbury, and difference in difference evaluation method to explore the effects of displacement on Red Zone residential residents. We found that compared to non-relocated neighbours, the displaced people experience a significant initial decrease in their wages and salaries, and their total income. The impacts vary with time spent in the Red Zone and when they moved away. Wages and salaries of those who were red-zoned and moved in 2011 were reduced by 8%, and 5.4% for those who moved in 2012. Females faced greater decreases in wages and salaries, and total income, than males. There were no discernible impacts of the relocation on people’s self-employment income.
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 10 March 2011 entitled, "Day 17, 6pm - inside the red zone".
The Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre's "Community Earthquake Update" bulletin, published on Friday 23 September 2011.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 29 October 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
Summary of oral history interview with Janelle Mackie about her experiences of the Canterbury earthquakes.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
An entry from Deb Robertson's blog for 10 February 2012 entitled, "Thinking about February 22....".
The Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre's "Community Earthquake Update" bulletin, published on Friday 22 July 2011.
The Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre's "Community Earthquake Update" bulletin, published on Friday 29 July 2011.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 12 March 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 10 December 2012, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.