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Articles, UC QuakeStudies

A plan which proactively addresses the risk of fraud and lays out the actions that SCIRT will take when any suspected fraud is reported or discovered. The first version of this plan was produced on 12 February 2014.

Articles, UC QuakeStudies

A plan which outlines the function, roles and responsibilities of SCIRT during an emergency event affecting SCIRT construction works. The first version of this plan was produced on 30 April 2012. Note that personal details of key personnel have been removed from this document.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team in Latimer Square. There are members of other emergency management teams in the background including the Tauranga Response Team, the Taupo Response Team, and the New South Wales USAR team.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team and the New Zealand Police standing on the corner of Worcester and Barbadoes Streets. In the background several emergency response vehicles are parked on the street.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Christchurch earthquake there are renewed calls for an inquiry into how Southern Response dealt with Canterbury earthquake claimants. Last year the government set up a support package for those who were short changed by Southern Response for their earthquake repairs. It came after a landmark High Court case found Southern Response misled and deceived Karl and Alison Dodds. Insurance claimants advocate, Ali Jones, says ten years on, lessons haven't been learned from how people were treated by Southern Response. She told RNZ reporter Sally Murphy that dealing with them is hell.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Results from a series of 1D seismic effective stress analyses of natural soil deposits from Christchurch are summarized. The analysed soil columns include sites whose performance during the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes varied significantly, from no liquefaction manifestation at the ground surface to very severe liquefaction, in which case a large area of the site was covered by thick soil ejecta. Key soil profile characteristics and response mechanisms affecting the severity of surface liquefaction manifestation and subsequent damage are explored. The influence of shaking intensity on the triggering and contribution of these mechanisms is also discussed. Careful examination of the results highlights the importance of considering the deposit as a whole, i.e. a system of layers, including interactions between layers in the dynamic response and through pore water pressure redistribution and water flow.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.