Implementing seismic risk mitigation is a major challenge in many earthquake prone regions. The objective of this research is to investigate how property investment market practices can be used to enhance building owners’ decisions to improve seismic performance of earthquake prone buildings (EPBs). A case study method adopted, revealed the impacts of the property market stakeholders’ practices on seismic retrofit decisions. The findings from this research provide significant new insights on how property market-based incentives such as such as mandatory disclosure of seismic risks in all transactions in the property market, effective awareness seismic risk program and a unified earthquake safety assessment information system, can be used to enhance EPBs owners seismic retrofit decisions. These market-based incentives offer compelling reasons for the different property market stakeholders and the public at large to retain, care, invest, and act responsibly to rehabilitate EPBs. The findings suggest need for stakeholders involved in property investment and retrofit decisions to work together to foster seismic rehabilitation of EPBs.
The earthquake swarm that has struck Canterbury, New Zealand from September 2010 has led to widespread destruction and loss of life in the city of Christchurch. In response to this the New Zealand government convened a Royal Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908. The terms of reference for this enquiry were wide ranging, and included inquiry into legal and best-practice requirements for earthquake-prone buildings and associated risk management strategies. The Commission produced a final report on earthquake-prone buildings and recommendations which was made public on the 7th December 2012. Also on the 7th of December 2012 the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) released a Consultation Document that includes many of the recommendations put forward by the Royal Commission. This paper examines the evidence presented to the Royal Commission and reviews their recommendations and those of MBIE in relation to the management of earthquake-prone buildings. An analysis of the likely impacts of the recommendations and proposals on both the property market and society in general is also undertaken.
More than 18 months since the Canterbury earthquakes the rental property shortage continues to worsen, and there are predictions it won't be easing anytime soon.
The housing and mortgage market in Christchurch experienced significant changes since the 2011 earthquake, especially after the reconstruction of the city. The increasing speed of Christchurch average house price exceed the average house price of the whole country, as well as the number of new dwellings. By this regard, this study surveyed the households in Christchurch to analyze the effect of the earthquake on housing and mortgage market. This includes factors such as housing price, interest rate, government policy and socioeconomic factors in terms of age, gender, educational attainment, income, marital status and family life cycle.
Logistic regression model is used to analyze the data. The study provides an overview of the housing market and mortgage market in Christchurch. The logistic regression, results show changes on sensitivity between the socio-economic factors and house purchase, as well as mortgage borrowing pre- and post-earthquake. The result indicates that the earthquake in Christchurch has affected households’ decision on house purchase and mortgage borrowing.
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority says it could step into the property market to stop land prices sky-rocketing but is confident it won't have to.
What are the lessons from the Christchurch earthquakes? The Government was slow in their quake response, but does that mean we should give more property market power to the private sector?
Lincoln University and CBRE, a commercial real estate service provider,
have conducted research to investigate the impacts of the Canterbury
earthquake on the commercial office market in Christchurch. The 22
February 2011 Canterbury earthquake had a devastating impact on
Christchurch property with significant damage caused to land and
buildings. As at January 2012, around 740 buildings have either been
demolished or identified to be demolished in central Christchurch. On
top of this, around 140 buildings have either been partially demolished
or identified to be partially demolished. The broad aims of our research are to (i) examine the nature and extent
of the CBD office relocation, (ii) identify the nature of the occupiers, (iii)
determine occupier’s perceptions of the future: their location and space
needs post the February earthquake, and the likelihood of relocating
back to the CBD after the rebuild, and (iv) find out what occupiers see
as the future of the CBD, and how they want this to look.
A review of the week's news including the aftermath of Auckland's killer Tornado, the pros and cons of the castration of serial sex offenders, the current state of the property market, the RNZAF's first revamped Orion on show, a Penthouse posing teacher's registration is revoked, Rugby World Cup opportunities for NZ business, a heroic ship wreck rescue remembered 80 years on and a true story of 'the show must go on' in the aftermth of the Christchurch earthquake.
A review of the week's news including the aftermath of Auckland's killer Tornado, the pros and cons of the castration of serial sex offenders, the current state of the property market, the RNZAF's first revamped Orion on show, a Penthouse posing teacher's registration is revoked, Rugby World Cup opportunities for NZ business, a heroic ship wreck rescue remembered 80 years on and a true story of 'the show must go on' in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake.
In September 2010 and February 2011, the Canterbury region experienced devastating earthquakes with an estimated economic cost of over NZ$40 billion (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012; Timar et al., 2014; Potter et al., 2015). The insurance market played an important role in rebuilding the Canterbury region after the earthquakes. Homeowners, insurance and reinsurance markets and New Zealand government agencies faced a difficult task to manage the rebuild process. From an empirical and theoretic research viewpoint, the Christchurch disaster calls for an assessment of how the insurance market deals with such disasters in the future. Previous studies have investigated market responses to losses in global catastrophes by focusing on the insurance supply-side. This study investigates both demand-side and supply-side insurance market responses to the Christchurch earthquakes. Despite the fact that New Zealand is prone to seismic activities, there are scant previous studies in the area of earthquake insurance. This study does offer a unique opportunity to examine and document the New Zealand insurance market response to catastrophe risk, providing results critical for understanding market responses after major loss events in general. A review of previous studies shows higher premiums suppress demand, but how higher premiums and a higher probability of risk affect demand is still largely unknown. According to previous studies, the supply of disaster coverage is curtailed unless the market is subsidised, however, there is still unsettled discussion on why demand decreases with time from the previous disaster even when the supply of coverage is subsidised by the government. Natural disaster risks pose a set of challenges for insurance market players because of substantial ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and high spatial correlation of catastrophe losses. Private insurance market inefficiencies due to high premiums and spatially concentrated risks calls for government intervention in the provision of natural disaster insurance to avert situations of noninsurance and underinsurance. Political economy considerations make it more likely for government support to be called for if many people are uninsured than if few people are uninsured. However, emergency assistance for property owners after catastrophe events can encourage most property owners to not buy insurance against natural disaster and develop adverse selection behaviour, generating larger future risks for homeowners and governments. On the demand-side, this study has developed an intertemporal model to examine how demand for insurance changes post-catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. In this intertemporal model, insurance can be sought in two sequential periods of time, and at the second period, it is known whether or not a loss event happened in period one. The results show that period one demand for insurance increases relative to the standard single period model when the second period is taken into consideration, period two insurance demand is higher post-loss, higher than both the period one demand and the period two demand without a period one loss. To investigate policyholders experience from the demand-side perspective, a total of 1600 survey questionnaires were administered, and responses from 254 participants received representing a 16 percent response rate. Survey data was gathered from four institutions in Canterbury and is probably not representative of the entire population. The results of the survey show that the change from full replacement value policy to nominated replacement value policy is a key determinant of the direction of change in the level of insurance coverage after the earthquakes. The earthquakes also highlighted the plight of those who were underinsured, prompting policyholders to update their insurance coverage to reflect the estimated cost of re-building their property. The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature, such as those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report increased risk perception if a similar event happens in future with females reporting a higher risk perception than males. Of the demographic variables, only gender has a relationship with changes in household cover. On the supply-side, this study has built a risk-based pricing model suitable to generate a competitive premium rate for natural disaster insurance cover. Using illustrative data from the Christchurch Red-zone suburbs, the model generates competitive premium rates for catastrophe risk. When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-definition New Zealand Earthquake Model, for example, insurers can find the model useful to identify losses at a granular level so as to calculate the competitive premium. This study observes that the key to the success of the New Zealand dual insurance system despite the high prevalence of catastrophe losses are; firstly the EQC’s flat-rate pricing structure keeps private insurance premiums affordable and very high nationwide homeowner take-up rates of natural disaster insurance. Secondly, private insurers and the EQC have an elaborate reinsurance arrangement in place. By efficiently transferring risk to the reinsurer, the cost of writing primary insurance is considerably reduced ultimately expanding primary insurance capacity and supply of insurance coverage.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes. The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world. In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison. The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs. After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices. Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.
Cartoons about political and social issues in New Zealand and overseas.
The cartoon has the words 'Tsunami Warning cancelled' in the centre. Above are the words 'The end is nigh... insurance running out! No more cover!' Below the word 'cancelled' are the words 'We have reinsurance!' Context - Civil Defence has cancelled a tsunami warning after a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck off the Kermadec Islands this morning (7 July 2011) The tsunami image is used to illustrate the problems that could arise from lack of insurance in Christchurch. When their policies run out on 30 June Earthquake-hit Christchurch and Waimakariri councils are in danger of having no property insurance because as the CEO of Civic Assurance, which insures most councils, says, 'the company cannot buy reinsurance'. There was also a potential problem for home-owners when AMI Insurance, the largest insurer of homes in Christchurch, was threatening insolvency. However, AMI has announced that it has re-insurance cover for earthquakes and other natural disasters from tomorrow (1 July 2011) for the next year. The Government feared AMI Insurance's directors would wind up the company affecting a huge section of New Zealand's insurance market and derail the reconstruction of Christchurch, official documents confirm. AMI said it had doubled its cover for the year to June 2012 after three large quakes in the year to June 2011. (Stuff 30 June 2011)
Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
Lincoln University was commissioned by the Avon-Otakaro Network (AvON) to estimate the value of the benefits of a ‘recreation reserve’ or ‘river park’ in the Avon River Residential Red Zone (ARRRZ). This research has demonstrated significant public desire and support for the development of a recreation reserve in the Avon River Residential Red Zone. Support is strongest for a unique natural environment with native fauna and flora, healthy wetlands and rivers, and recreational opportunities that align with this vision, such as walking, cycling and water-based sporting and leisure activities. The research also showed support for a reserve that promotes and enables community interaction and wellbeing, and is evident in respondents’ desires for community gardens, regular festivals and markets, and the physical linking of the CBD with eastern suburbs through a green corridor. There is less support for children’s playgrounds, sports fields or open grassed areas, all of which could be considered as more typical of an urban park development. Benefits (willing to pay) to Christchurch residents (excluding tourists) of a recreation reserve could be as high as $35 million each year.
Savings to public health costs could be as high as $50.3 million each year. The incorporation or restoration of various ecosystems services, including water quality improvements, flood mitigation and storm water management could yield a further $8.8 million ($19, 600) per hectare/year at 450 ha).
Combined annual benefits of a recreational reserve in the ARRRZ are approximately $94.1 million per annum but this figure does not include potentially significant benefits from, for example, tourism, property equity gains in areas adjacent to the reserve, or the effects of economic rejuvenation in the East.
Although we were not able to provide costing estimates for park attributes, this study does make available the value of benefits, which can be used as a guide to the scope of expenditure on development of each park attribute.
Questions to Ministers
1. CHRIS AUCHINVOLE to the Minister of Commerce: What legislative and regulatory steps has he taken to help restore investor confidence in the financial markets?
2. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: Does she stand by her reported statement that it would be pre-emptive to rule anything out because the Government was still working its way through extensive recommendations by the Welfare Working Group?
3. TE URUROA FLAVELL to the Minister of Transport: Ka aha ia ki te whakapaipai ake i te āhua o ngā rori i te tuawhenua, he hapori Māori nei te nuinga o ngā tāngata ki reira, ā, e kiia nei e ētahi, he pērā aua rori ki ngā mea o ngā ao pōhara rawa atu?
* Translation: What will he do to improve the conditions of roads in rural, predominately Māori communities, some of which have been described as of third world status?
4. Hon TREVOR MALLARD to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his answer to Oral Question No 1 yesterday in relation to unemployed 15 to 19-year-olds, "If we look at the household labour force survey, we see that there are 26,700 people in the 15 to 19-year-old category"?
5. TIM MACINDOE to the Minister of Health: What progress are district health boards making in providing faster cancer radiation treatment for patients?
6. GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister of Health: Are district health boards being funded sufficiently to maintain the level of services they provided in 2010/11?
7. KEVIN HAGUE to the Minister of Labour: When will the new chief inspector for mining and additional inspectors in the planned High Hazards Unit become operational?
8. CHARLES CHAUVEL to the Minister of Justice: Does he agree with the Chief Justice that the scheme for disclosure by the defence in criminal cases contained in the Criminal Procedure (Reform and Modernisation) Bill is "inconsistent with the defendant's right to have the prosecution prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" and with the late Chief District Court Judge that punishment at sentencing for procedural non-compliance "is conceptually incoherent and therefore arbitrary"?
9. Hon TAU HENARE to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: What is the Government doing to help teen parents get ahead?
10. Hon LIANNE DALZIEL to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: How many letters of offer from the Crown will be sent to insured residential red zone property owners this week?
11. NIKKI KAYE to the Minister of Internal Affairs: What announcements has he made today on improving flexibility for community groups receiving grants from gaming societies?
12. DARIEN FENTON to the Minister of Labour: Does she stand by her statement about making changes to mine safety that "until the royal commission of inquiry makes its findings, we will wait accordingly"?
The major earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought to an abrupt end a process of adaptive reuse, revitalisation and gentrification that was underway in the early 20th century laneways and buildings located in the south eastern corner of the Christchurch Central Business District. Up until then, this location was seen as an exemplar of how mixed use could contribute to making the central city an attractive and viable alternative to the suburban living experience predominant in New Zealand.
This thesis is the result of a comprehensive case study of this “Lichfield Lanes” area, which involved in depth interviews with business owners, observation of public meetings and examination of documents and the revitalisation research literature. Findings were that many of the factors seen to make this location successful pre-earthquakes mirror the results of similar research in other cities. These factors include: the importance of building upon historic architecture and the eclectic spaces this creates; a wide variety of uses generating street life; affordable rental levels; plus the dangers of uniformity of use brought about by focussing on business types that pay the most rent. Also critical is co-operation between businesses to create and effectively market and manage an identifiable precinct that has a coherent style and ambience that differentiates the location from competing suburban malls. In relation to the latter, a significant finding of this project was that the hospitality and retail businesses key to the success of Lichfield Lanes were not typical and could be described as quirky, bohemian, chaotic, relatively low rent, owner operated and appealing to the economically important “Creative Class” identified by Richard Florida (2002) and others. In turn, success for many of these businesses can be characterised as including psychological and social returns rather than simply conventional economic benefits. This has important implications for inner city revitalisation, as it contrasts with the traditional focus of local authorities and property developers on physical aspects and tenant profitability as measures of success. This leads on to an important conclusion from this research, which is that an almost completely inverted strategy from that applied to suburban mall development, may be most appropriate for successful inner city revitalisation. It also highlights a disconnection between the focus and processes of regulatory authorities and the outcomes and processes most acceptable to the people likely to frequent the central city. Developers are often caught in the middle of this conflicted situation. Another finding was early commitment by businesses to rebuild the case study area in the same style, but over time this waned as delay, demolition, insurance problems, political and planning uncertainty plus other issues made participation by the original owners and tenants impossible or uneconomic. In conclusion, the focus of inner city revitalisation is too often on buildings rather than the people that use them and what they now desire from the central city.
