Roz Johnson's Blog 05/08/2013: Colourful Canterbury Brewery Building Going
Articles, UC QuakeStudies
An entry from Roz Johnson's blog for 5 August 2013 entitled, "Colourful Canterbury Brewery Building Going".
An entry from Roz Johnson's blog for 5 August 2013 entitled, "Colourful Canterbury Brewery Building Going".
An entry from Roz Johnson's blog for 19 January 2013 entitled, "New Home".
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 3 June 2013 entitled, "Barbadoes Bedsits?".
The earthquake swarm that has struck Canterbury, New Zealand from September 2010 has led to widespread destruction and loss of life in the city of Christchurch. In response to this the New Zealand government convened a Royal Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908. The terms of reference for this enquiry were wide ranging, and included inquiry into legal and best-practice requirements for earthquake-prone buildings and associated risk management strategies. The Commission produced a final report on earthquake-prone buildings and recommendations which was made public on the 7th December 2012. Also on the 7th of December 2012 the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) released a Consultation Document that includes many of the recommendations put forward by the Royal Commission. This paper examines the evidence presented to the Royal Commission and reviews their recommendations and those of MBIE in relation to the management of earthquake-prone buildings. An analysis of the likely impacts of the recommendations and proposals on both the property market and society in general is also undertaken.
Christchurch and Canterbury suffered significant housing losses due to the earthquakes. Estimates from the Earthquake Commission (EQC) (2011) suggest that over 150,000 homes (around three quarters of Christchurch housing stock) sustained damage from the earthquakes. Some areas of Christchurch have been declared not suitable for rebuilding, affecting more than 7,500 residential properties.
The Canterbury earthquakes, which started with the 7.1 magnitude event on September 4, 2010, caused significant damage in the region. The September 4 earthquakes brought substantial damage to land, buildings, and infrastructure, while the 6.3 magnitude earthquake on February 22, 2011 (and its subsequent aftershocks), brought even greater property damage, but also significant loss of life in addition to the region. Thousands were injured, and 185 persons died. A national State of Emergency was declared and remained in effect until April 30, 2011. A significant number of people required immediate assistance and support to deal with loss, injury, trauma experiences, and property damages. Many had to find alternate accommodation as their houses were too damaged to stay in. Of those affected, many were already vulnerable, and others had been too traumatized by the events to effectively deal with the challenges they were faced with. A number of human service organizations in the region, from both government and non-government sectors, joined forces to be able to more effectively and efficiently help those in need. This was the start of what would become known as the Earthquake Support Coordination Service. The aim of this report is to present an evaluation of the Earthquake Support Coordination Service and its collaborative organization, based on documentation and interviews with key stakeholders of the service. The aim is also to evaluate the service based on perspectives gathered among the clients as well as the coordinators working in the service. The final aim is to offer a reflection on the service model, and on what factors enabled the service, as well as recommendations regarding aspects of the service which may require review, and aspects which may be useful in other contexts.
The Mѡ=7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake struck on 4 September 2010, approximately 45 km west of Christchurch, New Zealand. It revealed a previously unknown fault (the Greendale fault) and caused billions of dollars of damage due to high peak ground velocities and extensive liquefaction. It also triggered the Mw=6.3 Christchurch earthquake on 22 February 2011, which caused further damage and the loss of 185 lives. The objective of this research was to determine the relationship between stress and seismic properties in a seismically active region using manually-picked P and S wave arrival times from the aftershock sequence between 8 September 2010-13 January 2011 to estimate shear-wave splitting (SWS) parameters, VP =VS-ratios, anisotropy (delay-time tomography), focal mechanisms, and tectonic stress on the Canterbury plains. The maximum horizontal stress direction was highly consistent in the plains, with an average value of SHmax=116 18 . However, the estimates showed variation in SHmax near the fault, with one estimate rotating by as much as 30° counter-clockwise. This suggests heterogeneity of stress at the fault, though the cause remains unclear. Orientations of the principal stresses predominantly indicate a strike-slip regime, but there are possible thrust regimes to the west and north/east of the fault. The SWS fast directions (ø) on the plains show alignment with SHmax at the majority of stations, indicating stress controlled anisotropy. However, structural effects appear more dominant in the neighbouring regions of the Southern Alps and Banks Peninsula.
DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all his statements? TODD McCLAY to the Minister of Finance: What progress is the Government making in its share offer programme to reduce debt and free up capital for priority spending? Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS to the Prime Minister: Does he believe that he has met the requirements of the Cabinet Manual to behave in a way that upholds, and is seen to uphold, the highest ethical standards in his ministerial capacity, his political capacity and his personal capacity; if so, why? Hon PHIL HEATLEY to the Minister for Social Development: What reports has she received on the latest benefit figures? Hon DAVID PARKER to the Minister of Finance: Will the recent rise in the New Zealand dollar to a post-float high on the Trade Weighted Index cause job losses among non-primary exporters and import substitution businesses? JULIE ANNE GENTER to the Minister of Finance: Does he have a plan to fund the Auckland City rail link in the upcoming Budget given that public backing for the rail project is more than twice as strong as the Government's proposed new motorway north from Puhoi? Dr JIAN YANG to the Minister for Economic Development: How is the Government recognising the importance of China for New Zealand's trade, education and tourism sectors? Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for State Owned Enterprises: What responsibility, if any, does he take for Solid Energy's precarious financial position? NICKY WAGNER to the Minister of Housing: How will the $320 million settlement of Housing New Zealand's insurance claim for earthquake damaged properties help achieve the Government's priority of rebuilding Christchurch? GRANT ROBERTSON to the Prime Minister: What role, if any, did he play in recommending the appointment of Ian Fletcher as Director of the Government Communications Security Bureau? MIKE SABIN to the Associate Minister of Social Development: What early results can he report from the Government's efforts to deal with welfare fraud? GARETH HUGHES to the Minister of Energy and Resources: Will he recommend returning the Crown Minerals Amendment Bill to the select committee so that the public can have a say on the so-called "Anadarko Amendment"; if not, why not?
The city of Ōtautahi/Christchurch experienced a series of earthquakes that began on September 4th, 2010. The most damaging event occurred on February 22nd, 2011 but significant earthquakes also occurred on June 13th and December 23rd with aftershocks still occurring well into 2012. The resulting disaster is the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history with 185 deaths. During 2011 the Canterbury earthquakes were one of the costliest disasters worldwide with an expected cost of up to $NZ30 billion. Hundreds of commercial buildings and thousands of houses have been destroyed or are to be demolished and extensive repairs are needed for infrastructure to over 100,000 homes. As many as 8,900 people simply abandoned their homes and left the city in the first few months after the February event (Newell, 2012), and as many as 50,000 may leave during 2012. In particular, young whānau and single young women comprised a disproportionate number of these migrants, with evidence of a general movement to the North Island. Te Puni Kōkiri sought a mix of quantitative and qualitative research to examine the social and economic impacts of the Christchurch earthquakes on Māori and their whānau. The result of this work will be a collection of evidence to inform policy to support and assist Māori and their whānau during the recovery/rebuild phases. To that end, this report triangulates available statistical and geographical information with qualitative data gathered over 2010 and 2011 by a series of interviews conducted with Māori who experienced the dramatic events associated with the earthquakes. A Māori research team at Lincoln University was commissioned to undertake the research as they were already engaged in transdisciplinary research (began in the May 2010), that focused on quickly gathering data from a range of Māori who experienced the disaster, including relevant economic, environmental, social and cultural factors in the response and recovery of Māori to these events. Participants for the qualitative research were drawn from Māori whānau who both stayed and left the city. Further data was available from ongoing projects and networks that the Lincoln research team was already involved in, including interviews with Māori first responders and managers operating in the CBD on the day of the February event. Some limited data is also available from younger members of affected whānau. Māori in Ōtautahi/Christchurch City have exhibited their own culturally-attuned collective responses to the disaster. However, it is difficult to ascertain Māori demographic changes due to a lack of robust statistical frameworks but Māori outward migration from the city is estimated to range between 560 and 1,100 people. The mobility displayed by Māori demonstrates an important but unquantified response by whānau to this disaster, with emigration to Australia presenting an attractive option for young Māori, an entrenched phenomenon that correlates to cyclical downturns and the long-term decline of the New Zealand economy. It is estimated that at least 315 Māori have emigrated from the Canterbury region to Australia post-quake, although the disaster itself may be only one of a series of events that has prompted such a decision. Māori children made up more than one in four of the net loss of children aged 6 to 15 years enrolled in schools in Greater Christchurch over the year to June 2011. Research literature identifies depression affecting a small but significant number of children one to two years post-disaster and points to increasing clinical and organisational demands for Māori and other residents of the city. For those residents in the eastern or coastal suburbs – home to many of the city’s Māori population - severe damage to housing, schools, shops, infrastructure, and streets has meant disruption to their lives, children’s schooling, employment, and community functioning. Ongoing abandonment of homes by many has meant a growing sense of unease and loss of security, exacerbated by arson, burglaries, increased drinking, a stalled local and national economy, and general confusion about the city’s future. Māori cultural resilience has enabled a considerable network of people, institutions, and resources being available to Māori , most noticeably through marae and their integral roles of housing, as a coordinating hub, and their arguing for the wider affected communities of Christchurch. Relevant disaster responses need to be discussed within whānau, kōhanga, kura, businesses, communities, and wider neighbourhoods. Comprehensive disaster management plans need to be drafted for all iwi in collaboration with central government, regional, and city or town councils. Overall, Māori are remarkably philosophical about the effects of the disaster, with many proudly relishing their roles in what is clearly a historic event of great significance to the city and country. Most believe that ‘being Māori’ has helped cope with the disaster, although for some this draws on a collective history of poverty and marginalisation, features that contribute to the vulnerability of Māori to such events. While the recovery and rebuild phases offer considerable options for Māori and iwi, with Ngāi Tahu set to play an important stakeholder in infrastructural, residential, and commercial developments, some risk and considerable unknowns are evident. Considerable numbers of Māori may migrate into the Canterbury region for employment in the rebuild, and trades training strategies have already been established. With many iwi now increasingly investing in property, the risks from significant earthquakes are now more transparent, not least to insurers and the reinsurance sector. Iwi authorities need to be appraised of insurance issues and ensure sufficient coverage exists and investments and developments are undertaken with a clear understanding of the risks from natural hazards and exposure to future disasters.
The Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010-2011, in particular the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake and the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, produced severe and widespread liquefaction in Christchurch and surrounding areas. The scale of the liquefaction was unprecedented, and caused extensive damage to a variety of man-made structures, including residential houses. Around 20,000 residential houses suffered serious damage as a direct result of the effects of liquefaction, and this resulted in approximately 7000 houses in the worst-hit areas being abandoned. Despite the good performance of light timber-framed houses under the inertial loads of the earthquake, these structures could not withstand the large loads and deformations associated with liquefaction, resulting in significant damage. The key structural component of houses subjected to liquefaction effects was found to be their foundations, as these are in direct contact with the ground. The performance of house foundations directly influenced the performance of the structure as a whole. Because of this, and due to the lack of research in this area, it was decided to investigate the performance of houses and in particular their foundations when subjected to the effects of liquefaction. The data from the inspections of approximately 500 houses conducted by a University of Canterbury summer research team following the 4th September 2010 earthquake in the worst-hit areas of Christchurch were analysed to determine the general performance of residential houses when subjected to high liquefaction loads. This was followed by the detailed inspection of around 170 houses with four different foundation types common to Christchurch and New Zealand: Concrete perimeter with short piers constructed to NZS3604, concrete slab-on-grade also to NZS3604, RibRaft slabs designed by Firth Industries and driven pile foundations. With a focus on foundations, floor levels and slopes were measured, and the damage to all areas of the house and property were recorded. Seven invasive inspections were also conducted on houses being demolished, to examine in more detail the deformation modes and the causes of damage in severely affected houses. The simplified modelling of concrete perimeter sections subjected to a variety of liquefaction-related scenarios was also performed, to examine the comparative performance of foundations built in different periods, and the loads generated under various bearing loss and lateral spreading cases. It was found that the level of foundation damage is directly related to the level of liquefaction experienced, and that foundation damage and liquefaction severity in turn influence the performance of the superstructure. Concrete perimeter foundations were found to have performed most poorly, suffering high local floor slopes and being likely to require foundation repairs even when liquefaction was low enough that no surface ejecta was seen. This was due to their weak, flexible foundation structure, which cannot withstand liquefaction loads without deforming. The vulnerability of concrete perimeter foundations was confirmed through modelling. Slab-on-grade foundations performed better, and were unlikely to require repairs at low levels of liquefaction. Ribraft and piled foundations performed the best, with repairs unlikely up to moderate levels of liquefaction. However, all foundation types were susceptible to significant damage at higher levels of liquefaction, with maximum differential settlements of 474mm, 202mm, 182mm and 250mm found for concrete perimeter, slab-on-grade, ribraft and piled foundations respectively when subjected to significant lateral spreading, the most severe loading scenario caused by liquefaction. It was found through the analysis of the data that the type of exterior wall cladding, either heavy or light, and the number of storeys, did not affect the performance of foundations. This was also shown through modelling for concrete perimeter foundations, and is due to the increased foundation strengths provided for heavily cladded and two-storey houses. Heavy roof claddings were found to increase the demands on foundations, worsening their performance. Pre-1930 concrete perimeter foundations were also found to be very vulnerable to damage under liquefaction loads, due to their weak and brittle construction.