The increase in urban population has required cities to rethink their strategies for minimising greenhouse gas impacts and adapting to climate change. While urban design and planning policy have been guided by principles such as walkability (to reduce the dependence on cars) and green infrastructure (to enhance the quality of open spaces to support conservation and human values), there have been conflicting views on what spatial strategies will best prepare cities for a challenging future. Researchers supporting compact cities based upon public Transit Oriented Development have claimed that walkability, higher density and mixed-uses make cities more sustainable (Owen, 2009) and that, while green spaces in cities are necessary, they are dull in comparison with shopfronts and street vendors (Speck, 2012, p 250). Other researchers claim that green infrastructure is fundamental to improving urban sustainability and attracting public space users with improved urban comfort, consequently encouraging walkability (Pitman and Ely, 2013). Landscape architects tend to assume that ‘the greener the better’; however, the efficiency of urban greenery in relation to urban comfort and urbanity depends on its density, distribution and the services provided. Green infrastructure can take many forms (from urban forests to street trees) and provide varied services (amended microclimate, aesthetics, ecology and so forth). In this paper, we evaluate the relevance of current policy in Christchurch regarding both best practice in green infrastructure and urban comfort (Tavares, 2015). We focus on the Christchurch Blueprint for rebuilding the central city, and critically examine the post-earthquake paths the city is following regarding its green and grey infrastructures and the resulting urban environment. We discuss the performance and appropriateness of the current Blueprint in post-earthquake Christchurch, particularly as it relates to the challenges that climate change is creating for cities worldwide.
The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage during the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch Central Business District, left this community with more than $NZD 40 billion in losses (~20 % GDP), demolition of approximately 60 % of multi-storey concrete buildings (3 storeys and up), and closure of the core business district for over 2 years. The aftermath of the earthquake sequence has revealed unique issues and complexities for the owners of commercial and multi-storey residential buildings in relation to unexpected technical, legal, and financial challenges when making decisions regarding the future of their buildings impacted by the earthquakes. The paper presents a framework to understand the factors influencing post-earthquake decisions (repair or demolish) on multi-storey concrete buildings in Christchurch. The study, conducted in 2014, includes in-depth investigations on 15 case-study buildings using 27 semi-structured interviews with various property owners, property managers, insurers, engineers, and government authorities in New Zealand. The interviews revealed insights regarding the multitude of factors influencing post-earthquake decisions and losses. As expected, the level of damage and repairability (cost to repair) generally dictated the course of action. There is strong evidence, however, that other variables have significantly influenced the decision on a number of buildings, such as insurance, business strategies, perception of risks, building regulations (and compliance costs), and government decisions. The decision-making process for each building is complex and unique, not solely driven by structural damage. Furthermore, the findings have put the spotlight on insurance policy wordings and the paradoxical effect of insurance on the recovery of Christchurch, leading to other challenges and issues going forward.
We examine the role of business interruption (BI) insurance in business recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 2011. First, we ask whether BI insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the immediate (3-6 months) aftermath of a disaster. We find positive but statistically insignificant evidence that those firms that had incurred damage, but were covered by BI insurance, had higher likelihood of survival post-quake compared with those firms that did not have any insurance. For the medium-term (2-3 years) survival of firms, our results show a more explicit role for insurance. Firms with BI insurance experience increased productivity and improved performance following a catastrophe. Furthermore, we find that those organisations that receive prompt and full payments of their claims have a better recovery than those that had protracted or inadequate claims payments, but this difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. We find no statistically significant evidence that the latter group (inadequate payment) did any better than those organisations that had damage but no insurance coverage. In general, our analysis indicates the importance not only of adequate insurance coverage, but also of an insurance system that delivers prompt claim payments.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in 'The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice'. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-017-0067-y. The following terms of use apply: https://www.springer.com/gp/open-access/publication-policies/aam-terms-of-use.
