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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Following the 22nd February 2011, Mw 6.2 earthquake located along a previously unknown fault beneath the Port Hills of Christchurch, surface cracking was identified in contour parallel locations within fill material at Quarry Road on the lower slopes of Mount Pleasant. GNS Science, in the role of advisor to the Christchurch City Council, concluded that these cracks were a part of a potential rotational mass movement (named zone 11A) within the fill and airfall loess material present. However, a lack of field evidence for slope instability and an absence of laboratory geotechnical data on which slope stability analysis was based, suggested this conclusion is potentially incorrect. It was hypothesised that ground cracking was in fact due to earthquake shaking, and not mass movement within the slope, thus forming the basis of this study. Three soil units were identified during surface and subsurface investigations at Quarry Road: fill derived from quarry operations in the adjacent St. Andrews Quarry (between 1893 and 1913), a buried topsoil, and underlying in-situ airfall loess. The fill material was identified by the presence of organic-rich topsoil “clods” that were irregular in both size (∼10 – 200 mm) and shape, with variable thicknesses of 1 – 10 m. Maximum thickness, as indicated by drill holes and geophysical survey lines, was identified below 6 Quarry Road and 7 The Brae where it is thought to infill a pre-existing gully formed in the underlying airfall loess. Bearing strength of the fill consistently exceeded 300 kPa ultimate below ∼500 mm depth. The buried topsoil was 200 – 300 mm thick, and normally displayed a lower bearing strength when encountered, but not below 300 kPa ultimate (3 – 11 blows per 100mm or ≥100 kPa allowable). In-situ airfall loess stood vertically in outcrop due to its characteristic high dry strength and also showed Scala penetrometer values of 6 – 20+ blows per 100 mm (450 – ≥1000 kPa ultimate). All soils were described as being moist to dry during subsurface investigations, with no groundwater table identified during any investigation into volcanic bedrock. In-situ moisture contents were established using bulk disturbed samples from hand augers and test pitting. Average moisture contents were low at 9% within the fill, 11 % within the buried topsoil, and 8% within the airfall loess: all were below the associated average plastic limit of 17, 15, and 16, respectively, determined during Atterberg limit analysis. Particle size distributions, identified using the sieve and pipette method, were similar between the three soil units with 11 – 20 % clay, 62 – 78 % silt, and 11 – 20 % fine sand. Using these results and the NZGS soil classification, the loess derived fill and in-situ airfall loess are termed SILT with some clay and sand, and the buried topsoil is SILT with minor clay and sand. Dispersivity of the units was found using the Emerson crumb test, which established that the fill can be non- to completely dispersive (score 0 – 4). The buried topsoil was always non-dispersive (score 0), and airfall loess completely dispersive (score 4). Values for cohesion (c) and internal friction angle (φ) of the three soil units were established using the direct shear box at field moisture contents. Results showed all soil units had high shear strengths at the moisture contents tested (c = 18 – 24 kPa and φ = 42 – 50°), with samples behaving in a brittle fashion. Moisture content was artificially increased to 16% within the buried topsoil, which reduced the shear strength (c = 10 kPa, φ = 18°) and allowed it to behave plastically. Observational information indicating stability at Quarry Road included: shallow, discontinuous, cracks that do not display vertical offset; no scarp features or compressional zones typical of landsliding; no tilted or deformed structures; no movement in inclinometers; no basal shear zone identified in logged core to 20 m depth; low field moisture contents; no groundwater table; and high soil strength using Scala penetrometers. Limit equilibrium analysis of the slope was conducted using Rocscience software Slide 5.0 to verify the slope stability identified by observational methods. Friction, cohesion, and density values determined during laboratory were input into the two slope models investigated. Results gave minimum static factor of safety values for translational (along buried topsoil) and rotational (in the fill) slides of 2.4 – 4.2. Sensitivity of the slope to reduced shear strength parameters was analysed using c = 10 kPa and φ = 18° for the translational buried topsoil plane, and a cohesion of 0 kPa within the fill for the rotational plane. The only situation that gave a factor of safety <1.0 was in nonengineered fill at 0.5 m depth. Pseudostatic analysis based on previous peak ground acceleration (PGA) values for the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and predicted PGAs for future Alpine Fault and Hope Fault earthquakes established minimum factor of safety values between 1.2 and 3.3. Yield acceleration PGAs were computed to be between 0.8g and 1.6g. Based on all information gathered, the cracking at Quarry Road is considered to be shallow deformation in response to earthquake shaking, and not due to deep-seated landsliding. It is recommended that the currently bare site be managed by smoothing the land, installing contour drainage, and bioremediation of the surface soils to reduce surface water infiltration and runoff. Extensive earthworks, including removal of the fill, are considered unnecessary. Any future replacement of housing would be subject to site-specific investigations, and careful foundation design based on those results.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This project was initiated by ENGEO Limited and KiwiRail Holdings Limited to assess the stability of Slovens Creek Viaduct (specifically its western abutment) and a 3km section of rail corridor between Slovens Creek Viaduct and Avoca on the Midland Line (MDL). Commonly known as the scenic TranzAlpine rail journey (through Arthurs Pass National Park) the MDL connects Greymouth to Christchurch via Rolleston, where the MDL meets the Main South Line into Christchurch. The project area is approximately 40km southeast of Arthurs Pass Township, in the eastern extension of the Castle Hill Basin which is part of the Waimakariri Catchment and Canterbury Foothills. The field area is underlain by Rakaia Terrane, which is part of the Torlesse Composite Terrane forming the basement rock unit for the field area. Cretaceous-Tertiary rocks of the Castle Hill Basin overlie the basement strata and record a transgression-regression sequence, as well as mid-Oligocene submarine volcanism. The stratigraphic sequence in the Castle Hill Basin, and its eastern extension to Avoca, comprises two formations of the Eyre group, the older Broken River Formation and the younger Iron Creek Formation. Deep marine Porter Group limestones, marls, and tuffs of Oligocene age succeed the Iron Creek Formation of the Eyre Group, and probably records the maximum of the transgression. The Enys Formation lies disconformably on the Porter Group and is overlain unconformably by Late Pleistocene glacifluvial and glacial deposits. The Tertiary strata in the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are weak, and the clay-rich tuff derived from mid-Oligocene volcanism is particularly prone to slaking. Extensive mapping carried out for this project has identified that some 90 percent of the surface along the length of the Slovens-Avoca corridor has been subject to mass movement. The landslides of the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are clearly younger than the Last Glaciation, and Slovens Creek has been downcutting, with associated faulting and uplift, to form the present day geomorphology of the rail corridor. Deep-seated landslides in the rail corridor extend to Slovens Creek, locally deflecting the stream course, and a generic ground failure model for the rail corridor has been developed. Exploratory geotechnical investigations, including core drilling, installation of an inclinometer and a piezometer, enabled the construction of a simple ground model and cross section for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment. Limit-equilibrium and pseudo-static slope stability analyses using both circular and block critical slip surface search methods were applied to the ground model for the western abutment of Slovens Creek Viaduct. Piezometric and strength data obtained during laboratory testing of core material have been used to constrain the western abutment stability assessment for one representative section line (C-C’). Prior to pseudo-static sensitivity analyses peak ground acceleration (PGA) for various Ultimate Limit State (ULS) design return periods, defined by an equation given in NZS1170.5:2004, were calculated and have been used as a calibration technique to find and compare specific PGA values for pseudo-static analyses in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area. The main purpose has been to provide an indication of how railway infrastructure could be affected by seismic events of various return periods defined by ULS design standards for the area. Limit equilibrium circular slip surface search methods, both grid search and auto refine search, indicated the slope is stable with a FoS greater than 1.0 returned from each, although one particular surface returned the lowest FoS in each. This surface is in the lower portion of the slope, adjacent to Slovens Stream and northeast of the MDL. As expected, pseudo-static analyses returned a lower FoS overall when compared to limit equilibrium analyses. The PGA analyses suggest that partial ground failure at the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment could occur in a 1 in 25-year return period event within materials on the slower slope beyond the immediate rail corridor. A ULS (1 in 500-year) event in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area would likely produce a PGA of ~0.9g, and the effects on the western abutment and rail infrastructure would most likely be catastrophic. Observed ground conditions for the western abutment of the Slovens Creek Viaduct suggest there is no movement within the landslide at depth within the monitoring timeframe of this project (22 May 2015 – 4 August 2015). Slope stability monitoring is recommended to be continued in two parts: (1) the inclinometer in BH1 is to be monitored on a six monthly basis for one year following completion of this thesis, and then annually unless ground movements become evident; and (2) surface movement monitoring should be installed using a fixed datum on the stable eastern abutment. Long-term stability management strategies for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment are dependent upon future observed changes and ongoing monitoring. Hazard and risk assessment using the KiwiRail Qualitative Risk Assessment Framework (QRA) is recommended, and if slope stability becomes problematic for operation of the Midland Line consideration should be given to deep slope drainage. In the event of a large magnitude or high PGA earthquake all monitoring should be reviewed.