Tsunami have the potential to cause significant disruptions to society, including damage to infrastructure, critical to the every-day operation of society. Effective risk management is required to reduce the potential tsunami impacts to them. Christchurch city, situated on the eastern coast of New Zealand’s South Island, is exposed to a number of far-field tsunami hazards. Although the tsunami hazard has been well identified for Christchurch city infrastructure, the likely impacts have not been well constrained. To support effective risk management a credible and realistic infrastructure impact model is required to inform risk management planning. The objectives of this thesis are to assess the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure from a credible, hypothetical far-field tsunami scenario. To achieve this an impact assessment process is adopted, using tsunami hazard and exposure measures to determine asset vulnerability and subsequent impacts. However, the thesis identified a number of knowledge gaps in infrastructure vulnerability to tsunami. The thesis addresses this by using two approaches: a tsunami damage matrix; and the development of tsunami fragility functions. The tsunami damage matrix pools together tsunami impacts on infrastructure literature, and post-event field observations. It represents the most comprehensive ‘look-up’ resource for tsunami impacts to infrastructure to date. This damage matrix can inform the assessment of tsunami impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure by providing a measure of damage likelihood at various hazard intensities. A more robust approach to tsunami vulnerability of infrastructure are fragility functions, which are also developed in this thesis. These were based on post-event tsunami surveys of the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami in Japan. The fragility functions are limited to road and bridge infrastructure, but represent the highest resolution measure of vulnerability for the given assets. As well as providing a measure of damage likelihood for a given tsunami hazard intensity, these also indicate a level of asset damage. The impact assessment process, and synthesized vulnerability measures, are used to run tsunami impact models for Christchurch infrastructure to determine the probability of asset damage occurring and to determine if impact will reach or exceed a given damage state. The models suggest that infrastructure damage is likely to occur in areas exposed to tsunami inundation in this scenario, with significant damage identified for low elevation roads and bridges. The results are presented and discussed in the context of the risk management framework, with emphasis on using risk assessment to inform risk treatment, monitoring and review. In summary, this thesis A) advances tsunami vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies for infrastructure and B) provides a tsunami impact assessment framework for Christchurch city infrastructure which will inform infrastructure tsunami risk management for planners, emergency managers and lifelines groups.
Christchurch City Council abandons plan to sell its City Care maintenance bid as part of its plan to raise $600 million to repair infrastructure damaged by earthquakes.
A video of a presentation by Haydn Read, Programme Director of Smart City Coalition, at the 2016 Seismics in the City Conference. The presentation is titled, "Smart City/Choice City".The abstract for the presentation reads, "'We want to get to the point where people can get amazing information in real-time that helps them make choices about where to swim or what road to take' (Vicki Buck, Deputy Mayor of Christchurch). Real time information and feedback via the Internet of Things. The CCC is now part of Land Information New Zealand's (LINZ) Smart City coalition which aims to test the value of smart city concepts through a series of projects in Christchurch, Auckland, and Wellington."Note that due to technical issues, the final part of this presentation was not recorded.
A video of a presentation by Professor Chris Kissling, Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, at the 2016 Seismics in the City Conference. The presentation is titled, "Transport Roles in Helping Shape Canterbury's Post-earthquakes Future".The abstract for the presentation reads, "The necessity for embracing integrated transportation solutions to meet emerging societal needs."
The Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by major earthquakes on the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011. The quakes caused 185 fatalities and extensive land, infrastructure and building damage, particularly in the Eastern suburbs of Christchurch city. Almost 450 ha of residential and public land was designated as a ‘Red Zone’ unsuitable for residential redevelopment because land damage was so significant, engineering solutions were uncertain, and repairs would be protracted. Subsequent demolition of all housing and infrastructure in the area has left a blank canvas of land stretching along the Avon River corridor from the CBD to the sea.
Initially the Government’s official – but enormously controversial – position was that this land would be cleared and lie fallow until engineering solutions could be found that enabled residential redevelopment. This paper presents an application of a choice experiment (CE) that identified and assessed Christchurch residents’ preferences for different land use options of this Red Zone. Results demonstrated strong public support for the development of a recreational reserve comprising a unique natural environment with native fauna and flora, healthy wetlands and rivers, and recreational opportunities that align with this vision. By highlighting the value of a range of alternatives, the CE provided a platform for public participation and expanded the conversational terrain upon which redevelopment policy took place. We conclude the method has value for land use decision-making beyond the disaster recovery context.
Sewerage systems convey sewage, or wastewater, from residential or commercial buildings through complex reticulation networks to treatment plants. During seismic events both transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation can induce physical damage to sewerage system components, limiting or impeding the operability of the whole system. The malfunction of municipal sewerage systems can result in the pollution of nearby waterways through discharge of untreated sewage, pose a public health threat by preventing the use of appropriate sanitation facilities, and cause serious inconvenience for rescuers and residents. Christchurch, the second largest city in New Zealand, was seriously affected by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) in 2010-2011. The CES imposed widespread damage to the Christchurch sewerage system (CSS), causing a significant loss of functionality and serviceability to the system. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) relied heavily on temporary sewerage services for several months following the CES. The temporary services were supported by use of chemical and portable toilets to supplement the damaged wastewater system. The rebuild delivery agency -Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was created to be responsible for repair of 85 % of the damaged horizontal infrastructure (i.e., water, wastewater, stormwater systems, and roads) in Christchurch. Numerous initiatives to create platforms/tools aiming to, on the one hand, support the understanding, management and mitigation of seismic risk for infrastructure prior to disasters, and on the other hand, to support the decision-making for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery, have been promoted worldwide. Despite this, the CES in New Zealand highlighted that none of the existing platforms/tools are either accessible and/or readable or usable by emergency managers and decision makers for restoring the CSS. Furthermore, the majority of existing tools have a sole focus on the engineering perspective, while the holistic process of formulating recovery decisions is based on system-wide approach, where a variety of factors in addition to technical considerations are involved. Lastly, there is a paucity of studies focused on the tools and frameworks for supporting decision-making specifically on sewerage system restoration after earthquakes. This thesis develops a decision support framework for sewerage pipe and system restoration after earthquakes, building on the experience and learning of the organisations involved in recovering the CSS following the CES in 2010-2011. The proposed decision support framework includes three modules: 1) Physical Damage Module (PDM); 2) Functional Impact Module (FIM); 3) Pipeline Restoration Module (PRM). The PDM provides seismic fragility matrices and functions for sewer gravity and pressure pipelines for predicting earthquake-induced physical damage, categorised by pipe materials and liquefaction zones. The FIM demonstrates a set of performance indicators that are categorised in five domains: structural, hydraulic, environmental, social and economic domains. These performance indicators are used to assess loss of wastewater system service and the induced functional impacts in three different phases: emergency response, short-term recovery and long-term restoration. Based on the knowledge of the physical and functional status-quo of the sewerage systems post-earthquake captured through the PDM and FIM, the PRM estimates restoration time of sewer networks by use of restoration models developed using a Random Forest technique and graphically represented in terms of restoration curves. The development of a decision support framework for sewer recovery after earthquakes enables decision makers to assess physical damage, evaluate functional impacts relating to hydraulic, environmental, structural, economic and social contexts, and to predict restoration time of sewerage systems. Furthermore, the decision support framework can be potentially employed to underpin system maintenance and upgrade by guiding system rehabilitation and to monitor system behaviours during business-as-usual time. In conjunction with expert judgement and best practices, this framework can be moreover applied to assist asset managers in targeting the inclusion of system resilience as part of asset maintenance programmes.
With the occurrence of natural disasters on the increase, major cities around the world face the potential of complete loss of infrastructure due to design guidelines that do not consider resilience in the design. With the February 22nd, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, being the largest insured event, lessons learnt from the rebuild will be vital for the preparation of future disasters. Therefore the objective of this research is to understand the financial implications of the changes to the waste water design guidelines used throughout the five year rebuild programme of works. The research includes a study of the SCIRT alliance model selected for the delivery that is flexible enough to handle changes in the design with minimal impact on the direct cost of the rebuild works. The study further includes the analysis and compares the impact of the three different guidelines on maintenance and replacement cost over the waste water pipe asset life. The research concludes that with the varying ground conditions in Christchurch and also the wide variety of materials in use in the waste water network up to the start of the CES, the rebuild was not a ‘one size fits all’ approach.
This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.
Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) play acrucial role in times of disasters. Therefore it is crucial to understand more thoroughly the communication roles and responsibilities of interagency team members and to examine how individual members communicate within a complex, evolving, and unstable environment. It is also important to understand how different organisational identities and their spatial geographies contribute to the interactional dynamics. Earthquakes hit the Canterbury region on September, 2010 and then on February 2011 a more devastating shallow earthquake struck resulting in severe damage to the Aged Residential Care (ARC) sector. Over 600 ARC beds were lost and 500 elderly and disabled people were displaced. Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) set up an interagency emergency response team to address the issues of vulnerable people with significant health and disability needs who were unable to access their normal supports due to the effects of the earthquake. The purpose of this qualitative interpretive study is to focus on the case study of the response and evacuation of vulnerable people by interagencies responding to the event. Staff within these agencies were interviewed with a focus on the critical incidents that either stabilised or negatively influenced the outcome of the response. The findings included the complexity of navigating multiple agencies communication channels; understanding the different hierarchies and communication methods within each agency; data communication challenges when infrastructures were severely damaged; the importance of having the right skills, personal attributes and understanding of the organisations in the response; and the significance of having a liaison in situ representing and communicating through to agencies geographically dispersed from Canterbury. It is hoped that this research will assist in determining a future framework for interagency communication best practice and policy.
ANDREW LITTLE to the Prime Minister: What are the priorities for the Government in assisting communities affected by yesterday’s earthquake?
MATT DOOCEY to the Minister of Finance: What advice has he received about the economic impact of the Kaikōura earthquake?
EUGENIE SAGE to the Minister of Transport: What updates can he give on the transport sector’s response to earthquake damage to State Highway 1 and the rail line between Seddon and Cheviot?
GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister of Finance: What is his initial assessment of the fiscal impact of yesterday morning’s earthquake and what, if any, new or changed Budget allocations is he considering in response to the earthquake?
PAUL FOSTER-BELL to the Minister of Civil Defence: How is the Government supporting people affected by the Kaikōura earthquake?
RON MARK to the Minister of Civil Defence: Can the Government assure New Zealanders on our level of preparedness for all natural disasters?
SUE MORONEY to the Minister of Transport: What roads and public transport services are currently not operational following damage from the earthquake yesterday and when is it expected access and services will be restored?
BRETT HUDSON to the Minister of Transport: What action is the Government taking to repair damaged transport infrastructure following the Kaikōura earthquake?
GARETH HUGHES to the Minister of Broadcasting: Will she join with me to acknowledge the work of all media in New Zealand, which is so important in times of natural disaster and crisis; if so, will she consider increasing our public broadcaster Radio New Zealand’s funding in Budget 2017?
CLAYTON MITCHELL to the Minister of Civil Defence: What progress has been made, if any, on new civil defence legislation which focuses on large and significant events such as the Christchurch and Kaikōura earthquakes?
ALASTAIR SCOTT to the Minister of Health: What updates has he received on the Government’s health response to the Kaikōura earthquake?
CLARE CURRAN to the Minister of Civil Defence: What actions have been taken by Civil Defence to ensure those people in the areas worst hit by the earthquake have enough food, clothing, water, and shelter?
NUK KORAKO to the Minister of Finance: How does New Zealand’s growing economy and the Government’s commitment to responsible fiscal management mean New Zealand is well-placed to respond to the Kaikōura earthquake?
ANDREW LITTLE to the Prime Minister: Has he spoken to relevant Ministers about the lessons learned from the Canterbury earthquakes to ensure people affected by the recent earthquakes have an easier and faster recovery?
STUART SMITH to the Minister of Civil Defence: What update can he provide about the Government’s response to the Kaikōura earthquake?
RON MARK to the Prime Minister: Can he update the House on the situation in quake-affected areas in the South Island?
JAMES SHAW to the Prime Minister: Is he committed to all his Government’s policies?
Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister of Health: Does he stand by his statement that following the Valentine’s Day earthquake this year in Canterbury, “it was timely to review whether any additional mental health and wellbeing support was needed”; if so, will he consider reviewing whether any additional support is needed for Canterbury and Nelson-Marlborough district health boards as a result of the recent earthquakes?
JACQUI DEAN to the Minister of Transport: What updates has he received on damage to transport infrastructure following the Kaikōura earthquake?
JAN LOGIE to the Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety: What is his response to yesterday’s call from members of the Joint Working Group on Pay Equity Principles for the Government to “immediately right this historic wrong and implement the JWG principles”?
JACINDA ARDERN to the Minister for Economic Development: When is he likely to announce a recovery or support package for small businesses in earthquake-affected areas?
KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI to the Minister of Police: What are New Zealand Police doing to support the Kaikōura community?
CHRIS HIPKINS to the Minister of Education: When did she first discuss the potential impact of Monday’s 7.5 earthquake on NCEA and Scholarship exams with the New Zealand Qualifications Authority?
IAN McKELVIE to the Minister for Primary Industries: What recent reports has he received on the impact of the recent earthquakes on the primary sector?
Liquefaction during the 4th September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake and large aftershocks in 2011 (Canterbury earthquake sequence, CES) caused severe damage to land and infrastructure within Christchurch, New Zealand. Approximately one third of the total CES-induced financial losses were directly attributable to liq- uefaction and thus highlights the need for local and regional authorities to assess liquefaction hazards for present and future developments. This thesis is the first to conduct paleo-liquefaction studies in eastern Christchurch for the purpose of de- termining approximate return times of liquefaction-inducing earthquakes within the region. The research uncovered evidence for pre-CES liquefaction dated by radiocarbon and cross-cutting relationships as post-1660 to pre-1905. Additional paleo-liquefaction investigations within the eastern Christchurch suburb of Avon- dale, and the northern township of Kaiapoi, revealed further evidence for pre-CES liquefaction. Pre-CES liquefaction in Avondale is dated as post-1321 and pre-1901, while the Kaiapoi features likely formed during three distinct episodes: post-1458 and possibly during the 1901 Cheviot earthquake, post-1297 to pre-1901, and pre-1458. Evaluation of the liquefaction potential of active faults within the Can- terbury region indicates that many faults have the potential to cause widespread liquefaction within Avondale and Kaiapoi. The identification of pre-CES liquefac- tion confirms that these areas have previously liquefied, and indicates that residen- tial development in eastern Christchurch between 1860 and 2005 occurred in areas containing geologic evidence for pre-CES liquefaction. Additionally, on the basis of detailed field and GIS-based mapping and geospatial-statistical analysis, the distribution and severity of liquefaction and lateral spreading within the eastern Christchurch suburb of Avonside is shown in this study to be strongly in uenced by geomorphic and topographic variability. This variability is not currently ac- counted for in site-specific liquefaction assessments nor the simplified horizontal displacement models, and accounts for some of the variability between the pre- dicted horizontal displacements and those observed during the CES. This thesis highlights the potential applications of paleo-liquefaction investigations and ge- omorphic mapping to seismic and liquefaction hazard assessments and may aid future land-use planning decisions.
This project was initiated by ENGEO Limited and KiwiRail Holdings Limited to assess the stability of Slovens Creek Viaduct (specifically its western abutment) and a 3km section of rail corridor between Slovens Creek Viaduct and Avoca on the Midland Line (MDL). Commonly known as the scenic TranzAlpine rail journey (through Arthurs Pass National Park) the MDL connects Greymouth to Christchurch via Rolleston, where the MDL meets the Main South Line into Christchurch. The project area is approximately 40km southeast of Arthurs Pass Township, in the eastern extension of the Castle Hill Basin which is part of the Waimakariri Catchment and Canterbury Foothills. The field area is underlain by Rakaia Terrane, which is part of the Torlesse Composite Terrane forming the basement rock unit for the field area. Cretaceous-Tertiary rocks of the Castle Hill Basin overlie the basement strata and record a transgression-regression sequence, as well as mid-Oligocene submarine volcanism. The stratigraphic sequence in the Castle Hill Basin, and its eastern extension to Avoca, comprises two formations of the Eyre group, the older Broken River Formation and the younger Iron Creek Formation. Deep marine Porter Group limestones, marls, and tuffs of Oligocene age succeed the Iron Creek Formation of the Eyre Group, and probably records the maximum of the transgression. The Enys Formation lies disconformably on the Porter Group and is overlain unconformably by Late Pleistocene glacifluvial and glacial deposits. The Tertiary strata in the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are weak, and the clay-rich tuff derived from mid-Oligocene volcanism is particularly prone to slaking. Extensive mapping carried out for this project has identified that some 90 percent of the surface along the length of the Slovens-Avoca corridor has been subject to mass movement. The landslides of the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are clearly younger than the Last Glaciation, and Slovens Creek has been downcutting, with associated faulting and uplift, to form the present day geomorphology of the rail corridor. Deep-seated landslides in the rail corridor extend to Slovens Creek, locally deflecting the stream course, and a generic ground failure model for the rail corridor has been developed. Exploratory geotechnical investigations, including core drilling, installation of an inclinometer and a piezometer, enabled the construction of a simple ground model and cross section for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment. Limit-equilibrium and pseudo-static slope stability analyses using both circular and block critical slip surface search methods were applied to the ground model for the western abutment of Slovens Creek Viaduct. Piezometric and strength data obtained during laboratory testing of core material have been used to constrain the western abutment stability assessment for one representative section line (C-C’). Prior to pseudo-static sensitivity analyses peak ground acceleration (PGA) for various Ultimate Limit State (ULS) design return periods, defined by an equation given in NZS1170.5:2004, were calculated and have been used as a calibration technique to find and compare specific PGA values for pseudo-static analyses in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area. The main purpose has been to provide an indication of how railway infrastructure could be affected by seismic events of various return periods defined by ULS design standards for the area. Limit equilibrium circular slip surface search methods, both grid search and auto refine search, indicated the slope is stable with a FoS greater than 1.0 returned from each, although one particular surface returned the lowest FoS in each. This surface is in the lower portion of the slope, adjacent to Slovens Stream and northeast of the MDL. As expected, pseudo-static analyses returned a lower FoS overall when compared to limit equilibrium analyses. The PGA analyses suggest that partial ground failure at the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment could occur in a 1 in 25-year return period event within materials on the slower slope beyond the immediate rail corridor. A ULS (1 in 500-year) event in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area would likely produce a PGA of ~0.9g, and the effects on the western abutment and rail infrastructure would most likely be catastrophic. Observed ground conditions for the western abutment of the Slovens Creek Viaduct suggest there is no movement within the landslide at depth within the monitoring timeframe of this project (22 May 2015 – 4 August 2015). Slope stability monitoring is recommended to be continued in two parts: (1) the inclinometer in BH1 is to be monitored on a six monthly basis for one year following completion of this thesis, and then annually unless ground movements become evident; and (2) surface movement monitoring should be installed using a fixed datum on the stable eastern abutment. Long-term stability management strategies for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment are dependent upon future observed changes and ongoing monitoring. Hazard and risk assessment using the KiwiRail Qualitative Risk Assessment Framework (QRA) is recommended, and if slope stability becomes problematic for operation of the Midland Line consideration should be given to deep slope drainage. In the event of a large magnitude or high PGA earthquake all monitoring should be reviewed.
