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Research Papers, Lincoln University

Environmental assessment in New Zealand is governed by the provisions of the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991. The Act requires persons wishing to undertake certain activities to apply for resource consent from their local or regional council - a procedure termed the Resource Consent Process. The key component of a resource consent application is an Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE) report; a statement of the environmental effects of a proposed activity. Problems arise when environmental assessments are complicated by uncertain and abnormal circumstances such as natural hazards. Natural hazards (including earthquakes, floods, tsunami, and coastal erosion) can be catastrophic to an environment. If hazards are not avoided or successfully mitigated, they can result in serious consequences to proposed development and to the environment which the proposal relates. The aim of this study is to assess the adequacy of the resource consent process (as outlined in the Resource Management Act 1991) for dealing with proposed development affected by natural hazards. This study reviews the context of the resource consent process for dealing with natural hazards to identify potential issues in the assessment process. Guidance criteria for assessing natural hazards (termed Natural Hazard Assessment) are developed to evaluate against two resource consent applications affected by natural hazards. The findings of the consent process review and case study evaluation are discussed to determine the adequacy of the consent process for dealing with natural hazards. From the review of the consent process it was evident that the process has a number of problems for accommodating natural hazards into the assessment. Although many important traits are provided for in the process, such traits are not always reflected in environmental assessments. Evaluation of two resource consent applications against the process of Natural Hazard Assessment (NHA) showed that these consent applications did not adequately detail key information relating to natural hazards. Many problems evident in these applications were not amended by the Consent Authorities in the review process and subsequently consent was granted to information-deficient applications. Problematic issues identified in this study include: • A distinct lack of guidance (legal or otherwise) for the applicant and Consent Authority regarding the boundaries of inclusion of an effect; • Deficiencies in planning documents are reflected in AEE reports, the review of the consent application and in the end-decision; • Under-utilisation of "experts" throughout the consent process; • Minimal identification and account for the degree of uncertainty throughout the consent process; • Resource consents are being granted even though information in consent applications, and the means for assessing the information is deficient. These issues reflect that decisions are not being made based on all elements involved in a potential hazard. Subsequently, the resource consent process is not adequate for dealing with all aspects of natural hazards. The Natural Hazard Assessment process provides educated assessment criteria to assess development affected by natural hazards. By accounting for the problems evident in the consent process, the introduction of a three-tier identification, risk and vulnerability assessment, and evaluation process to account for uncertainties, Natural Hazard Assessment provides a platform for a thorough assessment of natural hazards. The application of the principles of Natural Hazard Assessment to the consent applications affected by natural hazards showed that many key issues were not covered in the assessment under the consent process. The nature of a natural event is that one may not occur in a given region over many lifetimes, however they will occur at some stage and planning and environmental assessment needs to provide for the associated hazards. Implementation of Natural Hazard Assessment is needed to help provide answers for the problems experienced in the resource consent process. Natural Hazard Assessment would allow decision-makers to make informed judgements on the situation at hand, leading to better planning and land-use options. Change to current practice is needed, as following the current path of environmental assessment will be the hazard in the end.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Christchurch City Council (Council) is undertaking the Land Drainage Recovery Programme in order to assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three stages:  Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies required to fill the gaps.  Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 1.  Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and compare with policy options; however, Council have not established a consistent policy on managed retreat that can be applied for equal comparison; without which substantial assumptions are required. We recommend Council undertake a study to define a managed retreat framework as an option for the city. - In undertaking Stage 1 with floodplain management as the focal point in a multi hazards context we have identified that Stage 3 requires consideration of options in the context of economics, implementation and residual risk. Presently the scope of work will provide a level of definition for floodplain options; however, this will not be at equal levels of detail for other hazard management options. Therefore, we recommend Council considers undertaking other studies with those key hazards (e.g. Coastal Hazards) as a focal point and identifies the engineering options to address such hazards. Doing so will provide equal levels of information for Council to make an informed and defendable decision on which options are progressed following Stage 3.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.

Other, National Library of New Zealand

Website of Canterbury CDEM Group, which is a partnership of local authorities, emergency services and other organisations tasked with providing effective and comprehensive management of major hazards and their consequences anywhere in Canterbury. Includes community preparedness information, information for emergency managers and CDEM Group plan.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The Master of Engineering Management Project was sponsored by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and consisted of two phases: The first was an analysis of existing information detailing the effects of hazardous natural events on Canterbury Lifeline Utilities in the past 15 years. The aim of this “Lessons Learned” project was to produce an analysis report that identified key themes from the research, gaps in the existing data and to provide recommendations from these “Lessons Learned.” The Second phase was the development of a practical “Disaster Mitigation Guideline” that outlined lessons in the field of Emergency Sanitation. This research would build upon the first stage and would draw from international reference to develop a guideline that has practical implementation possibilities throughout the world.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of the photocopy template for the Christchurch City Council's green sticker. The sticker was used by the Civil Defence after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes to indicate that a building had been inspected and that 'no structural or other safety hazards' were found.

Research Papers, Lincoln University

Numerous rockfalls released during the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence affected vital road sections for local commuters. We quantified rockfall fatality risk on two main routes by adapting a risk approach for roads originally developed for snow avalanche risk. We present results of the collective and individual fatality risks for traffic flow and waiting traffic. Waiting traffic scenarios particularly address the critical spatial-temporal dynamics of risk, which should be acknowledged in operational risk management. Comparing our results with other risks commonly experienced in New Zealand indicates that local rockfall risk is close to tolerability thresholds and likely exceeds acceptable risk.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Recent surface-rupturing earthquakes in New Zealand have highlighted significant exposure and vulnerability of the road network to fault displacement. Understanding fault displacement hazard and its impact on roads is crucial for mitigating risks and enhancing resilience. There is a need for regional-scale assessments of fault displacement to identify vulnerable areas within the road network for the purposes of planning and prioritising site-specific investigations. This thesis employs updated analysis of data from three historical surface-rupturing earthquakes (Edgecumbe 1987, Darfield 2010, and Kaikoūra 2016) to develop an empirical model that addresses the gap in regional fault displacement hazard analysis. The findings contribute to understanding of • How to use seismic hazard model inputs for regional fault displacement hazard analysis • How faulting type and sediment cover affects the magnitude and spatial distribution of fault displacement • How the distribution of displacement and regional fault displacement hazard is impacted by secondary faulting • The inherent uncertainties and limitations associated with employing an empirical approach at a regional scale • Which sections of New Zealand’s roading network are most susceptible to fault displacement hazard and warrant site-specific investigations • Which regions should prioritise updating emergency management plans to account for post-event disruptions to roading. I used displacement data from the aforementioned historical ruptures to generate displacement versus distance-to-fault curves for various displacement components, fault types, and geological characteristics. Using those relationships and established relationships for along-strike displacement, displacement contours were generated surrounding active faults within the NZ Community Fault Model. Next, I calculated a new measure of 1D strain along roads as well as relative hazard, which integrated 1D strain and normalised slip rate data. Summing these values at the regional level identified areas of heightened relative hazard across New Zealand, and permits an assessment of the susceptibility of road networks using geomorphon land classes as proxies for vulnerability. The results reveal that fault-parallel displacements tend to localise near the fault plane, while vertical and fault-perpendicular displacements sustain over extended distances. Notably, no significant disparities were observed in off-fault displacement between the hanging wall and footwall sides of the fault, or among different surface geology types, potentially attributed to dataset biases. The presence of secondary faulting in the dataset contributes to increased levels of tectonic displacement farther from the fault, highlighting its significance in hazard assessments. Furthermore, fault displacement contours delineate broader zones around dip-slip faults compared to strike-slip faults, with correlations identified between fault length and displacement width. Road ‘strain’ values are higher around dip-slip faults, with notable examples observed in the Westland and Buller Districts. As expected, relative hazard analysis revealed elevated values along faults with high slip rates, notably along the Alpine Fault. A regional-scale analysis of hazard and exposure reveals heightened relative hazard in specific regions, including Wellington, Southern Hawke’s Bay, Central Bay of Plenty, Central West Coast, inland Canterbury, and the Wairau Valley of Marlborough. Notably, the Central West Coast exhibits the highest summed relative hazard value, attributed to the fast-slipping Alpine Fault. The South Island generally experiences greater relative hazard due to larger and faster-slipping faults compared to the North Island, despite having fewer roads. Central regions of New Zealand face heightened risk compared to Southern or Northern regions. Critical road links intersecting high-slipping faults, such as State Highways 6, 73, 1, and 2, necessitate prioritisation for site-specific assessments, emergency management planning and targeted mitigation strategies. Roads intersecting with the Alpine Fault are prone to large parallel displacements, requiring post-quake repair efforts. Mitigation strategies include future road avoidance of nearby faults, modification of road fill and surface material, and acknowledgement of inherent risk, leading to prioritised repair efforts of critical roads post-quake. Implementing these strategies enhances emergency response efforts by improving accessibility to isolated regions following a major surface-rupturing event, facilitating faster supply delivery and evacuation assistance. This thesis contributes to the advancement of understanding fault displacement hazard by introducing a novel regional, empirical approach. The methods and findings highlight the importance of further developing such analyses and extending them to other critical infrastructure types exposed to fault displacement hazard in New Zealand. Enhancing our comprehension of the risks associated with fault displacement hazard offers valuable insights into various mitigation strategies for roading infrastructure and informs emergency response planning, thereby enhancing both national and global infrastructure resilience against geological hazards.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of the photocopy template for the Christchurch City Council's yellow sticker. The sticker was used by the Civil Defence after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes to indicate that a building had been inspected and that structural damage or other safety hazards had been found. The sticker states that there should be no entry to the building, 'except on essential business'. It also states that 'earthquake aftershocks present danger' and that people who enter must do so at their own risk.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

Sue Holmes, resident of Seabreeze Close in Bexley, which was built on reclaimed land which has liquefied after the Canterbury earthquake; Dr Tom Wilson, lecturer in Hazard and Disaster Management, from the department of Geological Sciences, Canterbury University; and Bob Parker, Mayor of Christchurch.