Opposition leader Simon Bridges is accusing the government of a spending blowout. He says the government plans to increase borrowing by $17 billion over the next four years. Mr Bridges tells Gyles Beckford the total is about what National had to borrow to steer the country through the Global Financial Crisis and the Canterbury earthquakes.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
MARAMA DAVIDSON to the Prime Minister: Ka tū a ia i runga i tana kōrero mō te iti rawa o te mahi haumi i roto ratonga tūmataiti, ā, nā runga i tērā, “we didn't know it would be this bad” ā, mēnā kua pēnei rawa, ka pēhea te nui o te iti rawa o te mahi haumi nei? Translation: Does she stand by her statement on underinvestment in public services that “we didn't know it would be this bad”, and if so, how significant is this underinvestment? Hon SIMON BRIDGES to the Prime Minister: Does she stand by all her Government’s policies and actions? Hon AMY ADAMS to the Minister of Finance: Is he committed to reducing core Crown net debt to 20 percent of GDP by 30 June 2022? Dr DEBORAH RUSSELL to the Minister of Finance: What recent reports has he seen on the state of the New Zealand economy? Hon MICHAEL WOODHOUSE to the Minister of Health: Does he stand by all his statements and actions? JAMI-LEE ROSS to the Minister of Transport: What is the total increased level of funding for the Public Transport activity class for the next 10 years if the mid-point level of funding proposed in the draft Government Policy Statement in the 2018/19 year continues at that level for 10 years without increase; and can he confirm that when that increased funding is added together with mid-point level funding for the new Rapid Transit and Transitional Rail activity classes over 10 years, the total new and increased funding for these three activity classes is $5.398 billion? Dr DUNCAN WEBB to the Minister responsible for the Earthquake Commission: What reports has she seen about the financial impact of remedial repairs in Canterbury by EQC? Hon NATHAN GUY to the Minister of Agriculture: Does he stand by all his Government’s actions in the agricultural sector? Hon PAULA BENNETT to the Minister of Employment: Does he stand by all his policies, statements, and actions? JAN TINETTI to the Minister of Education: What funding challenges does the early child education sector face? BRETT HUDSON to the Minister for Government Digital Services: Does she agree with the comment made by ICT veteran and expert in the industry, Ian Apperley, who said “when you read the Government’s Chief Technology Officer job description it occurs to me that making the role effective is provably impossible. It is largely waffly which means the Government may not know what it wants”; if not, why not? Dr LIZ CRAIG to the Minister of Health: What advice has he received about DHB deficit levels?
One of the most controversial issues highlighted by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquake series and more recently the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake, has been the evident difficulty and lack of knowledge and guidelines for: a) evaluation of the residual capacity damaged buildings to sustain future aftershocks; b) selection and implementation of a series of reliable repairing techniques to bring back the structure to a condition substantially the same as prior to the earthquake; and c) predicting the cost (or cost-effectiveness) of such repair intervention, when compared to fully replacement costs while accounting for potential aftershocks in the near future. As a result of such complexity and uncertainty (i.e., risk), in combination with the possibility (unique in New Zealand when compared to most of the seismic-prone countries) to rely on financial support from the insurance companies, many modern buildings, in a number exceeding typical expectations from past experiences at an international level, have ended up being demolished. This has resulted in additional time and indirect losses prior to the full reconstruction, as well as in an increase in uncertainty on the actual relocation of the investment. This research project provides the main end-users and stakeholders (practitioner engineers, owners, local and government authorities, insurers, and regulatory agencies) with comprehensive evidence-based information to assess the residual capacity of damage reinforced concrete buildings, and to evaluate the feasibility of repairing techniques, in order to support their delicate decision-making process of repair vs. demolition or replacement. Literature review on effectiveness of epoxy injection repairs, as well as experimental tests on full-scale beam-column joints shows that repaired specimens have a reduced initial stiffness compared with the undamaged specimen, with no apparent strength reduction, sometimes exhibiting higher displacement ductility capacities. Although the bond between the steel and concrete is only partially restored, it still allows the repaired specimen to dissipate at least the same amount of hysteretic energy. Experimental tests on buildings subjected to earthquake loading demonstrate that even for severe damage levels, the ability of the epoxy injection to restore the initial stiffness of the structure is significant. Literature review on damage assessment and repair guidelines suggests that there is consensus within the international community that concrete elements with cracks less than 0.2 mm wide only require cosmetic repairs; epoxy injection repairs of cracks less and 2.0 mm wide and concrete patching of spalled cover concrete (i.e., minor to moderate damage) is an appropiate repair strategy; and for severe damaged components (e.g., cracks greater than 2.0 mm wide, crushing of the concrete core, buckling of the longitudinal reinforcement) local replacement of steel and/or concrete in addition to epoxy crack injection is more appropriate. In terms of expected cracking patterns, non-linear finite element investigations on well-designed reinforced concrete beam-to-column joints, have shown that lower number of cracks but with wider openings are expected to occur for larger compressive concrete strength, f’c, and lower reinforcement content, ρs. It was also observed that the tensile concrete strength, ft, strongly affects the expected cracking pattern in the beam-column joints, the latter being more uniformly distributed for lower ft values. Strain rate effects do not seem to play an important role on the cracking pattern. However, small variations in the cracking pattern were observed for low reinforcement content as it approaches to the minimum required as per NZS 3101:2006. Simple equations are proposed in this research project to relate the maximum and residual crack widths with the steel strain at peak displacement, with or without axial load. A literature review on fracture of reinforcing steel due to low-cycle fatigue, including recent research using steel manufactured per New Zealand standards is also presented. Experimental results describing the influence of the cyclic effect on the ultimate strain capacity of the steel are also discussed, and preliminary equations to account for that effect are proposed. A literature review on the current practice to assess the seismic residual capacity of structures is also presented. The various factors affecting the residual fatigue life at a component level (i.e., plastic hinge) of well-designed reinforced concrete frames are discussed, and equations to quantify each of them are proposed, as well as a methodology to incorporate them into a full displacement-based procedure for pre-earthquake and post-earthquake seismic assessment.