Plumbers say EQC paying bills too slowly, Earthquake Commission defends its claim process, Events centre, not stimulus package, for West Coast, Harawira calls meeting to consider forming new party, Government, Auckland council split over development, Search work in Christchurch central city nears completion, Power in South Christchurch threatened by cut cable.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event. One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
One of the great challenges facing human systems today is how to prepare for, manage, and adapt successfully to the profound and rapid changes wreaked by disasters. Wellington, New Zealand, is a capital city at significant risk of devastating earthquake and tsunami, potentially requiring mass evacuations with little or short notice. Subsequent hardship and suffering due to widespread property damage and infrastructure failure could cause large areas of the Wellington Region to become uninhabitable for weeks to months. Previous research has shown that positive health and well-being are associated with disaster-resilient outcomes. Preventing adverse outcomes before disaster strikes, through developing strengths-based skill sets in health-protective attitudes and behaviours, is increasingly advocated in disaster research, practise, and management. This study hypothesised that well-being constructs involving an affective heuristic play vital roles in pathways to resilience as proximal determinants of health-protective behaviours. Specifically, this study examined the importance of health-related quality of life and subjective well-being in motivating evacuation preparedness, measured in a community sample (n=695) drawn from the general adult population of Wellington’s isolated eastern suburbs. Using a quantitative epidemiological approach, the study measured the prevalence of key quality of life indicators (physical and mental health, emotional well-being or “Sense of Coherence”, spiritual well-being, social well-being, and life satisfaction) using validated psychometric scales; analysed the strengths of association between these indicators and the level of evacuation preparedness at categorical and continuous levels of measurement; and tested the predictive power of the model to explain the variance in evacuation preparedness activity. This is the first study known to examine multi-dimensional positive health and global well-being as resilient processes for engaging in evacuation preparedness behaviour. A cross-sectional study design and quantitative survey were used to collect self-report data on the study variables; a postal questionnaire was fielded between November 2008 and March 2009 to a sampling frame developed through multi-stage cluster randomisation. The survey response rate was 28.5%, yielding a margin of error of +/- 3.8% with 95% confidence and 80% statistical power to detect a true correlation coefficient of 0.11 or greater. In addition to the primary study variables, data were collected on demographic and ancillary variables relating to contextual factors in the physical environment (risk perception of physical and personal vulnerability to disaster) and the social environment (through the construct of self-determination), and other measures of disaster preparedness. These data are reserved for future analyses. Results of correlational and regression analyses for the primary study variables show that Wellingtonians are highly individualistic in how their well-being influences their preparedness, and a majority are taking inadequate action to build their resilience to future disaster from earthquake- or tsunami-triggered evacuation. At a population level, the conceptual multi-dimensional model of health-related quality of life and global well-being tested in this study shows a positive association with evacuation preparedness at statistically significant levels. However, it must be emphasised that the strength of this relationship is weak, accounting for only 5-7% of the variability in evacuation preparedness. No single dimension of health-related quality of life or well-being stands out as a strong predictor of preparedness. The strongest associations for preparedness are in a positive direction for spiritual well-being, emotional well-being, and life satisfaction; all involve a sense of existential meaningfulness. Spiritual well-being is the only quality of life variable making a statistically significant unique contribution to explaining the variance observed in the regression models. Physical health status is weakly associated with preparedness in a negative direction at a continuous level of measurement. No association was found at statistically significant levels for mental health status and social well-being. These findings indicate that engaging in evacuation preparedness is a very complex, holistic, yet individualised decision-making process, and likely involves highly subjective considerations for what is personally relevant. Gender is not a factor. Those 18-24 years of age are least likely to prepare and evacuation preparedness increases with age. Multidimensional health and global well-being are important constructs to consider in disaster resilience for both pre-event and post-event timeframes. This work indicates a need for promoting self-management of risk and building resilience by incorporating a sense of personal meaning and importance into preparedness actions, and for future research into further understanding preparedness motivations.
Surrounded by mud and puddles in Christchurch Prime Minister John Key puts his arm round co-leader of the Maori Party Pita Sharples and smiles happily; behind them is a brand new plastic portaloo. On the ground lies a newspaper with a headline that reads 'Govt. to fund $2m giant RWC plastic waka'. Pita Sharples says 'and to show we're not neglecting our priorities in these austere times, Christchurch will get a new plastic portaloo!' Context - The government has hit back at criticism over a $2 million venue centre in the shape of a waka for the Rugby World Cup (RWC), defending the cost as necessary to host a world-class event. Co-leader of the Maori Party Pita Sharples says the waka will promote Maori culture during the Rugby World Cup and at other events (like the America's Cup). Labour Party MP Shane Jones asks "How can Dr Sharples and Prime Minister John Key actually believe that this expensive indulgence is a positive advertisement for Maori? The truth is they don't but they're both working together in a desperate effort to keep the Maori Party afloat. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.