At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
Decision making on the reinstatement of the Christchurch sewer system after the Canterbury (New Zealand) earthquake sequence in 2010–2011 relied strongly on damage data, in particular closed circuit television (CCTV). This paper documents that process and considers how data can influence decision making. Data are analyzed on 33,000 pipes and 13,000 repairs and renewals. The primary findings are that (1) there should be a threshold of damage per pipe set to make efficient use of CCTV; (2) for those who are estimating potential damage, care must be taken in direct use of repair data without an understanding of the actual damage modes; and (3) a strong correlation was found between the ratio of faults to repairs per pipe and the estimated peak ground velocity. Taken together, the results provide evidence of the extra benefit that damage data can provide over repair data for wastewater networks and may help guide others in the development of appropriate strategies for data collection and wastewater pipe decisions after disasters.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
The Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 caused significant damage and disruption to the city of Christchurch, New Zealand. A Royal Commission was established to report on the causes of building failure as a result of the earthquakes as well as look at the legal and best-practice requirements for buildings in New Zealand Central Business Districts. The Royal Commission made 189 recommendations on a variety of matters including managing damaged buildings after an earthquake, the adequacy of building codes and standards, and the processes of seismic assessments of existing buildings to determine their earthquake vulnerability. In response the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the agency responsible for administering building regulation in New Zealand, established a work programme to assist with the Canterbury rebuild and to implement the lessons learned throughout New Zealand. The five primary work streams in the programme are: • Facilitating the Canterbury Rebuild • Structural Performance and Design Standards • Geotechnical and structural guidance • Existing Building Resilience • Post Disaster Building Management This paper provides more detail on each of the work streams. There has been significant collaboration between the New Zealand Government and the research community, technical societies, and engineering consultants, both within New Zealand and internationally, to deliver the programme and improve the resilience of the New Zealand built environment. This has presented major challenges for an extremely busy industry in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes. The paper identifies the items of work that have been completed and the work that is still in progress at the time of writing.
Christchurch City Council (Council) is undertaking the Land Drainage Recovery Programme in order to assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three stages: Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies required to fill the gaps. Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 1. Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and compare with policy options; however, Council have not established a consistent policy on managed retreat that can be applied for equal comparison; without which substantial assumptions are required. We recommend Council undertake a study to define a managed retreat framework as an option for the city. - In undertaking Stage 1 with floodplain management as the focal point in a multi hazards context we have identified that Stage 3 requires consideration of options in the context of economics, implementation and residual risk. Presently the scope of work will provide a level of definition for floodplain options; however, this will not be at equal levels of detail for other hazard management options. Therefore, we recommend Council considers undertaking other studies with those key hazards (e.g. Coastal Hazards) as a focal point and identifies the engineering options to address such hazards. Doing so will provide equal levels of information for Council to make an informed and defendable decision on which options are progressed following Stage 3.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of a major disaster on the management of human resources in the construction sector. It sets out to identify the construction skills challenges and the factors that affected skills availability following the 2010/2011 earthquakes in Christchurch. It is hoped that this study will provide insights for on-going reconstruction and future disaster response with respect to the problem of skills shortages. Design/methodology/approach A triangulation method was adopted. The quantitative method, namely, a questionnaire survey, was employed to provide a baseline description. Field observations and interviews were used as a follow-up to ascertain issues and potential shortages over time. Three focus groups in the form of research workshops were convened to gain further insight into the feedback and to investigate the validity and applicability of the research findings. Findings The earthquakes in Christchurch had compounded the pre-existing skills shortages in the country due to heightened demand from reconstruction. Skills shortages primarily existed in seismic assessment and design for land and structures, certain trades, project management and site supervision. The limited technical capability available nationally, shortage of temporary accommodation to house additional workers, time needed for trainees to become skilled workers, lack of information about reconstruction workloads and lack of operational capacity within construction organisations, were critical constraints to the resourcing of disaster recovery projects. Research limitations/implications The research findings contribute to the debate on skills issues in construction. The study provides evidence that contributes to an improved understanding of the industry’s skills vulnerability and emerging issues that would likely exist after a major disaster in a resource-limited country such as New Zealand. Practical implications From this research, decision makers and construction organisations can gain a clear direction for improving the construction capacity and capability for on-going reconstruction. Factors that affected the post-earthquake skills availability can be considered by decision makers and construction organisations in their workforce planning for future disaster events. The recommendations will assist them in addressing skills shortages for on-going reconstruction. Originality/value Although the study is country-specific, the findings show the nature and scale of skills challenges the construction industry is likely to face following a major disaster, and the potential issues that may compound skills shortages. It provides lessons for other disaster-prone countries where the resource pool is small and a large number of additional workers are needed to undertake reconstruction.
