Two projects are documented within this MEM Report: I. The first project examined what was learnt involving the critical infrastructure in the aftermath of natural disasters in the Canterbury region of New Zealand – the most prominent being the series of earthquakes between 2010 and 2011. The project identified several learning gaps, leading to recommendations for further investigations that could add significant value for the lifeline infrastructure community. II. Following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series was initiated with two booklets, one on Emergency Potable Water and a second on Emergency Sanitation. The key message from both projects is that we can and must learn from disasters. The projects described are part of the emergency management, and critical infrastructure learning cycles – presenting knowledge captured by others in a digestible format, enabling the lessons to be reapplied. Without these kinds of projects, there will be fewer opportunities to learn from other’s successes and failures when it comes to preparing for natural disasters.
This research examines a surprising partner in emergency management - a local community time bank. Specifically, we explain the role of the Lyttelton Time Bank in promoting community resiliency following the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. A time bank is a grassroots exchange system in which members trade services non-reciprocally. This exchange model assumes that everyone has tradable skills and all labour is equal in value. One hour of any labour earns a member one time bank hour, which can be used to purchase another member’s services. Before the earthquakes struck, the Lyttelton Time Bank (TB) had organised over 10% of the town’s residents and 18 local organisations. It was documenting, developing, and mobilising skills to solve individual and collective problems. This report examines the Lyttelton Time Bank and its’ role before, during, and after the earthquakes based on the analysis of over three and a half years of fieldwork, observations, interviews, focus groups, trading activity, and secondary data.
This report focuses on the Waimakariri District Council's approach to earthquake recovery which was developed as an Integrated, Community-based Recovery Framework. This approach has been held up as exemplary in a number of fora and has received a great deal of interest and support both nationally and internationally. It has evolved as a result of the September earthquake and the thousands of aftershocks that have followed, along with the regulatory changes that have impacted on building safety and land availability since, but it builds on a set of pre-existing competencies and a well-established organisational culture that focusses on:
* Working with communities and each other;
* Keeping people informed;
* Doing better everyday;
* Taking responsibility;
* Acting with integrity, honesty and trust.
The report identifies, and speaks to, three themes or tensions drawn from either the disaster/emergency management literature or actual cases of recovery practice observed here in Canterbury over the last 2 years. These themes are the:
1. unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity around both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 2. general consensus that good local government-community relationships are crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 3. balancing Business as Usual (BaU) with recovery issues.Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The aim of this multidisciplinary research was to retrospectively analyse the gastroenteritis prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The first focus was to assess whether earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis agents spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis cases over the period of 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The gastroenteritis agents considered in this study were Escherichia coli found in the drinking water supply (MPN/100mL) and Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) (less than <0.02mg/L). The second focus was the protocols that averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at three Emergency Centres (ECs): Burnside High School Emergency Centre (BEC); Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre (CEC); and Linwood High School Emergency Centre (LEC). Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols and indirect themes included type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. This research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. A damage profile was created by amalgamating different types of damage for the considered factors for each Census Area Unit (CAU) in Christchurch. The damage profile enabled the application of a variety of statistical methods which included Moran’s I , Hot Spot (HS) analysis, Spearman’s Rho, and Besag–York–Mollié Model using a range of software. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The ECs were selected to represent the Christchurch area, and were situated where potential for gastroenteritis was high. BEC represented the western side of Christchurch; whilst, CEC and LEC represented the eastern side, where the potential for gastroenteritis was high according to the outputs of the quantitative spatial modelling. Qualitative analysis from the interviews at the ECs revealed that evacuees were arriving at the ECs with gastroenteritis-like symptoms. Participants believed that those symptoms did not originate at the ECs. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols that included prolific use of hand sanitisers; surveillance; and the services offered. Indirect themes included the EC layout, type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. Indirect themes governed the quality and sustainability of the direct themes implemented, which in turn averted gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. It was concluded that gastroenteritis point prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake could not be solely explained by earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis causative agents alone. However, this research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Creating a damage profile for each CAU and using spatial data analysis can isolate vulnerable areas, and qualitative data analysis provides localised information. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.
Hon PHIL HEATLEY to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the economy – and especially on further signs of economic momentum in the regions and among manufacturers?
Dr RUSSEL NORMAN to the Minister of Finance: How much did the Government's share sales in Mighty River Power, Meridian, and Air New Zealand raise, given that the Supplement to the 2010 Investment Statement of the Government of New Zealand projected that those sales would raise $5.18 billion?
Hon DAVID PARKER to the Minister for ACC: How much did ACC invest in Pike River Coal Limited and in New Zealand Oil and Gas Limited over the last eight years, and how much has it made or lost in total on its investment in each company, taking into account share purchases, subscriptions and sales, dividends, and current share prices?
Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS to the Minister of Māori Affairs: Does he stand by his statement "I know Māori want to talk about the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in our constitution, and how our legal and political systems can reflect tikanga Māori."; if so, why?
Hon SHANE JONES to the Associate Minister of Finance: Is he satisfied with his performance in regard to his delegations as Associate Minister of Finance?
JONATHAN YOUNG to the Minister for Building and Construction: What reports has he received regarding the state of the building and construction sector?
GARETH HUGHES to the Minister for the Environment: Did the Environmental Protection Authority assess the full version of Anadarko's Discharge Management Plan and Emergency Response Plan as part of its evaluation of the company's Environmental Impact Assessment for the Deepwater Taranaki Well; if not, why not?
Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister of Finance: When, if at all, did Cabinet approve the timing of the Air New Zealand sell-down and what directions did Cabinet give the shareholding Ministers?
NICKY WAGNER to the Minister of Housing: What steps is the Government taking to rebuild Christchurch's housing stock damaged or destroyed by the earthquakes?
Hon DAMIEN O'CONNOR to the Minister for Primary Industries: Does he stand by his statement "The opportunity, and challenge, for our meat producers now is to add value to different cuts of meat and continue to sell the New Zealand story"; if so, why?
IAN McKELVIE to the Minister of Local Government: How is the Government improving councils' financial reporting?
DARIEN FENTON to the Minister of Labour: Does he stand by his statement that "I am especially keen to hear what affected parties have to say on the Part 6A proposals in the Bill, and will carefully consider their submissions and the recommendations of the select committee"?
