The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately 35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global insurance event of all time. These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond. Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local government landscape. This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them to their own planning. It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the lessons from WDC.
Questions to Ministers 1. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: Is he satisfied that actions to address the Christchurch earthquake are an adequate response; if not, what are his areas of concern? 2. AMY ADAMS to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the economic impact of the earthquake in Christchurch on 22 February 2011? 3. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Is he satisfied with the level of support being offered to the people of Christchurch in the wake of the earthquake on 22 February 2011? 4. NICKY WAGNER to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: What is the Government doing to support Canterbury businesses and employees through the earthquake recovery? 5. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: Is she confident that the Ministry of Social Development has responded adequately to the Christchurch earthquake? 6. METIRIA TUREI to the Minister of Finance: Has he considered raising a temporary levy on income to help fund the rebuilding of Christchurch; if so, how much could it raise? 7. AARON GILMORE to the Minister for Tertiary Education: What work has been done to help the families of tertiary students and tertiary institutions affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch? 8. Hon JIM ANDERTON to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Will he ensure that Christchurch homeowners and businesses are able to access insurance cover from existing policies or new cover they require since the 22 February 2011 earthquake? 9. Hon JOHN BOSCAWEN to the Attorney-General: Has he asked the Māori Party to agree to amendments to the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill that would make it explicitly clear that customary title holders would not be able to charge individuals for accessing a beach, and require any negotiated settlements to be referred back to Parliament for validation; if so, what response did he receive? 10. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Attorney-General: Does the Government intend to proceed this week with its legislation to replace the existing Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004? 11. RAHUI KATENE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Did he agree with his spokesman's response to the situation for residents in Christchurch East following the earthquake of 22 February 2011, that, "It is apparent, given the scale out there, that there just wasn't sufficient hardware out there, loos and the like", and what urgent actions have been taken to give priority to communities in the eastern suburbs? 12. COLIN KING to the Minister of Civil Defence: Why was a state of national emergency declared on 23 February 2011?
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
