Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste. Waste volumes from a single event can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste generation rate of the affected community. These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and personnel. Mismanagement of disaster waste can affect both the response and long term recovery of a disaster affected area. Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event specific, making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another. The aim of this research is to develop a systems understanding of disaster waste management and in turn develop context- and disaster-transferrable decision-making guidance for emergency and waste managers. To research this complex and multi-disciplinary problem, a multi-hazard, multi-context, multi-case study approach was adopted. The research focussed on five major disaster events: 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The first stage of the analysis involved the development of a set of ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators. The indicators demonstrate a method by which disaster managers, planners and researchers can simplify the very large spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key decision-drivers which will likely influence post-disaster management requirements. The second stage of the research was to develop a set of criteria to represent the desirable environmental, economic, social and recovery effects of a successful disaster waste management system. These criteria were used to assess the effectiveness of the disaster waste management approaches for the case studies. The third stage of the research was the cross-case analysis. Six main elements of disaster waste management systems were identified and analysed. These were: strategic management, funding mechanisms, operational management, environmental and human health risk management, and legislation and regulation. Within each of these system elements, key decision-making guidance (linked to the ‘disaster & disaster waste’ indicators) and management principles were developed. The ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators, the effects assessment criteria and management principles have all been developed so that they can be practically applied to disaster waste management planning and response in the future.
Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
Earthquakes impacting on the built environment can generate significant volumes of waste, often overwhelming existing waste management capacities. Earthquake waste can pose a public and environmental health hazard and can become a road block on the road to recovery. Specific research has been developed at the University of Canterbury to go beyond the current perception of disaster waste as a logistical hurdle, to a realisation that disaster waste management is part of the overall recovery process and can be planned for effectively. Disaster waste decision-makers, often constrained by inappropriate institutional frameworks, are faced with conflicting social, economic and environmental drivers which all impact on the overall recovery. Framed around L’Aquila earthquake, Italy, 2009, this paper discusses the social, economic and environmental effects of earthquake waste management and the impact of existing institutional frameworks (legal, financial and organisational). The paper concludes by discussing how to plan for earthquake waste management.
Recycling is often employed as part of a disaster waste management system. However, the feasibility, method and effectiveness of recycling varies between disaster events. This qualitative study is based on literature reviews, expert interviews and active participatory research of five international disaster events in developed countries (2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australia; 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy; 2005 Hurricane Katrina, United States; 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand; 2011 Great East Japan earthquake) to answer three questions: What are the main factors that affect the feasibility of recycling post-disaster? When is on-site or off-site separation more effective? What management approaches improve recycling effectiveness? Seven disaster-specific factors need to be assessed to determine the feasibility of disaster waste recycling programmes: volume of waste; degree of mixing of waste; human and environmental health hazards; areal extent of the waste; community priorities; funding mechanisms; and existing and disaster-specific regulations. The appropriateness of on or off-site waste separation depends on four factors: time constraints; resource availability; degree of mixing of waste and human and public health hazards. Successful recycling programmes require good management including clear and well enforced policies (through good contracts or regulations) and pre-event planning. Further research into post-disaster recycling markets, funding mechanisms and recycling in developing countries is recommended.
The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are impacted by the organisation and human resourcing of the physical works. This research addresses the suitability of different resourcing strategies on post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. This qualitative analysis primarily draws on five international case studies including 2010 Canterbury earthquake, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 2009 Samoan Tsunami, 2009 Victorian Bushfires and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The implementation strategies are divided into two categories: collectively and individually facilitated works. The impacts of the implementation strategies chosen are assessed for all disaster waste management activities including demolition, waste collection, transportation, treatment and waste disposal. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness of projects; and environmental, economic and social impacts. Generally, the case studies demonstrate that detritus waste removal and debris from major repair work is managed at an individual property level. Debris collection, demolition and disposal are generally and most effectively carried out as a collective activity. However, implementation strategies are affected by contextual factors (such as funding and legal constraints) and the nature of the disaster waste (degree of hazardous waste, geographical spread of waste etc.) and need to be designed accordingly. Community involvement in recovery activities such as demolition and debris removal is shown to contribute positively to psychosocial recovery.
The Master of Engineering Management Project was sponsored by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and consisted of two phases: The first was an analysis of existing information detailing the effects of hazardous natural events on Canterbury Lifeline Utilities in the past 15 years. The aim of this “Lessons Learned” project was to produce an analysis report that identified key themes from the research, gaps in the existing data and to provide recommendations from these “Lessons Learned.” The Second phase was the development of a practical “Disaster Mitigation Guideline” that outlined lessons in the field of Emergency Sanitation. This research would build upon the first stage and would draw from international reference to develop a guideline that has practical implementation possibilities throughout the world.
Disaster recovery is significantly affected by funding availability. The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are not only impacted by the extent of the funding but also the mechanisms with which funding is prioritised, allocated and delivered. This research addresses the impact of funding mechanisms on the effectiveness and efficiency of post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. A qualitative assessment of the impacts on recovery of different funding sources and mechanisms was carried out, using the 2010 Canterbury Earthquake as well as other recent international events as case studies. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness, environmental, economic and social impacts. Of the case studies investigated, the Canterbury Earthquake was the only disaster response to rely solely on a privatised approach to insurance for debris management. Due to the low level of resident displacement and low level of hazard in the waste, this was a satisfactory approach, though not ideal. This approach has led to greater organisational complexity and delays. For many other events, the potential community wide impacts caused by the prolonged presence of disaster debris means that publicly funded and centrally facilitated programmes appear to be the most common and effective method of managing disaster waste.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
