New Zealand's devastating Canterbury earthquakes provided an opportunity to examine the efficacy of existing regulations and policies relevant to seismic strengthening of vulnerable buildings. The mixed-methods approach adopted, comprising both qualitative and quantitative approaches, revealed that some of the provisions in these regulations pose as constraints to appropriate strengthening of earthquake-prone buildings. Those provisions include the current seismic design philosophy, lack of mandatory disclosure of seismic risks and ineffective timeframes for strengthening vulnerable buildings. Recommendations arising from these research findings and implications for pre-disaster mitigation for future earthquake and Canterbury's post-disaster reconstruction suggest: (1) a reappraisal of the requirements for earthquake engineering design and construction, (2) a review and realignment of all regulatory frameworks relevant to earthquake risk mitigation, and (3) the need to develop a national programme necessary to achieve consistent mitigation efforts across the country. These recommendations are important in order to present a robust framework where New Zealand communities such as Christchurch can gradually recover after a major earthquake disaster, while planning for pre-disaster mitigation against future earthquakes. AM - Accepted Manuscript
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
During the 21st century, New Zealand has experienced increasing public concern over the quality of the design and appearance of new developments, and their effects on the urban environment. In response to this, a number of local authorities developed a range of tools to address this issue, including urban design panels to review proposals and provide independent advice. Following the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, the commitment to achieve high quality urban design within Christchurch was given further importance, with the city facing the unprecedented challenge of rebuilding a ‘vibrant and successful city’.
The rebuild and regeneration reinforced the need for independent design review, putting more focus and emphasis on the role and use of the urban design panel; first through collaboratively assisting applicants in achieving a better design outcome for their development by providing an independent set of eyes on their design; and secondly in assisting Council officers in forming their recommendations on resource consent decisions. However, there is a perception that urban design and the role of the urban design panel is not fully understood, with some stakeholders arguing that Council’s urban design requirements are adding cost and complexity to their developments.
The purpose of this research was to develop a better understanding on the role of the Christchurch urban design panel post-earthquake in the central city; its direct and indirect influence on the built environment; and the deficiencies in the broader planning framework and institutional settings that it might be addressing. Ultimately, the perceived role of the Panel is understood, and there is agreement that urban design is having a positive influence on the built environment, albeit viewed differently amongst the varying groups involved. What has become clear throughout this research is that the perceived tension between the development community and urban design well and truly exists, with the urban design panel contributing towards this. This tension is exacerbated further through the cost of urban design to developers, and the drive for financial return from their investments.
The panel, albeit promoting a positive experience, is simply a ‘tick box’ exercise for some, and as the research suggests, groups or professional are determining themselves what constitutes good urban design, based on their attitude, the context in which they sit and the financial constraints to incorporate good design elements. It is perhaps a bleak time for urban design, and more about building homes.
Territorial authorities in New Zealand are responding to regulatory and market forces in the wake of the 2011 Christchurch earthquake to assess and retrofit buildings determined to be particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. Pending legislation may shorten the permissible timeframes on such seismic improvement programmes, but Auckland Council’s Property Department is already engaging in a proactive effort to assess its portfolio of approximately 3500 buildings, prioritise these assets for retrofit, and forecast construction costs for improvements. Within the programme structure, the following varied and often competing factors must be accommodated: * The council’s legal, fiscal, and ethical obligations to the people of Auckland per building regulations, health and safety protocols, and economic growth and urban development planning strategies; * The council’s functional priorities for service delivery; * Varied and numerous stakeholders across the largest territorial region in New Zealand in both population and landmass; * Heritage preservation and community and cultural values; and * Auckland’s prominent economic role in New Zealand’s economy which requires Auckland’s continued economic production post-disaster. Identifying those buildings most at risk to an earthquake in such a large and varied portfolio has warranted a rapid field assessment programme supplemented by strategically chosen detailed assessments. Furthermore, Auckland Council will benefit greatly in time and resources by choosing retrofit solutions, techniques, and technologies applicable to a large number of buildings with similar configurations and materials. From a research perspective, the number and variety of buildings within the council’s property portfolio will provide valuable data for risk modellers on building typologies in Auckland, which are expected to be fairly representative of the New Zealand building stock as a whole.
