An earthquake community group in Canterbury says a damning report on the ineffectiveness of the Earthquake Commission highlights the frustration of getting information on their own homes.
A photograph of an architectural detail above a window of Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace.
Blog from Christchurch business-owner Nicky Arts detailing the rebuild of the Christchurch CBD following the earthquakles of 2010 and 2011.
The Earthquake Commission has been granted an interim injunction stopping a blogger sharing details from a leaked email with Canterbury home owners.
In a serious privacy breach - the addresses and earthquake claim details of almost ten thousand Canterbury people have been mistakenly emailed by Earthquake Commission to the wrong person.
The man who received Earthquake Commission files detailing claims by 83,000 Christchurch people says he's appalled the slip-up has become a political football.
The Earthquake Commission has been forced into an embarrassing admission that the details of all 83-thousand clients in its Canterbury Home Repair programme have been accidentally emailed to the wrong address.
The Earthquake Commission has admitted its privacy breach was almost 10 times worse than it had said, with the details of all 83-thousand clients in its Canterbury Home Repair programme being emailed out.
The Earthquake Commission has admitted the details of all 83-thousand clients in its Canterbury Home Repair programme have been accidentally emailed to the wrong place, not just the almost 10 thousand it said on Friday
According to the sign it can take about 30 minutes to walk from the entry point (near the small statue) to the centre and out again. What you can do with a few thousand old bricks and gravel. See next photo for more detail.
TODD McCLAY to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the Government's financial position? DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all his statements? METIRIA TUREI to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his reported statement that "anyone expecting details of a 'cosy sort of little deal' would be disappointed" by the Deputy Auditor-General's report into the SkyCity Convention Centre negotiations. DENIS O'ROURKE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: What criteria did he use in deciding that owners of vacant sections in the red zone of Christchurch should only be compensated at half of the sections' most recent rateable value? KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI to the Minister for Economic Development: What economic opportunities will a new convention centre bring for Auckland? Hon DAVID PARKER to the Prime Minister: Did he or his office receive the 12 November 2009 report from Ministry officials to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, summarising the process with SkyCity for the building of a convention centre; if so, did he read it? MIKE SABIN to the Associate Minister for Social Development: What steps is the Government taking to reduce welfare fraud? Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for State Owned Enterprises: What contingency plans, if any, does the Government have in place regarding its asset sale programme should the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter reduce production? KEVIN HAGUE to the Minister of Trade: Will New Zealand support Australia's objection to signing up to investor-state dispute provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement; if not, why not? Hon LIANNE DALZIEL to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Why is he offering only 50 percent of rating valuation for commercial or bare land in the residential red zone where the land could not be insured? MARK MITCHELL to the Minister of Corrections: What announcements has she made on improving prisoner employment training in New Zealand prisons? CHRIS HIPKINS to the Minister of Education: Does she stand by all her decisions in relation to schools in Christchurch?
Questions to Ministers 1. TODD McCLAY to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the Government's financial position? 2. DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all his statements? 3. METIRIA TUREI to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his reported statement that "anyone expecting details of a 'cosy sort of little deal' would be disappointed" by the Deputy Auditor-General's report into the SkyCity Convention Centre negotiations. 4. DENIS O'ROURKE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: What criteria did he use in deciding that owners of vacant sections in the red zone of Christchurch should only be compensated at half of the sections' most recent rateable value? 5. KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI to the Minister for Economic Development: What economic opportunities will a new convention centre bring for Auckland? 6. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Prime Minister: Did he or his office receive the 12 November 2009 report from Ministry officials to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, summarising the process with SkyCity for the building of a convention centre; if so, did he read it? 7. MIKE SABIN to the Associate Minister for Social Development: What steps is the Government taking to reduce welfare fraud? 8. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for State Owned Enterprises: What contingency plans, if any, does the Government have in place regarding its asset sale programme should the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter reduce production? 9. KEVIN HAGUE to the Minister of Trade: Will New Zealand support Australia's objection to signing up to investor-state dispute provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement; if not, why not? 10. Hon LIANNE DALZIEL to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Why is he offering only 50 percent of rating valuation for commercial or bare land in the residential red zone where the land could not be insured? 11. MARK MITCHELL to the Minister of Corrections: What announcements has she made on improving prisoner employment training in New Zealand prisons? 12. CHRIS HIPKINS to the Minister of Education: Does she stand by all her decisions in relation to schools in Christchurch?
Questions to Ministers 1. TODD McCLAY to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the Government's financial position? 2. DAVID SHEARER to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by all his statements? 3. METIRIA TUREI to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his reported statement that "anyone expecting details of a 'cosy sort of little deal' would be disappointed" by the Deputy Auditor-General's report into the SkyCity Convention Centre negotiations. 4. DENIS O'ROURKE to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: What criteria did he use in deciding that owners of vacant sections in the red zone of Christchurch should only be compensated at half of the sections' most recent rateable value? 5. KANWALJIT SINGH BAKSHI to the Minister for Economic Development: What economic opportunities will a new convention centre bring for Auckland? 6. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Prime Minister: Did he or his office receive the 12 November 2009 report from Ministry officials to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, summarising the process with SkyCity for the building of a convention centre; if so, did he read it? 7. MIKE SABIN to the Associate Minister for Social Development: What steps is the Government taking to reduce welfare fraud? 8. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister for State Owned Enterprises: What contingency plans, if any, does the Government have in place regarding its asset sale programme should the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter reduce production? 9. KEVIN HAGUE to the Minister of Trade: Will New Zealand support Australia's objection to signing up to investor-state dispute provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement; if not, why not? 10. Hon LIANNE DALZIEL to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Why is he offering only 50 percent of rating valuation for commercial or bare land in the residential red zone where the land could not be insured? 11. MARK MITCHELL to the Minister of Corrections: What announcements has she made on improving prisoner employment training in New Zealand prisons? 12. CHRIS HIPKINS to the Minister of Education: Does she stand by all her decisions in relation to schools in Christchurch?
The Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010-2011, in particular the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake and the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, produced severe and widespread liquefaction in Christchurch and surrounding areas. The scale of the liquefaction was unprecedented, and caused extensive damage to a variety of man-made structures, including residential houses. Around 20,000 residential houses suffered serious damage as a direct result of the effects of liquefaction, and this resulted in approximately 7000 houses in the worst-hit areas being abandoned. Despite the good performance of light timber-framed houses under the inertial loads of the earthquake, these structures could not withstand the large loads and deformations associated with liquefaction, resulting in significant damage. The key structural component of houses subjected to liquefaction effects was found to be their foundations, as these are in direct contact with the ground. The performance of house foundations directly influenced the performance of the structure as a whole. Because of this, and due to the lack of research in this area, it was decided to investigate the performance of houses and in particular their foundations when subjected to the effects of liquefaction. The data from the inspections of approximately 500 houses conducted by a University of Canterbury summer research team following the 4th September 2010 earthquake in the worst-hit areas of Christchurch were analysed to determine the general performance of residential houses when subjected to high liquefaction loads. This was followed by the detailed inspection of around 170 houses with four different foundation types common to Christchurch and New Zealand: Concrete perimeter with short piers constructed to NZS3604, concrete slab-on-grade also to NZS3604, RibRaft slabs designed by Firth Industries and driven pile foundations. With a focus on foundations, floor levels and slopes were measured, and the damage to all areas of the house and property were recorded. Seven invasive inspections were also conducted on houses being demolished, to examine in more detail the deformation modes and the causes of damage in severely affected houses. The simplified modelling of concrete perimeter sections subjected to a variety of liquefaction-related scenarios was also performed, to examine the comparative performance of foundations built in different periods, and the loads generated under various bearing loss and lateral spreading cases. It was found that the level of foundation damage is directly related to the level of liquefaction experienced, and that foundation damage and liquefaction severity in turn influence the performance of the superstructure. Concrete perimeter foundations were found to have performed most poorly, suffering high local floor slopes and being likely to require foundation repairs even when liquefaction was low enough that no surface ejecta was seen. This was due to their weak, flexible foundation structure, which cannot withstand liquefaction loads without deforming. The vulnerability of concrete perimeter foundations was confirmed through modelling. Slab-on-grade foundations performed better, and were unlikely to require repairs at low levels of liquefaction. Ribraft and piled foundations performed the best, with repairs unlikely up to moderate levels of liquefaction. However, all foundation types were susceptible to significant damage at higher levels of liquefaction, with maximum differential settlements of 474mm, 202mm, 182mm and 250mm found for concrete perimeter, slab-on-grade, ribraft and piled foundations respectively when subjected to significant lateral spreading, the most severe loading scenario caused by liquefaction. It was found through the analysis of the data that the type of exterior wall cladding, either heavy or light, and the number of storeys, did not affect the performance of foundations. This was also shown through modelling for concrete perimeter foundations, and is due to the increased foundation strengths provided for heavily cladded and two-storey houses. Heavy roof claddings were found to increase the demands on foundations, worsening their performance. Pre-1930 concrete perimeter foundations were also found to be very vulnerable to damage under liquefaction loads, due to their weak and brittle construction.
The collapse of Redcliffs’ cliff in the 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes were the first times ever a major failure incident occurred at Redcliffs in approximately 6000 years. This master’s thesis is a multidisciplinary engineering geological investigation sought to study these particular failure incidents, focusing on collecting the data necessary to explain the cause and effect of the cliff collapsing in the event of two major earthquakes. This study provides quantitative and qualitative data about the geotechnical attributes and engineering geological nature of the sea-cut cliff located at Redcliffs. Results from surveying the geology of Redcliffs show that the exposed lithology of the cliff face is a variably jointed rock body of welded and (relatively intact) unwelded ignimbrite, a predominantly massive unit of brecciated tuff, and a covering of wind-blown loess and soil deposit (commonly found throughout Canterbury) on top of the cliff. Moreover, detailing the external component of the slope profile shows that Redcliffs’ cliff is a 40 – 80 m cliff with two intersecting (NE and SE facing) slope aspects. The (remotely) measured geometry of the cliff face comprises of multiple outstanding gradients, averaging a slope angle of ~67 degrees (post-13 June 2011), where the steepest components are ~80 degrees, whereas the gentle sloping sections are ~44 degrees. The physical structure of Redcliffs’ cliff drastically changed after each collapse, whereby seismically induced alterations to the slope geometry resulted in material deposited on the talus at the base of the cliff. Prior to the first collapse, the variance of the gradient down the slope was minimal, with the SE Face being the most variable with up to three major gradients on one cross section. However, after each major collapse, the variability increased with more parts of the cliff face having more than one major gradient that is steeper or gentler than the remainder of the slope. The estimated volume of material lost as a result of the gradient changes was 28,267 m³ in February and 11,360 m³ in June 2011. In addition, surveys of the cliff top after the failure incidents revealed the development of fissures along the cliff edge. Monitoring 10 fissures over three months indicated that fissured by the cliff edge respond to intense seismicity (generally ≥ Mw 4) by widening. Redcliffs’ cliff collapsed on two separate occasions as a result of an accumulated amount of damage of the rock masses in the cliff (caused by weathering and erosion over time), and two Mw 6.2 trigger earthquakes which shook the Redcliffs and the surrounding area at a Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) estimated to be around 2 g. The results of the theoretical study suggests that PGA levels felt on-site during both instances of failure are the result of three major factors: source of the quake and the site affected; topographic amplification of the ground movement; the short distance between the source and the cliff for both fault ruptures; the focus of seismic energy in the direction of thrust faulting along a path that intercepts Redcliffs (and the Port Hills). Ultimately, failure on the NE and SE Faces of Redcliffs’ cliff was concluded to be global as every part of the exposed cliff face deposited a significant volume of material on the talus at the base of the cliff, with the exception of one section on the NE Face. The cliff collapses was a concurrent process that is a single (non-monotonic) event that operated as a complex series of (primarily) toppling rock falls, some sliding of blocks, and slumping of the soil mantle on top of the cliff. The first collapse had a mixture of equivalent continua slope movement of the heavily weathered / damaged surface of the cliff face, and discontinuous slope movement of the jointed inner slope (behind the heavily weathered surface); whereas the second collapse resulted in only discontinuous slope movement on account of the freshly exposed cliff face that had damage to the rock masses, in the form of old and (relatively) new discontinuous fractures, induced by earthquakes and aftershocks leading up to the point of failure.