At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
Geological research in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, New Zealand, was necessary due to the importance and perishability of field data. It also reflects a real desire on the part of researchers to contribute not only to immediate scientific understanding but also to the societal recovery effort by enhancing knowledge of the event for the benefit of affected communities, civil defence organizations and regional and national decision makers. This commitment to outreach and engagement is consistent with the recent IAPG statement of Geoethics. More immediately, it was informed by experience of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake sequence. After that earlier disaster, intense interactions between researchers and various response agencies as well as local communities informed the development and dissemination of a set of ethical guidelines for researchers immediately following the Mw7.8 14 November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. In this presentation, I argue that ethical engagement of this kind is the key to gathering high quality research data immediately after the event. Creating trusting and mutually respectful, mutually beneficial relationships is also vital to ongoing engagement to facilitate further “in depth” research in collaboration with communities.
© 2017 The Royal Society of New Zealand. This paper discusses simulated ground motion intensity, and its underlying modelling assumptions, for great earthquakes on the Alpine Fault. The simulations utilise the latest understanding of wave propagation physics, kinematic earthquake rupture descriptions and the three-dimensional nature of the Earth's crust in the South Island of New Zealand. The effect of hypocentre location is explicitly examined, which is found to lead to significant differences in ground motion intensities (quantified in the form of peak ground velocity, PGV) over the northern half and southwest of the South Island. Comparison with previously adopted empirical ground motion models also illustrates that the simulations, which explicitly model rupture directivity and basin-generated surface waves, lead to notably larger PGV amplitudes than the empirical predictions in the northern half of the South Island and Canterbury. The simulations performed in this paper have been adopted, as one possible ground motion prediction, in the ‘Project AF8’ Civil Defence Emergency Management exercise scenario. The similarity of the modelled ground motion features with those observed in recent worldwide earthquakes as well as similar simulations in other regions, and the notably higher simulated amplitudes than those from empirical predictions, may warrant a re-examination of regional impact assessments for major Alpine Fault earthquakes.
