An aerial photograph of central Kaiapoi with the New World supermarket in the centre.
Central Kaiapoi
Damage from the Christchurch 7.1 earthquake on 4th Sept 2010
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Damage from the Christchurch 7.1 earthquake on 4th Sept 2010
One Month after the Christchurch Earthquake. This is in Kaiapoi at the north end of Christchurch. A view down the walkway next to the river Twitter | Facebook |
Damage from the Christchurch 7.1 earthquake on 4th Sept 2010
This is the pedestrian bridge in Kaiapoi close to Christchurch. Not the best angle but the whole bridge on the right hand side is twisted and looks like some kind of rollercoaster. Taken one month after the Quake Twitter |
The twisted and buckled bridge over the river. View looking down the bridge. Damaged from the Christchurch Earthquake Twitter | Facebook |
Photograph captioned by Fairfax, "Arnold and Joy Pohio of Kaiapoi, north of Christchurch, speak of their son Joseph Pohio 40 yrs, who was killed during the earthquake while in the central city."
Organisations locate strategically within Business Districts (CBDs) in order to cultivate their image, increase their profile, and improve access to customers, suppliers, and services. While CBDs offer an economic benefit to organisations, they also present a unique set of hazard vulnerabilities and planning challenges for businesses. As of May 2012, the Christchurch CBD has been partially cordoned off for over 14 months. Economic activity within the cordoned CBD, which previously contained 6,000 businesses and over 51,000 workers, has been significantly diminished and organisations have been forced to find new ways of operating. The vulnerabilities and resilience of CBDs not only influences outcomes for CBD organisations, but also the broader interconnected (urban/regional/national) system. A CBD is a hub of economic, social, and built infrastructure within a network of links and nodes. When the hub is disrupted all of the people, objects, and transactions that usually flow into and out of the hub must be redirected elsewhere. In an urban situation this means traffic jams in peripheries of the city, increased prices of commercial property, and capital flight; all of which are currently being faced in Canterbury. This report presents the lessons learned from organisations in CBDs affected by the Canterbury earthquakes. Here we focus on the Christchurch CBD; however, several urban town centres were extensively disrupted by the earthquakes. The statistics and discussion presented in this report are based on the results of an ongoing study conducted by Resilient Organisations (www.resorgs.org.nz). The data was captured using two questionnaire surveys of Canterbury organisations (issued November 2010 and May 2011), interviews with key informants, and in-depth case studies of organisations. Several industry sectors were sampled, and geographic samples of organisations in the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and the Kaiapoi town centre were also collected. Results in this report describing “non-CBD organisations” refer to all organisations outside of the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi town centres.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately 35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global insurance event of all time. These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond. Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local government landscape. This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them to their own planning. It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the lessons from WDC.