In the wake of the Canterbury earthquakes, one of the biggest threats to our heritage buildings is the risk of earthquakes and the associated drive to strengthen or demolish buildings. Can Small Town NZ balance the requirements of the EQPB legislation and economic realities of their places? The government’s priority is on safety of building occupants and citizens in the streets. However, maintaining and strengthening privately-owned heritage buildings is often cost prohibitive. Hence, heritage regulation has frequently been perceived as interfering with private property rights, especially when heritage buildings occupy a special place in the community becoming an important place for people (i.e. public benefits are larger than private). We investigate several case studies where building owners have been given green light to demolish heritage listed buildings to make way for modern developments. In two of the case studies developers provided evidence of unaffordable strengthening costs. A new trend that has emerged is a voluntary offer of contributing to an incentive fund to assist with heritage preservation of other buildings. This is a unique example where private owners offer incentives (via council controlled organisations) instead of it being purely the domain of the central or local governments.
New Zealand's devastating Canterbury earthquakes provided an opportunity to examine the efficacy of existing regulations and policies relevant to seismic strengthening of vulnerable buildings. The mixed-methods approach adopted, comprising both qualitative and quantitative approaches, revealed that some of the provisions in these regulations pose as constraints to appropriate strengthening of earthquake-prone buildings. Those provisions include the current seismic design philosophy, lack of mandatory disclosure of seismic risks and ineffective timeframes for strengthening vulnerable buildings. Recommendations arising from these research findings and implications for pre-disaster mitigation for future earthquake and Canterbury's post-disaster reconstruction suggest: (1) a reappraisal of the requirements for earthquake engineering design and construction, (2) a review and realignment of all regulatory frameworks relevant to earthquake risk mitigation, and (3) the need to develop a national programme necessary to achieve consistent mitigation efforts across the country. These recommendations are important in order to present a robust framework where New Zealand communities such as Christchurch can gradually recover after a major earthquake disaster, while planning for pre-disaster mitigation against future earthquakes. AM - Accepted Manuscript
Following the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, a renewed focus has been directed across New Zealand to the hazard posed by the country‘s earthquake-vulnerable buildings, namely unreinforced masonry (URM) and reinforced concrete (RC) buildings with potentially nonductile components that have historically performed poorly in large earthquakes. The research reported herein was pursued with the intention of addressing several recommendations made by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission of Inquiry which were classified into the following general categories: Identification and provisional vulnerability assessment of URM and RC buildings and building components; Testing, assessment, and retrofitting of URM walls loaded out-of-plane, with a particular focus on highly vulnerable URM cavity walls; Testing and assessment of RC frame components, especially those with presumably non-ductile reinforcement detailing; Portfolio management considering risks, regulations, and potential costs for a portfolio that includes several potentially earthquake-vulnerable buildings; and Ongoing investigations and proposed research needs. While the findings from the reported research have implications for seismic assessments of buildings across New Zealand and elsewhere, an emphasis was placed on Auckland given this research program‘s partnership with the Auckland Council, the Auckland region accounting for about a third each of the country‘s population and economic production, and the number and variety of buildings within the Auckland building stock. An additional evaluation of a historic building stock was carried out for select buildings located in Hawke‘s Bay, and additional experimental testing was carried out for select buildings located in Hawke‘s Bay and Christchurch.
The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage during the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch Central Business District, left this community with more than $NZD 40 billion in losses (~20 % GDP), demolition of approximately 60 % of multi-storey concrete buildings (3 storeys and up), and closure of the core business district for over 2 years. The aftermath of the earthquake sequence has revealed unique issues and complexities for the owners of commercial and multi-storey residential buildings in relation to unexpected technical, legal, and financial challenges when making decisions regarding the future of their buildings impacted by the earthquakes. The paper presents a framework to understand the factors influencing post-earthquake decisions (repair or demolish) on multi-storey concrete buildings in Christchurch. The study, conducted in 2014, includes in-depth investigations on 15 case-study buildings using 27 semi-structured interviews with various property owners, property managers, insurers, engineers, and government authorities in New Zealand. The interviews revealed insights regarding the multitude of factors influencing post-earthquake decisions and losses. As expected, the level of damage and repairability (cost to repair) generally dictated the course of action. There is strong evidence, however, that other variables have significantly influenced the decision on a number of buildings, such as insurance, business strategies, perception of risks, building regulations (and compliance costs), and government decisions. The decision-making process for each building is complex and unique, not solely driven by structural damage. Furthermore, the findings have put the spotlight on insurance policy wordings and the paradoxical effect of insurance on the recovery of Christchurch, leading to other challenges and issues going forward.
Territorial authorities in New Zealand are responding to regulatory and market forces in the wake of the 2011 Christchurch earthquake to assess and retrofit buildings determined to be particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. Pending legislation may shorten the permissible timeframes on such seismic improvement programmes, but Auckland Council’s Property Department is already engaging in a proactive effort to assess its portfolio of approximately 3500 buildings, prioritise these assets for retrofit, and forecast construction costs for improvements. Within the programme structure, the following varied and often competing factors must be accommodated: * The council’s legal, fiscal, and ethical obligations to the people of Auckland per building regulations, health and safety protocols, and economic growth and urban development planning strategies; * The council’s functional priorities for service delivery; * Varied and numerous stakeholders across the largest territorial region in New Zealand in both population and landmass; * Heritage preservation and community and cultural values; and * Auckland’s prominent economic role in New Zealand’s economy which requires Auckland’s continued economic production post-disaster. Identifying those buildings most at risk to an earthquake in such a large and varied portfolio has warranted a rapid field assessment programme supplemented by strategically chosen detailed assessments. Furthermore, Auckland Council will benefit greatly in time and resources by choosing retrofit solutions, techniques, and technologies applicable to a large number of buildings with similar configurations and materials. From a research perspective, the number and variety of buildings within the council’s property portfolio will provide valuable data for risk modellers on building typologies in Auckland, which are expected to be fairly representative of the New Zealand building stock as a whole.
The quality of multi-owned residential buildings and the capability to maintain that quality into the future is important in preserving not only the monetary value of such housing (Lujanen, 2010) but also the quality of life for its residents. The aim of this paper is to examine the governance and decision-making rules and regulations as they relate to the undertaking of major repairs in multi-owned residential buildings in Finland and New Zealand with particular regard to the Finnish Limited Liability Housing Companies Act 2010 (LLHCA 2010) and the New Zealand Unit Titles Act 2010 (UTA 2010). Currently, major building repairs are topical issues in both countries; in Finland as a result of ageing buildings requiring major re-fitting of pipes and other infrastructure, and in New Zealand as a result of earthquake damage in Christchurch and Leaky Building Syndrome nationwide. Major repairs can be a significant financial burden to unit owners and collective decisions can be difficult to achieve. Interestingly, new legislation that governs multi-owned housing was enacted in both countries in 2010. The recent enactment of this legislation provides an opportunity to examine the UTA 2010 and LLHCA 2010 with regard to how they address major repairs, improvements in housing stock and the financing possibilities associated with these undertakings. More specifically this paper explores housing intensification (i.e. building up, out or alongside existing multi-owned residential buildings on commonly owned land) as a means of financing major repairs. The comparison of governance and decision-making in two different shared ownership systems with different histories and cultural contexts provides a chance to explore the possibilities and challenges that each country faces, and the potential to learn from each other’s practices and develop these further. In this regard the findings from this paper contribute to the academic literature (Bugden 2005; Easthope & Randolph 2009; Dupuis & Dixon 2010; Lujanen 2010; Easthope, Hudson & Randolph 2013) concerning to the governance of multi-owned housing as it relates to intensive housing development and its wider social and economic implications.
During the 21st century, New Zealand has experienced increasing public concern over the quality of the design and appearance of new developments, and their effects on the urban environment. In response to this, a number of local authorities developed a range of tools to address this issue, including urban design panels to review proposals and provide independent advice. Following the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, the commitment to achieve high quality urban design within Christchurch was given further importance, with the city facing the unprecedented challenge of rebuilding a ‘vibrant and successful city’.
The rebuild and regeneration reinforced the need for independent design review, putting more focus and emphasis on the role and use of the urban design panel; first through collaboratively assisting applicants in achieving a better design outcome for their development by providing an independent set of eyes on their design; and secondly in assisting Council officers in forming their recommendations on resource consent decisions. However, there is a perception that urban design and the role of the urban design panel is not fully understood, with some stakeholders arguing that Council’s urban design requirements are adding cost and complexity to their developments.
The purpose of this research was to develop a better understanding on the role of the Christchurch urban design panel post-earthquake in the central city; its direct and indirect influence on the built environment; and the deficiencies in the broader planning framework and institutional settings that it might be addressing. Ultimately, the perceived role of the Panel is understood, and there is agreement that urban design is having a positive influence on the built environment, albeit viewed differently amongst the varying groups involved. What has become clear throughout this research is that the perceived tension between the development community and urban design well and truly exists, with the urban design panel contributing towards this. This tension is exacerbated further through the cost of urban design to developers, and the drive for financial return from their investments.
The panel, albeit promoting a positive experience, is simply a ‘tick box’ exercise for some, and as the research suggests, groups or professional are determining themselves what constitutes good urban design, based on their attitude, the context in which they sit and the financial constraints to incorporate good design elements. It is perhaps a bleak time for urban design, and more about building homes.
