The collapse of Redcliffs’ cliff in the 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes were the first times ever a major failure incident occurred at Redcliffs in approximately 6000 years. This master’s thesis is a multidisciplinary engineering geological investigation sought to study these particular failure incidents, focusing on collecting the data necessary to explain the cause and effect of the cliff collapsing in the event of two major earthquakes. This study provides quantitative and qualitative data about the geotechnical attributes and engineering geological nature of the sea-cut cliff located at Redcliffs. Results from surveying the geology of Redcliffs show that the exposed lithology of the cliff face is a variably jointed rock body of welded and (relatively intact) unwelded ignimbrite, a predominantly massive unit of brecciated tuff, and a covering of wind-blown loess and soil deposit (commonly found throughout Canterbury) on top of the cliff. Moreover, detailing the external component of the slope profile shows that Redcliffs’ cliff is a 40 – 80 m cliff with two intersecting (NE and SE facing) slope aspects. The (remotely) measured geometry of the cliff face comprises of multiple outstanding gradients, averaging a slope angle of ~67 degrees (post-13 June 2011), where the steepest components are ~80 degrees, whereas the gentle sloping sections are ~44 degrees. The physical structure of Redcliffs’ cliff drastically changed after each collapse, whereby seismically induced alterations to the slope geometry resulted in material deposited on the talus at the base of the cliff. Prior to the first collapse, the variance of the gradient down the slope was minimal, with the SE Face being the most variable with up to three major gradients on one cross section. However, after each major collapse, the variability increased with more parts of the cliff face having more than one major gradient that is steeper or gentler than the remainder of the slope. The estimated volume of material lost as a result of the gradient changes was 28,267 m³ in February and 11,360 m³ in June 2011. In addition, surveys of the cliff top after the failure incidents revealed the development of fissures along the cliff edge. Monitoring 10 fissures over three months indicated that fissured by the cliff edge respond to intense seismicity (generally ≥ Mw 4) by widening. Redcliffs’ cliff collapsed on two separate occasions as a result of an accumulated amount of damage of the rock masses in the cliff (caused by weathering and erosion over time), and two Mw 6.2 trigger earthquakes which shook the Redcliffs and the surrounding area at a Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) estimated to be around 2 g. The results of the theoretical study suggests that PGA levels felt on-site during both instances of failure are the result of three major factors: source of the quake and the site affected; topographic amplification of the ground movement; the short distance between the source and the cliff for both fault ruptures; the focus of seismic energy in the direction of thrust faulting along a path that intercepts Redcliffs (and the Port Hills). Ultimately, failure on the NE and SE Faces of Redcliffs’ cliff was concluded to be global as every part of the exposed cliff face deposited a significant volume of material on the talus at the base of the cliff, with the exception of one section on the NE Face. The cliff collapses was a concurrent process that is a single (non-monotonic) event that operated as a complex series of (primarily) toppling rock falls, some sliding of blocks, and slumping of the soil mantle on top of the cliff. The first collapse had a mixture of equivalent continua slope movement of the heavily weathered / damaged surface of the cliff face, and discontinuous slope movement of the jointed inner slope (behind the heavily weathered surface); whereas the second collapse resulted in only discontinuous slope movement on account of the freshly exposed cliff face that had damage to the rock masses, in the form of old and (relatively) new discontinuous fractures, induced by earthquakes and aftershocks leading up to the point of failure.
Based on a qualitative study of four organisations involving 47 respondents following the extensive 2010 – 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand, this paper presents some guidance for human resource practitioners dealing with post-disaster recovery. A key issue is the need for the human resource function to reframe its practices in a post-disaster context, developing a specific focus on understanding and addressing changing employee needs, and monitoring the leadership behaviour of supervisors. This article highlights the importance of flexible organisational responses based around a set of key principles concerning communication and employee perceptions of company support.
Deconstruction, at the end of the useful life of a building, produces a considerable amount of materials which must be disposed of, or be recycled / reused. At present, in New Zealand, most timber construction and demolition (C&D) material, particularly treated timber, is simply waste and is placed in landfills. For both technical and economic reasons (and despite the increasing cost of landfills), this position is unlikely to change in the next 10 – 15 years unless legislation dictates otherwise. Careful deconstruction, as opposed to demolition, can provide some timber materials which can be immediately re-used (eg. doors and windows), or further processed into other components (eg. beams or walls) or recycled (‘cascaded’) into other timber or composite products (e.g. fibre-board). This reusing / recycling of materials is being driven slowly in NZ by legislation, the ‘greening’ of the construction industry and public pressure. However, the recovery of useful material can be expensive and uneconomic (as opposed to land-filling). In NZ, there are few facilities which are able to sort and separate timber materials from other waste, although the soon-to-be commissioned Burwood Resource Recovery Park in Christchurch will attempt to deal with significant quantities of demolition waste from the recent earthquakes. The success (or otherwise) of this operation should provide good information as to how future C&D waste will be managed in NZ. In NZ, there are only a few, small scale facilities which are able to burn waste wood for energy recovery (e.g. timber mills), and none are known to be able to handle large quantities of treated timber. Such facilities, with constantly improving technology, are being commissioned in Europe (often with Government subsidies) and this indicates that similar bio-energy (co)generation will be established in NZ in the future. However, at present, the NZ Government provides little assistance to the bio-energy industry and the emergence worldwide of shale-gas reserves is likely to push the economic viability of bio-energy further into the future. The behaviour of timber materials placed in landfills is complex and poorly understood. Degrading timber in landfills has the potential to generate methane, a potent greenhouse gas, which can escape to the atmosphere and cancel out the significant benefits of carbon sequestration during tree growth. Improving security of landfills and more effective and efficient collection and utilisation of methane from landfills in NZ will significantly reduce the potential for leakage of methane to the atmosphere, acting as an offset to the continuing use of underground fossil fuels. Life cycle assessment (LCA), an increasingly important methodology for quantifying the environmental impacts of building materials (particularly energy, and global warming potential (GWP)), will soon be incorporated into the NZ Green Building Council Greenstar rating tools. Such LCA studies must provide a level playing field for all building materials and consider the whole life cycle. Whilst the end-of-life treatment of timber by LCA may establish a present-day base scenario, any analysis must also present a realistic end-of-life scenario for the future deconstruction of any 6 new building, as any building built today will be deconstructed many years in the future, when very different technologies will be available to deal with construction waste. At present, LCA practitioners in NZ and Australia place much value on a single research document on the degradation of timber in landfills (Ximenes et al., 2008). This leads to an end-of-life base scenario for timber which many in the industry consider to be an overestimation of the potential negative effects of methane generation. In Europe, the base scenario for wood disposal is cascading timber products and then burning for energy recovery, which normally significantly reduces any negative effects of the end-of-life for timber. LCA studies in NZ should always provide a sensitivity analysis for the end-of-life of timber and strongly and confidently argue that alternative future scenarios are realistic disposal options for buildings deconstructed in the future. Data-sets for environmental impacts (such as GWP) of building materials in NZ are limited and based on few research studies. The compilation of comprehensive data-sets with country-specific information for all building materials is considered a priority, preferably accounting for end-of-life options. The NZ timber industry should continue to ‘champion’ the environmental credentials of timber, over and above those of the other major building materials (concrete and steel). End-of-life should not be considered the ‘Achilles heel’ of the timber story.
