Prior to the devastating 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, parts of the CBD of Christchurch, New Zealand were undergoing revitalisation incorporating aspects of adaptive reuse and gentrification. Such areas were often characterised by a variety of bars, restaurants, and retail outlets of an “alternative” or “bohemian” style. These early 20th century buildings also exhibited relatively low rents and a somewhat chaotic and loosely planned property development approach by small scale developers. Almost all of these buildings were demolished following the earthquakes and a cordon placed around the CBD for several years. A paper presented at the ERES conference in 2013 presented preliminary results, from observation of post-earthquake public meetings and interviews with displaced CBD retailers. This paper highlighted a strongly held fear that the rebuild of the central city, then about to begin, would result in a very different style and cost structure from that which previously existed. As a result, permanent exclusion from the CBD of the types of businesses that previously characterised the successfully revitalised areas would occur. Five years further on, new CBD retail and office buildings have been constructed, but large areas of land between them remain vacant and the new buildings completed are often having difficulty attracting tenants. This paper reports on the further development of this long-term Christchurch case study and examines if the earlier predictions of the displaced retailers are coming true, in that a new CBD that largely mimics a suburban mall in style and tenancy mix, inherently loses some of its competitive advantage?
Research indicates that aside from the disaster itself, the next major source of adverse outcomes during such events, is from errors by either the response leader or organisation. Yet, despite their frequency, challenge, complexity, and the risks involved; situations of extreme context remain one of the least researched areas in the leadership field. This is perhaps surprising. In the 2010 and 2011 (Christchurch) earthquakes alone, 185 people died and rebuild costs are estimated to have been $40b. Add to this the damage and losses annually around the globe arising from natural disasters, major business catastrophes, and military conflict; there is certainly a lot at stake (lives, way of life, and our well-being). While over the years, much has been written on leadership, there is a much smaller subset of articles on leadership in extreme contexts, with the majority of these focusing on the event rather than leadership itself. Where leadership has been the focus, the spotlight has shone on the actions and capabilities of one person - the leader. Leadership, however, is not simply one person, it is a chain or network of people, delivering outcomes with the support of others, guided by a governance structure, contextualised by the environment, and operating on a continuum across time (before, during, and after an event). This particular research is intended to examine the following: • What are the leadership capabilities and systems necessary to deliver more successful outcomes during situations of extreme context; • How does leadership in these circumstances differ from leadership during business as usual conditions; • Lastly, through effective leadership, can we leverage these unfortunate events to thrive, rather than merely survive?
The use of post-earthquake cordons as a tool to support emergency managers after an event has been documented around the world. However, there is limited research that attempts to understand the use, effectiveness, inherent complexities, impacts and subsequent consequences of cordoning once applied. This research aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed understanding of first, the cordons and associated processes, and their implications in a post-earthquake scenario. We use a qualitative method to understand cordons through case studies of two cities where it was used in different temporal and spatial scales: Christchurch (2011) and Wellington (Kaikōura earthquake 2016), New Zealand. Data was collected through 21 expert interviews obtained through purposive and snowball sampling of key informants who were directly or indirectly involved in a decision-making role and/or had influence in relation to the cordoning process. The participants were from varying backgrounds and roles i.e. emergency managers, council members, business representatives, insurance representatives, police and communication managers. The data was transcribed, coded in Nvivo and then grouped based on underlying themes and concepts and then analyzed inductively. It is found that cordons are used primarily as a tool to control access for the purpose of life safety and security. But cordons can also be adapted to support recovery. Broadly, it can be synthesized and viewed based on two key aspects, ‘decision-making’ and ‘operations and management’, which overlap and interact as part of a complex system. The underlying complexity arises in large part due to the multitude of sectors it transcends such as housing, socio-cultural requirements, economics, law, governance, insurance, evacuation, available resources etc. The complexity further increases as the duration of cordon is extended.
