Looking down Gloucester Street where ongoing demolition and reconstuction work are continuing. Street signs on the road say 'no road marking' and 'truck crossing'. In the background is a Wilson's carpark, converted from a site where a building has been demolished.
Looking in the cordon fence, the damaged Gough House, with windows boarded up and the Vintage Watch store on Hereford Street. On the fence is a sign that says 'Road closed' and another one advertising a Wilson's carpark
A PDF copy of pages 102-103 of the book Christchurch: The Transitional City Pt IV. The pages document the transitional project 'Dog Park Art Project Space'. Photo: Stacey Weaver Photography
A member of the public takes a closer look into the cordon, looking down to Hereford Street to the damaged Gough House, with windows boarded up and part of the Vintage Watch store. On the fence is a sign that says 'Road closed' and another one advertising a Wilson's carpark.
The Kaikoura earthquake in November 2016 highlighted the vulnerability of New Zealand’s rural communities to locally-specific hazard events, which generate regional and national scale impacts. Kaikoura was isolated with significant damage to both the east coast road (SH1) and rail corridor, and the Inland Road (Route 70). Sea bed uplift along the coast was significant – affecting marine resources and ocean access for marine operators engaged in tourism and harvesting, and recreational users. While communities closest to the earthquake epicentre (e.g., Kaikoura, Waiau, Rotherham and Cheviot) suffered the most immediate earthquake damage, the damage to the transport network, and the establishment of an alternative transport route between Christchurch and Picton, has significantly impacted on more distant communities (e.g., Murchison, St Arnaud and Blenheim). There was also considerable damage to vineyard infrastructure across the Marlborough region and damage to buildings and infrastructure in rural settlements in Southern Marlborough (e.g., Ward and Seddon).
The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in supporting lifelines utilities.
Initial recovery focus is on road access (especially the inland SH70) although attention also needs to be focussed on the timelines for reopening SH1 to the south. Information on progress and projected timelines is updated daily via NZTA (www.nzta.govt.nz/eq-travel ). Network analyses indicate potential day trip access and re-establishment of the Alpine Pacific triangle route. When verified against ‘capacity to host’ (Part 2 (15th December) there appears to potential for the reestablishment of overnight visits. Establishing secure road access is the key constraint to recovery. In terms of the economic recovery the Kaikoura District has traditionallyattracted a large number of visitors which can be grouped as: second home (and caravan) owners, domestic New Zealand and international travellers. These have been seen through a behaviour lens as “short stop”, ‘day” (where Kaikoura is the specific focal destination) and overnight visitors. At the present restricted access appears to make the latter group less amenable to visiting Kaikoura, not the least because the two large marine mammal operators have a strong focus on international visitors. For the present the domestic market provides a greater initial pathway to recovery. Our experiences in and reflections on Christchurch suggest Kaikoura will not go back to what it once was. A unique opportunity exists to reframe the Kaikoura experience around earthquake geology and its effects on human and natural elements. To capitalise on this opportunity there appears to be a need to move quickly on programming and presenting such experiences as part of a pathway to re-enabling domestic tourists while international visitor bookings and flows can be re-established. The framework developed for this study appears to be robust for rapid post disaster assessment. It needs to be regularly updated and linked with emerging governance and recovery processes.
Recent tsunami events have highlighted the importance of effective tsunami risk management strategies (including land-use planning, structural and natural mitigation, warning systems, education and evacuation planning). However, the rarity of tsunami means that empirical data concerning reactions to tsunami warnings and evacuation behaviour is rare when compared to findings for evacuations from other hazards. More knowledge is required to document the full evacuation process, including responses to warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics, and the return home. Tsunami evacuation modelling has the potential to inform evidence-based tsunami risk planning and response. However, to date, tsunami evacuation models have largely focused on the timings of evacuations, rather than behaviours of those evacuating. In this research, survey data was gathered from coastal communities in Banks Peninsula and Christchurch, New Zealand, relating to behaviours and actions during the November 14th 2016 Kaikōura earthquake tsunami. Survey questions asked about immediate actions following the earthquake shaking, reactions to tsunami warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics and details on congestion. This data was analysed to characterise trends and identify factors that influenced evacuation actions and behaviour, and was further used to develop a realistic evacuation model prototype to evaluate the capacity of the roading network in Banks Peninsula during a tsunami evacuation. The evacuation model incorporated tsunami risk management strategies that have been implemented by local authorities, and exposure and vulnerability data, alongside the empirical data collected from the survey. This research enhances knowledge of tsunami evacuation behaviour and reactions to tsunami warnings, and can be used to refine evacuation planning to ensure that people can evacuate efficiently, thereby reducing their tsunami exposure and personal risk.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence in New Zealand’s South Island induced widespread liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area on four occasions (4 Sept 2010; 22 Feb; 13 June; 23 Dec 2011), that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand. This impacted transport networks as well as infiltrated and contaminated the damaged storm water system, making rapid clean-up an immediate post-earthquake priority. In some places the ejecta was contaminated by raw sewage and was readily remobilised in dry windy conditions, creating a long-term health risk to the population. Thousands of residential properties were inundated with liquefaction ejecta, however residents typically lacked the capacity (time or resources) to clean-up without external assistance. The liquefaction silt clean-up response was co-ordinated by the Christchurch City Council and executed by a network of contractors and volunteer groups, including the ‘Farmy-Army’ and the ‘Student-Army’. The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately 2 months for each of the 3 main liquefaction inducing earthquakes; despite each event producing different volumes of ejecta. Preliminary cost estimates indicate total clean-up costs will be over NZ$25 million. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill since the beginning of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence. The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as a valuable case study to support further analysis and research on the coordination, management and costs of large volume deposition of fine grained sediment in urban areas.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.