The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
© 2017 The Royal Society of New Zealand. This paper discusses simulated ground motion intensity, and its underlying modelling assumptions, for great earthquakes on the Alpine Fault. The simulations utilise the latest understanding of wave propagation physics, kinematic earthquake rupture descriptions and the three-dimensional nature of the Earth's crust in the South Island of New Zealand. The effect of hypocentre location is explicitly examined, which is found to lead to significant differences in ground motion intensities (quantified in the form of peak ground velocity, PGV) over the northern half and southwest of the South Island. Comparison with previously adopted empirical ground motion models also illustrates that the simulations, which explicitly model rupture directivity and basin-generated surface waves, lead to notably larger PGV amplitudes than the empirical predictions in the northern half of the South Island and Canterbury. The simulations performed in this paper have been adopted, as one possible ground motion prediction, in the ‘Project AF8’ Civil Defence Emergency Management exercise scenario. The similarity of the modelled ground motion features with those observed in recent worldwide earthquakes as well as similar simulations in other regions, and the notably higher simulated amplitudes than those from empirical predictions, may warrant a re-examination of regional impact assessments for major Alpine Fault earthquakes.
The major earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought to an abrupt end a process of adaptive reuse, revitalisation and gentrification that was underway in the early 20th century laneways and buildings located in the south eastern corner of the Christchurch Central Business District. Up until then, this location was seen as an exemplar of how mixed use could contribute to making the central city an attractive and viable alternative to the suburban living experience predominant in New Zealand.
This thesis is the result of a comprehensive case study of this “Lichfield Lanes” area, which involved in depth interviews with business owners, observation of public meetings and examination of documents and the revitalisation research literature. Findings were that many of the factors seen to make this location successful pre-earthquakes mirror the results of similar research in other cities. These factors include: the importance of building upon historic architecture and the eclectic spaces this creates; a wide variety of uses generating street life; affordable rental levels; plus the dangers of uniformity of use brought about by focussing on business types that pay the most rent. Also critical is co-operation between businesses to create and effectively market and manage an identifiable precinct that has a coherent style and ambience that differentiates the location from competing suburban malls. In relation to the latter, a significant finding of this project was that the hospitality and retail businesses key to the success of Lichfield Lanes were not typical and could be described as quirky, bohemian, chaotic, relatively low rent, owner operated and appealing to the economically important “Creative Class” identified by Richard Florida (2002) and others. In turn, success for many of these businesses can be characterised as including psychological and social returns rather than simply conventional economic benefits. This has important implications for inner city revitalisation, as it contrasts with the traditional focus of local authorities and property developers on physical aspects and tenant profitability as measures of success. This leads on to an important conclusion from this research, which is that an almost completely inverted strategy from that applied to suburban mall development, may be most appropriate for successful inner city revitalisation. It also highlights a disconnection between the focus and processes of regulatory authorities and the outcomes and processes most acceptable to the people likely to frequent the central city. Developers are often caught in the middle of this conflicted situation. Another finding was early commitment by businesses to rebuild the case study area in the same style, but over time this waned as delay, demolition, insurance problems, political and planning uncertainty plus other issues made participation by the original owners and tenants impossible or uneconomic. In conclusion, the focus of inner city revitalisation is too often on buildings rather than the people that use them and what they now desire from the central city.
