The 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, and the resulting extensive data sets on damaged buildings that have been collected, provide a unique opportunity to exercise and evaluate previously published seismic performance assessment procedures. This poster provides an overview of the authors’ methodology to perform evaluations with two such assessment procedures, namely the P-58 guidelines and the REDi Rating System. P-58, produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States, aims to facilitate risk assessment and decision-making by quantifying earthquake ground shaking, structural demands, component damage and resulting consequences in a logical framework. The REDi framework, developed by the engineering firm ARUP, aids stakeholders in implementing resilience-based earthquake design. Preliminary results from the evaluations are presented. These have the potential to provide insights on the ability of the assessment procedures to predict impacts using “real-world” data. However, further work remains to critically analyse these results and to broaden the scope of buildings studied and of impacts predicted.
The operation of telecommunication networks is critical during business as usual times, and becomes most vital in post-disaster scenarios, when the services are most needed for restoring other critical lifelines, due to inherent interdependencies, and for supporting emergency and relief management tasks. In spite of the recognized critical importance, the assessment of the seismic performance for the telecommunication infrastructure appears to be underrepresented in the literature. The FP6 QuakeCoRE project “Performance of the Telecommunication Network during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence” will provide a critical contribution to bridge this gap. Thanks to an unprecedented collaboration between national and international researchers and highly experienced asset managers from Chorus, data and evidences on the physical and functional performance of the telecommunication network after the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011 have been collected and collated. The data will be processed and interpreted aiming to reveal fragilities and resilience of the telecommunication networks to seismic events
An UnReinforced clay brick Masonry (URM) chimney is composed of a cantilever URM appendage above a roofline and is considered one of the most earthquake prone non-structural compo¬nents within vintage URM and timber-framed buildings. Observations from past earthquakes including the 1992 Big Bear City earthquake, 1994 Northridge earthquake, 2001 Nisqually earthquake, 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes, 2012 Northern Italy earthquakes, and 2014 South Napa earthquake served repeatedly as a reminder of the hazard induced by URM chimneys. The observed failure types included several cases where the adopted retrofit techniques were not adequate to effectively secure chimneys dur¬ing the earthquake. Data collected during the 2010/2011 post-earthquake building assessments in Christchurch and insur¬ance claims are reported herein. Five full-scale solid clay brick URM chimneys which replicated the most encountered geometrical and construction characteristics were subjected to shake table testing. Two chim¬ney samples were representative of the as-built conditions, while three samples were retrofitted using two different configurations of Near-Surface-Mounted (NSM) Carbon-Fibre-Reinforced-Polymer (CFRP) strips and post-tensioning techniques. The adopted securing techniques allowed an increase in seismic acceleration capacity of more than five times for chimneys constructed with ultra-weak mortar and more than twice for chimneys built with weak mortar. http://www.16ibmac.com/
