Depicts huge elderly woman with 'CERA' on her dress scolding smaller adult dressed as schoolboy near bustop with sign 'CBD red zone tours' Text reads 'And don't talk to strangers and don't cross the road and remember to eat your lunch..' Context: After the 22 Feburary 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, the central business district (CBD) was marked as a red zone. Red zone areas were deemed unsuitable for habitation due to significant damage and at high risk of further damage from low levels of earth shaking. CERA (Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority) ran public bus tours of the Christchurch CBD from November to December 2011. For safety reasons the public was not allowed off the buses as it was a dangerous and active demolition site.
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New Zealanders have been extraordinarily generous in responding to the misery caused by the earthquakes in Christchurch. Contributions have poured in from everywhere as the rest of us express our solidarity the only way we really can, but allocating all this goodwill can be somewhat complicated. John Ware is director general of NZ Red Cross, and explained the complexities for us.
Under the caption 'Best value for money?' is a football stadium displaying a red cross. From within a voice proclaims the advantages of having a combined covered stadium, hospital and blood bank.
Under CERA, the Christchurch Central Development Unit had planned for a covered sports stadium, with attached facilities and shops as one of the key sites in the Christchurch rebuild after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. The 'blood bin' refers to the recent practice in rugby of sending off players with flesh wounds. There were also plans for a new hospital.
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The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes. The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world. In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison. The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs. After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices. Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.
