Mechanistic and scientific approaches to resilience assume that there is a “tipping point” at which a system can no longer absorb adversity; after this point, it is liable to collapse. Some of these perspectives, particularly those stemming from ecology and psychology, recognise that individuals and communities cannot be perpetually resilient without limits. While the resilience paradigm has been imported into the social sciences, the limits to resilience have often been disregarded. This leads to an overestimation of “human resourcefulness” within the resilience paradigm. In policy discourse, practice, and research, resilience seems to be treated as a “limitless” and human quality in which individuals and communities can effectively cope with any hazard at any time, for as long as they want and with any people. We critique these assumptions with reference to the recovery case in Ōtautahi Christchurch, Aotearoa New Zealand following the 2010-11 Canterbury earthquake sequence. We discuss the limits to resilience and reconceptualise resilience thinking for disaster risk reduction and sustainable recovery and development.
The skills agenda has grown in prominence within the construction industry. Indeed, skill shortages have been recognised as a perennial problem the construction industry faces, especially after a major disaster. In the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes, small and medium construction companies were at the forefront of rebuilding efforts. While the survival of these companies was seen to be paramount, and extreme events were seen to be a threat to survival, there is a dearth of research centring on their resourcing capacity following a disaster. This research aims to develop workforce resourcing best practice guidelines for subcontractors in response to large disaster reconstruction demands. By using case study methods, this research identified the challenges faced by subcontracting businesses in resourcing Christchurch recovery projects; identified the workforce resourcing strategies adopted by subcontracting businesses in response to reconstruction demand; and developed a best practice guideline for subcontracting businesses in managing the workforce at the organisational and/or project level. This research offers a twofold contribution. First, it provides an overview of workforce resourcing practices in subcontracting businesses. This understanding has enabled the development of a more practical workforce resourcing guideline for subcontractors. Second, it promotes evidence-informed decision-making in subcontractors’ workforce resourcing. Dynamics in workforce resourcing and their multifaceted interactions were explicitly depicted in this research. More importantly, this research provides a framework to guide policy development in producing a sustainable solution to skill shortages and establishing longterm national skill development initiatives. Taken together, this research derives a research agenda that maps under-explored areas relevant for further elaboration and future research. Prospective researchers can use the research results in identifying gaps and priority areas in relation to workforce resourcing.
Disasters are often followed by a large-scale stimulus supporting the economy through the built environment, which can last years. During this time, official economic indicators tend to suggest the economy is doing well, but as activity winds down, the sentiment can quickly change. In response to the damaging 2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand, the regional economy outpaced national economic growth rates for several years during the rebuild. The repair work on the built environment created years of elevated building activity. However, after the peak of the rebuilding activity, as economic and employment growth retracts below national growth, we are left with the question of how the underlying economy performs during large scale stimulus activity in the built environment. This paper assesses the performance of the underlying economy by quantifying the usual, demand-driven level of building activity at this time. Applying an Input–Output approach and excluding the economic benefit gained from the investment stimulus reveals the performance of the underlying economy. The results reveal a strong growing underlying economy, and while convergence was expected as the stimulus slowed down, the results found that growth had already crossed over for some time. The results reveal that the investment stimulus provides an initial 1.5% to 2% growth buffer from the underlying economy before the growth rates cross over. This supports short-term economic recovery and enables the underlying economy to transition away from a significant rebuild stimulus. Once the growth crosses over, five years after the disaster, economic growth in the underlying economy remains buoyant even if official regional economic data suggest otherwise.
