Tests have revealed that New Zealand's latest building designs will stand up to earthquakes of a greater intensity than the ones that occurred in Christchurch and Kaikōura. Researchers from the University of Auckland and Canterbury, in collaboration with QuakeCoRE and Tongji University in China, built a two-storey concrete building and put it on one of the largest shake tables in the world. All of the building's details were based on existing buildings in Wellington and Christchurch. The project leader is the University of Auckland's Dr Rick Henry. He talks to Guyon Espiner.
The use of post-earthquake cordons as a tool to support emergency managers after an event has been documented around the world. However, there is limited research that attempts to understand the use, effectiveness, inherent complexities, impacts and subsequent consequences of cordoning once applied. This research aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed understanding of first, the cordons and associated processes, and their implications in a post-earthquake scenario. We use a qualitative method to understand cordons through case studies of two cities where it was used in different temporal and spatial scales: Christchurch (2011) and Wellington (Kaikōura earthquake 2016), New Zealand. Data was collected through 21 expert interviews obtained through purposive and snowball sampling of key informants who were directly or indirectly involved in a decision-making role and/or had influence in relation to the cordoning process. The participants were from varying backgrounds and roles i.e. emergency managers, council members, business representatives, insurance representatives, police and communication managers. The data was transcribed, coded in Nvivo and then grouped based on underlying themes and concepts and then analyzed inductively. It is found that cordons are used primarily as a tool to control access for the purpose of life safety and security. But cordons can also be adapted to support recovery. Broadly, it can be synthesized and viewed based on two key aspects, ‘decision-making’ and ‘operations and management’, which overlap and interact as part of a complex system. The underlying complexity arises in large part due to the multitude of sectors it transcends such as housing, socio-cultural requirements, economics, law, governance, insurance, evacuation, available resources etc. The complexity further increases as the duration of cordon is extended.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes. The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world. In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison. The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs. After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices. Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.
JAN TINETTI to the Minister of Education: What actions has the Government taken to increase the number of New Zealanders participating in vocational education? Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH to the Minister of Finance: What measures, if any, does he have in place to ensure New Zealanders receive good value for money from the Government’s major spending initiatives? Hon JUDITH COLLINS to the Minister of Housing: Will there be any further delays to the conclusion of the KiwiBuild reset, including due to the resignation of the KiwiBuild head of delivery? Dr DUNCAN WEBB to the Minister for Courts: What recent reports has he seen regarding the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal? Hon NIKKI KAYE to the Associate Minister of Education: Does she stand by her statement regarding learning support coordinator allocations, “I’m pleased, I’m really pleased. I know there are people complaining, and that’s OK. We seem to live in a world where somebody’s got to complain about everything”? Hon MARK MITCHELL to the Minister responsible for Pike River Re-entry: Does he stand by all his statements, policies, and actions on the Pike River Mine? ANGIE WARREN-CLARK to the Minister for the Environment: What action is the Government taking to enhance urban development and protect elite soils? TODD MULLER to the Minister of Agriculture: Does he have confidence in New Zealand’s agricultural sector? Hon DAVID BENNETT to the Minister of Corrections: Does he stand by his statement, “We have never had to manage a prisoner like this before”, in relation to the alleged Christchurch gunman? JENNY MARCROFT to the Minister for Infrastructure: What recent announcements has he made regarding the New Zealand Infrastructure Commission-Te Waihanga? BRETT HUDSON to the Minister of Transport: Can he rule out any further increases in transport taxes or charges under this Government? DENISE LEE to the Minister for Women: Why did she say yesterday that the equal pay legislation was in select committee when it was reported back on 13 May, and has been sitting on the Order Paper for three months?
The increase of the world's population located near areas prone to natural disasters has given rise to new ‘mega risks’; the rebuild after disasters will test the governments’ capabilities to provide appropriate responses to protect the people and businesses. During the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes (2010-2012) that destroyed much of the inner city, the government of New Zealand set up a new partnership between the public and private sector to rebuild the city’s infrastructure. The new alliance, called SCIRT, used traditional risk management methods in the many construction projects. And, in hindsight, this was seen as one of the causes for some of the unanticipated problems. This study investigated the risk management practices in the post-disaster recovery to produce a specific risk management model that can be used effectively during future post-disaster situations. The aim was to develop a risk management guideline for more integrated risk management and fill the gap that arises when the traditional risk management framework is used in post-disaster situations. The study used the SCIRT alliance as a case study. The findings of the study are based on time and financial data from 100 rebuild projects, and from surveying and interviewing risk management professionals connected to the infrastructure recovery programme. The study focussed on post-disaster risk management in construction as a whole. It took into consideration the changes that happened to the people, the work and the environment due to the disaster. System thinking, and system dynamics techniques have been used due to the complexity of the recovery and to minimise the effect of unforeseen consequences. Based on an extensive literature review, the following methods were used to produce the model. The analytical hierarchical process and the relative importance index have been used to identify the critical risks inside the recovery project. System theory methods and quantitative graph theory have been used to investigate the dynamics of risks between the different management levels. Qualitative comparative analysis has been used to explore the critical success factors. And finally, causal loop diagrams combined with the grounded theory approach has been used to develop the model itself. The study identified that inexperienced staff, low management competency, poor communication, scope uncertainty, and non-alignment of the timing of strategic decisions with schedule demands, were the key risk factors in recovery projects. Among the critical risk groups, it was found that at a strategic management level, financial risks attracted the highest level of interest, as the client needs to secure funding. At both alliance-management and alliance-execution levels, the safety and environmental risks were given top priority due to a combination of high levels of emotional, reputational and media stresses. Risks arising from a lack of resources combined with the high volume of work and the concern that the cost could go out of control, alongside the aforementioned funding issues encouraged the client to create the recovery alliance model with large reputable construction organisations to lock in the recovery cost, at a time when the scope was still uncertain. This study found that building trust between all parties, clearer communication and a constant interactive flow of information, established a more working environment. Competent and clear allocation of risk management responsibilities, cultural shift, risk prioritisation, and staff training were crucial factors. Finally, the post-disaster risk management (PDRM) model can be described as an integrated risk management model that considers how the changes which happened to the environment, the people and their work, caused them to think differently to ease the complexity of the recovery projects. The model should be used as a guideline for recovery systems, especially after an earthquake, looking in detail at all the attributes and the concepts, which influence the risk management for more effective PDRM. The PDRM model is represented in Causal Loops Diagrams (CLD) in Figure 8.31 and based on 10 principles (Figure 8.32) and 26 concepts (Table 8.1) with its attributes.
The ultimate goal of this study is to develop a model representing the in-plane behaviour of plasterboard ceiling diaphragms, as part of the efforts towards performance-based seismic engineering of low-rise light timber-framed (LTF) residential buildings in New Zealand (NZ). LTF residential buildings in NZ are constructed according to a prescriptive standard – NZS 3604 Timberframed buildings [1]. With regards to seismic resisting systems, LTF buildings constructed to NZS3604 often have irregular bracing arrangements within a floor plane. A damage survey of LTF buildings after the Canterbury earthquake revealed that structural irregularity (irregular bracing arrangement within a plane) significantly exacerbated the earthquake damage to LTF buildings. When a building has irregular bracing arrangements, the building will have not only translational deflections but also a torsional response in earthquakes. How effectively the induced torsion can be resolved depends on the stiffness of the floors/roof diaphragms. Ceiling and floor diaphragms in LTF buildings in NZ have different construction details from the rest of the world and there appears to be no information available on timber diaphragms typical of NZ practice. This paper presents experimental studies undertaken on plasterboard ceiling diaphragms as typical of NZ residential practice. Based on the test results, a mathematical model simulating the in-plane stiffness of plasterboard ceiling diaphragms was developed, and the developed model has a similar format to that of plasterboard bracing wall elements presented in an accompany paper by Liu [2]. With these two models, three-dimensional non-linear push-over studies of LTF buildings can be undertaken to calculate seismic performance of irregular LTF buildings.
The world experiences a number of disasters each year. Following a disaster, the affected area moves to a phase of recovery which involves multiple stakeholders. An important element of recovery is planning the rebuild of the affected environment guided by the legislative framework to which planning is bound to (March & Kornakova, 2017). Yet, there appears to be little research that has investigated the role of planners in a recovery setting and the implications of recovery legislative planning frameworks. This study was conducted to explore the role of the planner in the Canterbury earthquake recovery process in New Zealand and the impact of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) on planners’ roles and how they operated. The methodology comprised a combination of document analysis of legislation and related recovery material and 21 semi-structured interviews with key planners, politicians and professionals involved in the recovery. The results suggest that the majority of planners interviewed were affected by the CER Act in their role and how they operated, although institutional context, especially political constraints, was a key factor in determining the degree of impact. It is argued that planners played a key role in recovery and were generally equipped in terms of skills needed in a recovery setting. In order to better utilise planners in post-disaster recovery or disaster risk management, two suggestions are proposed. Firstly, better promote planners and their capabilities to improve awareness of what planners can do. Secondly, educate and build an understanding between central government politicians and planners over each others role to produce better planning outcomes.
