Photos taken in Lyttelton showing the demolition of various buildings following the February 22 earthquake. File reference: CCL-2011-04-29-Lyttelton-Demolition-P1120223 From the collection of Christchurch City Libraries.
Photos taken in Lyttelton showing the demolition at various locations following the February 22 earthquake. File reference: CCL-2011-05-20-Lyttelton-Demolition-P1120445 From the collection of Christchurch City Libraries.
Lyttelton Service centre is boarded up and partially fenced off.
A photograph of the boarded-up Lyttelton Service Centre on London Street in Lyttelton.
A photograph of the boarded-up Lyttelton Service Centre on London Street in Lyttelton.
A photograph captioned by BeckerFraserPhotos, "A sign in the front doors of the Lyttelton Library on London Street, reading 'Lyttelton Service Centre now open'".
This book is the result of an investigation into the vulnerability of the infrastructure serving metropolitan Christchurch (including Lyttelton). The work was undertaken by the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group and the objectives are: to identify the vulnerability of engineering lifeline services to damage from earthquakes, flooding, tsunami and meteorological hazards; to identify practical engineering strategies for reducing the risk or impact of such damage and for providing for reinstatement following such events; and to communicate the issues to people involved in the management of these services and to raise the awareness of the public to their importance.
Organisations locate strategically within Business Districts (CBDs) in order to cultivate their image, increase their profile, and improve access to customers, suppliers, and services. While CBDs offer an economic benefit to organisations, they also present a unique set of hazard vulnerabilities and planning challenges for businesses. As of May 2012, the Christchurch CBD has been partially cordoned off for over 14 months. Economic activity within the cordoned CBD, which previously contained 6,000 businesses and over 51,000 workers, has been significantly diminished and organisations have been forced to find new ways of operating. The vulnerabilities and resilience of CBDs not only influences outcomes for CBD organisations, but also the broader interconnected (urban/regional/national) system. A CBD is a hub of economic, social, and built infrastructure within a network of links and nodes. When the hub is disrupted all of the people, objects, and transactions that usually flow into and out of the hub must be redirected elsewhere. In an urban situation this means traffic jams in peripheries of the city, increased prices of commercial property, and capital flight; all of which are currently being faced in Canterbury. This report presents the lessons learned from organisations in CBDs affected by the Canterbury earthquakes. Here we focus on the Christchurch CBD; however, several urban town centres were extensively disrupted by the earthquakes. The statistics and discussion presented in this report are based on the results of an ongoing study conducted by Resilient Organisations (www.resorgs.org.nz). The data was captured using two questionnaire surveys of Canterbury organisations (issued November 2010 and May 2011), interviews with key informants, and in-depth case studies of organisations. Several industry sectors were sampled, and geographic samples of organisations in the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and the Kaiapoi town centre were also collected. Results in this report describing “non-CBD organisations” refer to all organisations outside of the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi town centres.
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.