This thesis looks at the protocols museums and galleries adopt for the safeguarding of art, artefacts and cultural heritage. In particular, it analyses these procedures in relation to the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch, and considers how these events shaped the preventative conservation measures in place in museum and gallery institutions. Through gathering, assessing, and comparing this information about Christchurch’s institutions to disaster management best practices in national and international organisations, this thesis gauges the extent to which disaster management was changed in response to the events in Christchurch. This thesis first considers the growth in disaster management as a field, before examining what are considered best practices within this sector. Finally, it looks at specific institutions in Christchurch, including the Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu, Canterbury Museum, and the Air Force Museum of New Zealand.
Today was the first time I have been to the earthquake memorial since it was completed and opened on 22nd February 2017, six years after the devastating quake that killed the 185 that are named on this wall.
I knew two of the people on the list.
Nel presente articolo si illustra una procedura per il processamento automatizzato di prove CPT, il calcolo di vari indici di liquefazione e la rappresentazione dei dati su mappa. La procedura è applicata al caso studio del terremoto di Christchurch, Nuova Zelanda, del 22 febbraio 2011 (magnitudo momento, Mw = 6.2). Dall’analisi spaziale dei risultati emerge una buona correlazione tra le mappe ottenute per l’indicatore degli effetti al suolo e i danni osservati (su terreni e strutture). Tuttavia, per confermare la validità di tale procedura, sarà necessario esaminare ulteriori casi studio nel mondo.
73 months after the earthquake that damaged it, the jetty at South New Brighton Domain is still not repaired. Seven years ago it was straight and level.
Dull, flat and orrible (horrible) light meant this image was destined to become monochrome!
Only two of 20 houses left in the Rawhiti Earthquake Village.
This from the sign on perimeter fence:
"Since 2011, Rawhiti Domain has been used to provide temporary accommodation for those affected by the Canterbury earthquakes.
Over 200 households have used the 20 houses while their own homes have been repaired or rebuilt. The demand for acco...
Christchurch City Council (Council) is undertaking the Land Drainage Recovery Programme in order to assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three stages: Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies required to fill the gaps. Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 1. Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and compare with policy options; however, Council have not established a consistent policy on managed retreat that can be applied for equal comparison; without which substantial assumptions are required. We recommend Council undertake a study to define a managed retreat framework as an option for the city. - In undertaking Stage 1 with floodplain management as the focal point in a multi hazards context we have identified that Stage 3 requires consideration of options in the context of economics, implementation and residual risk. Presently the scope of work will provide a level of definition for floodplain options; however, this will not be at equal levels of detail for other hazard management options. Therefore, we recommend Council considers undertaking other studies with those key hazards (e.g. Coastal Hazards) as a focal point and identifies the engineering options to address such hazards. Doing so will provide equal levels of information for Council to make an informed and defendable decision on which options are progressed following Stage 3.
The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
The magnitude Mw7.8 ‘Kaikōura’ earthquake occurred shortly after midnight on 14 November 2016. This paper presents an overview of the geotechnical impacts on the South Island of New Zealand recorded during the postevent reconnaissance. Despite the large moment magnitude of this earthquake, relatively little liquefaction was observed across the South Island, with the only severe manifestation occurring in the young, loose alluvial deposits in the floodplains of the Wairau and Opaoa Rivers near Blenheim. The spatial extent and volume of liquefaction ejecta across South Island is significantly less than that observed in Christchurch during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and the impact of its occurrence to the built environment was largely negligible on account of the severe manifestations occurring away from the areas of major development. Large localised lateral displacements occurred in Kaikōura around Lyell Creek. The soft fine-grained material in the upper portions of the soil profile and the free face at the creek channel were responsible for the accumulation of displacement during the ground shaking. These movements had severely impacted the houses which were built close (within the zone of large displacement) to Lyell Creek. The wastewater treatment facility located just north of Kaikōura also suffered tears in the liners of the oxidation ponds and distortions in the aeration system due to ground movements. Ground failures on the Amuri and Emu Plains (within the Waiau Valley) were small considering the large peak accelerations (in excess of 1g) experienced in the area. Minor to moderate lateral spreading and ejecta was observed at some bridge crossings in the area. However, most of the structural damage sustained by the bridges was a result of the inertial loading, and the damage resulting from geotechnical issues were secondary.
Successful urban regeneration projects generate benefits that are realised over a much longer timeframe than normal market developments and benefits well beyond those that can be uplifted by a market developer. Consequently there is substantial evidence in the literature that successful place-making and urban regeneration projects are usually public-private partnerships and involve a funder, usually local or central government, willing to contribute ‘patient’ capital. Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes that devastated the centre of Christchurch, there was an urgent need to rebuild and revitalise the heart of the city, and increasing the number of people living in or near the city centre was seen as a key ingredient of that. In October 2010, an international competition was launched to design and build an Urban Village, a project intended to stimulate renewed residential development in the city. The competition attracted 58 entrants from around world, and in October 2013 the winning team was chosen from four finalists. However the team failed to secure sufficient finance, and in November 2015 the Government announced that the development would not proceed. The Government was unwilling or unable to recognise that an insistence on a pure market approach would not deliver the innovative sustainable village asked for in the competition brief, and failed to factor in the opportunity cost to government, local government, local businesses and the wider Christchurch community of delaying by many years the residential development of the eastern side of the city. As a result, the early vision of the vitality that a thriving residential neighbourhood would bring to the city has not yet been realised.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
