On 14 November 2016 a magnitude Mw 7.8 earthquake struck the upper South Island of New Zealand with effects also being observed in the capital city, Wellington. The affected area has low population density but is the largest wine production region in New Zealand and also hosts the main national highway and railway routes connecting the country’s three largest cities of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, with Marlborough Port in Picton providing connection between the South and North Islands. These transport facilities sustained substantial earthquake related damage, causing major disruptions. Thousands of landslides and multiple new faults were counted in the area. The winery facilities and a large number of commercial buildings and building components (including brick masonry veneers, historic masonry construction, and chimneys), sustained damage due to the strong vertical and horizontal acceleration. Presented herein are field observations undertaken the day immediately after the earthquake, with the aim to document earthquake damage and assess access to the affected area.
This paper provides a brief discussion of observed strong ground motions from the 14 November 2016 Mw7.8 Kaikoura earthquake. Specific attention is given to examining observations in the near-source region where several ground motions exceeding 1.0g horizontal are recorded, as well as up to 2.7g in the vertical direction at one location. Ground motion response spectra in the near-source, North Canterbury, Marlborough and Wellington regions are also examined and compared with design levels. Observed spectral amplitudes are also compared with predictions from empirical and physics-based ground motion modelling.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand. Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads. While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption. Following a robust review of literature and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Findings were supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and infrastructure exposure maps. A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services. The earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture. Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre landlines as they went. Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives. Adapting to an artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road cordon in order to get home to family and farms. Performance of dwellings was tied to socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre. Farmers who lost water access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers. Socioeconomic differences between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between the towns assessed in this study. Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and flexible with planning for multiple size classes of towns.
The magnitude Mw7.8 ‘Kaikōura’ earthquake occurred shortly after midnight on 14 November 2016. This paper presents an overview of the geotechnical impacts on the South Island of New Zealand recorded during the postevent reconnaissance. Despite the large moment magnitude of this earthquake, relatively little liquefaction was observed across the South Island, with the only severe manifestation occurring in the young, loose alluvial deposits in the floodplains of the Wairau and Opaoa Rivers near Blenheim. The spatial extent and volume of liquefaction ejecta across South Island is significantly less than that observed in Christchurch during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and the impact of its occurrence to the built environment was largely negligible on account of the severe manifestations occurring away from the areas of major development. Large localised lateral displacements occurred in Kaikōura around Lyell Creek. The soft fine-grained material in the upper portions of the soil profile and the free face at the creek channel were responsible for the accumulation of displacement during the ground shaking. These movements had severely impacted the houses which were built close (within the zone of large displacement) to Lyell Creek. The wastewater treatment facility located just north of Kaikōura also suffered tears in the liners of the oxidation ponds and distortions in the aeration system due to ground movements. Ground failures on the Amuri and Emu Plains (within the Waiau Valley) were small considering the large peak accelerations (in excess of 1g) experienced in the area. Minor to moderate lateral spreading and ejecta was observed at some bridge crossings in the area. However, most of the structural damage sustained by the bridges was a result of the inertial loading, and the damage resulting from geotechnical issues were secondary.
Farming and urban regions are impacted by earthquake disasters in different ways, and feature a range of often different recovery requirements. In New Zealand, and elsewhere, most earthquake impact and recovery research is urban focused. This creates a research deficit that can lead to the application of well-researched urban recovery strategies in rural areas to suboptimal effect. To begin to reduce this deficit, in-depth case studies of the earthquake impacts and recovery of three New Zealand farms severely impacted by the 14th November 2016, M7.8 Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake were conducted. The initial earthquake, its aftershocks and coseismic hazards (e.g., landslides, liquefaction, surface rupture) affected much of North Canterbury, Marlborough and the Wellington area. The three case study farms were chosen to broadly represent the main types of farming and topography in the Hurunui District in North Canterbury. The farms were directly and indirectly impacted by earthquakes and related hazards. On-farm infrastructure (e.g., woolsheds, homesteads) and essential services (e.g., water, power), frequently sourced from distributed networks, were severely impacted. The earthquake occurred after two years of regional drought had already stressed farm systems and farmers to restructuring or breaking point. Cascading interlinked hazards stemming from the earthquakes and coseismic hazards continued to disrupt earthquake recovery over a year after the initial earthquake. Semi-structured interviews with the farmers were conducted nine and fourteen months after the initial earthquake to capture the timeline of on-going impacts and recovery. Analysis of both geological hazard data and interview data resulted in the identification of key factors influencing farm level earthquake impact and recovery. These include pre-existing conditions (e.g., drought); farm-specific variations in recovery timelines; and resilience strategies for farm recovery resources. The earthquake recovery process presented all three farms with opportunities to change their business plans and adapt to mitigate on-going and future risk.
Geological research in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, New Zealand, was necessary due to the importance and perishability of field data. It also reflects a real desire on the part of researchers to contribute not only to immediate scientific understanding but also to the societal recovery effort by enhancing knowledge of the event for the benefit of affected communities, civil defence organizations and regional and national decision makers. This commitment to outreach and engagement is consistent with the recent IAPG statement of Geoethics. More immediately, it was informed by experience of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake sequence. After that earlier disaster, intense interactions between researchers and various response agencies as well as local communities informed the development and dissemination of a set of ethical guidelines for researchers immediately following the Mw7.8 14 November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. In this presentation, I argue that ethical engagement of this kind is the key to gathering high quality research data immediately after the event. Creating trusting and mutually respectful, mutually beneficial relationships is also vital to ongoing engagement to facilitate further “in depth” research in collaboration with communities.
Recent tsunami events have highlighted the importance of effective tsunami risk management strategies (including land-use planning, structural and natural mitigation, warning systems, education and evacuation planning). However, the rarity of tsunami means that empirical data concerning reactions to tsunami warnings and evacuation behaviour is rare when compared to findings for evacuations from other hazards. More knowledge is required to document the full evacuation process, including responses to warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics, and the return home. Tsunami evacuation modelling has the potential to inform evidence-based tsunami risk planning and response. However, to date, tsunami evacuation models have largely focused on the timings of evacuations, rather than behaviours of those evacuating. In this research, survey data was gathered from coastal communities in Banks Peninsula and Christchurch, New Zealand, relating to behaviours and actions during the November 14th 2016 Kaikōura earthquake tsunami. Survey questions asked about immediate actions following the earthquake shaking, reactions to tsunami warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics and details on congestion. This data was analysed to characterise trends and identify factors that influenced evacuation actions and behaviour, and was further used to develop a realistic evacuation model prototype to evaluate the capacity of the roading network in Banks Peninsula during a tsunami evacuation. The evacuation model incorporated tsunami risk management strategies that have been implemented by local authorities, and exposure and vulnerability data, alongside the empirical data collected from the survey. This research enhances knowledge of tsunami evacuation behaviour and reactions to tsunami warnings, and can be used to refine evacuation planning to ensure that people can evacuate efficiently, thereby reducing their tsunami exposure and personal risk.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
On November 14 2016 a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck the south island of New Zealand. The earthquake lasted for just two minutes with severe seismic shaking and damage in the Hurunui and Kaikōura districts. Although these are predominantly rural areas, with scattered small towns and mountainous topography, they also contain road and rail routes that are essential parts of the national transport infrastructure. This earthquake and the subsequent recovery are of particular significance as they represent a disaster following in close proximity to another similar disaster, with the Canterbury earthquakes occurring in a neighboring district five years earlier. The research used an inductive qualitative case study to explore the nature of the Kaikōura recovery. That recovery process involved a complex interplay between the three parties; (a) the existing local government in the district, (b) central government agencies funding the recovery of the local residents and the national transport infrastructure, and (c) recovery leaders arriving with recent expertise from the earlier Canterbury disaster. It was evident that three groups: locals, government, and experts represented a multi-party governance debate in which the control of the Kaikōura earthquake recovery was shared amongst them. Each party had their own expertise, adgenda and networks that they brought to the Kaikōura recovery, but this created tensions between external expertise and local, community leadership. Recent earthquake research suggests that New Zealand is currently in the midst of an earthquake cluster, with further seismic disasters likely to occur in relatively close succession. This is likely to be compounded by the increasing frequency of other natural disasters with the effects of climate change. The present study investigates a phenomenon that may become increasingly common, with the transfer of disaster expertise from one event to another, and the interface between those experts with local and national government in directing recoveries. The findings of this study have implications for practitioners and policy makers in NZ and other countries where disasters are experienced in close spatial and temporal proximity.
The Stone Jug Fault (SJF) ruptured during the November 14th, 2016 (at 12:02 am), Mw 7.8 Kaikōura Earthquake which initiated ~40 km west-southwest of the study area, at a depth of approximately 15 km. Preliminary post-earthquake mapping indicated that the SJF connects the Conway-Charwell and Hundalee faults, which form continuous surface rupture, however, detailed study of the SJF had not been undertaken prior to this thesis due to its remote location and mountainous topography. The SJF is 19 km long, has an average strike of ~160° and generally carries approximately equal components of sinistral and reverse displacement. The primary fault trace is sigmoidal in shape with the northern and southern tips rotating in strike from NNW to NW, as the SJF approaches the Hope and Hundalee faults. It comprises several steps and bends and is associated with many (N=48) secondary faults, which are commonly near irregularities in the main fault geometry and in a distributed fault zone at the southern tip. The SJF is generally parallel to Torlesse basement bedding where it may utilise pre-existing zones of weakness. Horizontal, vertical and net displacements range up to 1.4 m, with displacement profiles along the primary trace showing two main maxima separated by a minima towards the middle and ends of the fault. Average net displacement along the primary trace is ~0.4m, with local changes in relative values of horizontal and vertical displacement at least partly controlled by fault strike. Two trenches excavated across the northern segment of the fault revealed displacement of mainly Holocene stratigraphy dated using radiocarbon (N=2) and OSL (N=4) samples. Five surface-rupturing paleoearthquakes displaying vertical displacements of <1 m occurred at: 11,000±1000, 7500±1000, 6500±1000, 3500±100 and 3 (2016 Kaikōura) years BP. These events produce an average slip rate since ~11 ka of 0.2-0.4 mm/yr and recurrence intervals of up to 5500 years with an average recurrence interval of 2750 yrs. Comparison of these results with unpublished trench data suggests that synchronous rupture of the Hundalee, Stone Jug, Conway-Charwell, and Humps faults at ~3500 yrs BP cannot be discounted and it is possible that multi-fault ruptures in north Canterbury are more common than previously thought.
Recent global tsunami events have highlighted the importance of effective tsunami risk management strategies (including land-use planning, structural and natural defences, warning systems, education and evacuation measures). However, the rarity of tsunami means that empirical data concerning reactions to tsunami warnings and tsunami evacuation behaviour is rare when compared to findings about evacuations to avoid other sources of hazard. To date empirical research into tsunami evacuations has focused on evacuation rates, rather than other aspects of the evacuation process. More knowledge is required about responses to warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics and the return home after evacuations. Tsunami evacuation modelling has the potential to inform evidence-based tsunami risk planning and response. However to date tsunami evacuation models have largely focused on timings of evacuations, rather than evacuation behaviours. This Masters research uses a New Zealand case study to reduce both of these knowledge gaps. Qualitative survey data was gathered from populations across coastal communities in Banks Peninsula and Christchurch, New Zealand, required to evacuate due to the tsunami generated by the November 14th 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. Survey questions asked about reactions to tsunami warnings, actions taken prior to evacuating and movements during the 2016 tsunami evacuation. This data was analysed to characterise trends and identify factors that influenced evacuation actions and behaviour. Finally, it was used to develop an evacuation model for Banks Peninsula. Where appropriate, the modelling inputs were informed by the survey data. Three key findings were identified from the results of the evacuation behaviour survey. Although 38% of the total survey respondents identified the earthquake shaking as a natural cue for the tsunami, most relied on receiving official warnings, including sirens, to prompt evacuations. Respondents sought further official information to inform their evacuation decisions, with 39% of respondents delaying their evacuation in order to do so. Finally, 96% of total respondents evacuated by car. This led to congestion, particularly in more densely populated Christchurch city suburbs. Prior to this research, evacuation modelling had not been completed for Banks Peninsula. The results of the modelling showed that if evacuees know how to respond to tsunami warnings and where and how to evacuate, there are no issues. However, if there are poor conditions, including if people do not evacuate immediately, if there are issues with the roading network, or if people do not know where or how to evacuate, evacuation times increase with there being more bottlenecks leading out of the evacuation zones. The results of this thesis highlight the importance of effective tsunami education and evacuation planning. Reducing exposure to tsunami risk through prompt evacuation relies on knowledge of how to interpret tsunami warnings, and when, where and how to evacuate. Recommendations from this research outline the need for public education and engagement, and the incorporation of evacuation signage, information boards and evacuation drills. Overall these findings provide more comprehensive picture of tsunami evacuation behaviour and decision making based on empirical data from a recent evacuation, which can be used to improve tsunami risk management strategies. This empirical data can also be used to inform evacuation modelling to improve the accuracy and realism of the evacuation models.
The November 2016 MW 7.8 Kaikōura Earthquake initiated beneath the North Culverden basin on The Humps fault and propagated north-eastwards, rupturing at least 17 faults along a cumulative length of ~180 km. The geomorphic expression of The Humps Fault across the Emu Plains, along the NW margin of Culverden basin, comprises a series of near-parallel strands separated by up to 3 km across strike. The various strands strike east to east-northeast and have been projected to mainly dip steeply to the south in seismic data (~80°). In this area, the fault predominantly accommodates right-lateral slip, with uplift and subsidence confined to releasing and restraining bends and step-overs at a range of scales. The Kaikōura event ruptured pre-existing fault scarps along the Emu Plains, which had been partly identified prior to the earthquake. Geomorphology and faulting expression of The Humps Fault on The Emu Plains was mapped, along with faulting related structures which did not rupture in the 2016 earthquake. Fault ruptures strands are combined into sections and the kinematic deformation of sections analysed to provide a moment tensor fault plane solution. This fault plane solution is consistent with the regional principal horizontal shortening direction (PHS) of ~115°, similar to seismic focal mechanism solutions of some of the nearby aftershocks of the Kaikōura earthquake, and similar to the adjacent Hope Fault. To constrain the timing of paleoseismic events, a trench was excavated across the fault where it crossed a late Quaternary alluvial fan. Mapping of stratigraphy exposed in the trench walls, and dating of variably deformed strata, constrains the pre-historic earthquake event history at the trench site. The available data provides evidence for at least three paleo-earthquakes within the last 15.1 ka, with a possible fourth (penultimate) event. These events are estimated to have occurred at 7.7-10.3 ka, 10.3-14.8 ka, and one or more events that are older than ~15.1 ka. Some evidence suggests an additional penultimate event between 1850 C.E and 7.7 ka. Time-integrated slip-rates at three locations on the fault are measured using paleo-channels as piercing points. These sites give horizontal slip rates of 0.57 ± 0.1 mm/year, 0.49 ± 0.1 mm/year and one site constrains a minimum of between 0.1 - 0.4 mm/year. Two vertical slip-rates are calculated to be constrained to a maximum of 0.2 ± 0.02 mm/year at one site and between 0.02 and 0.1 mm/year at another site. Prior to this study, The Humps fault had only been partially documented in reconnaissance level mapping in the district, and no previous paleoseismic or slip rate data had been reported. This project has provided a detailed fault zone tectonic geomorphic map and established new slip-rate and paleoseismic data. The results highlight that The Humps fault plays an important role in regional seismicity and in accommodating plate boundary deformation across the North Canterbury region.
