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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

Christchurch city experienced a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on September 4, at 4:35 am. The epicentre was 40 km west of the city. It is the most damaging earthquake in New Zealand since the Hawke's Bay earthquake in 1931, but there was no loss of life. It was fortunate the earthquake occurred when the central city streets were deserted, as there ...

Images, eqnz.chch.2010

Christchurch city experienced a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on September 4 at 4:35 am. The epicentre was 40 km west of the city. It was the most damaging earthquake in New Zealand since the Hawke's Bay earthquake in 1931, but there was no loss of life. It was fortunate the earthquake occurred when the central city streets were deserted, as there w...

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

Following the devastating 1931 Hawke's Bay earthquake, buildings in Napier and surrounding areas in the Hawke's Bay region were rebuilt in a comparatively homogenous structural and architectural style comprising the region's famous Art Deco stock. These interwar buildings are most often composed of reinforced concrete two-way space frames, and although they have comparatively ductile detailing for their date of construction, are often expected to be brittle, earthquake-prone buildings in preliminary seismic assessments. Furthermore, the likelihood of global collapse of an RC building during a design-level earthquake became an issue warranting particular attention following the collapse of multiple RC buildings in the February 22, 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Those who value the architectural heritage and future use of these iconic Art Deco buildings - including building owners, tenants, and city officials, among others - must consider how they can be best preserved and utilized functionally given the especially pressing implications of relevant safety, regulatory, and economic factors. This study was intended to provide information on the seismic hazard, geometric weaknesses, collapse hazards, material properties, structural detailing, empirically based vulnerability, and recommended analysis approaches particular to Art Deco buildings in Hawke's Bay as a resource for professional structural engineers tasked with seismic assessments and retrofit designs for these buildings. The observed satisfactory performance of similar low-rise, ostensibly brittle RC buildings in other earthquakes and the examination of the structural redundancy and expected column drift capacities in these buildings, led to the conclusion that the seismic capacity of these buildings is generally underrated in simple, force-based assessments.

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

Following the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, a renewed focus has been directed across New Zealand to the hazard posed by the country‘s earthquake-vulnerable buildings, namely unreinforced masonry (URM) and reinforced concrete (RC) buildings with potentially nonductile components that have historically performed poorly in large earthquakes. The research reported herein was pursued with the intention of addressing several recommendations made by the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission of Inquiry which were classified into the following general categories:  Identification and provisional vulnerability assessment of URM and RC buildings and building components;  Testing, assessment, and retrofitting of URM walls loaded out-of-plane, with a particular focus on highly vulnerable URM cavity walls;  Testing and assessment of RC frame components, especially those with presumably non-ductile reinforcement detailing;  Portfolio management considering risks, regulations, and potential costs for a portfolio that includes several potentially earthquake-vulnerable buildings; and  Ongoing investigations and proposed research needs. While the findings from the reported research have implications for seismic assessments of buildings across New Zealand and elsewhere, an emphasis was placed on Auckland given this research program‘s partnership with the Auckland Council, the Auckland region accounting for about a third each of the country‘s population and economic production, and the number and variety of buildings within the Auckland building stock. An additional evaluation of a historic building stock was carried out for select buildings located in Hawke‘s Bay, and additional experimental testing was carried out for select buildings located in Hawke‘s Bay and Christchurch.

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

The M7.1 Darfield earthquake shook the town of Christchurch (New Zealand) in the early morning on Saturday 4th September 2010 and caused damage to a number of heritage unreinforced masonry buildings. No fatalities were reported directly linked to the earthquake, but the damage to important heritage buildings was the most extensive to have occurred since the 1931 Hawke‟s Bay earthquake. In general, the nature of damage was consistent with observations previously made on the seismic performance of unreinforced masonry buildings in large earthquakes, with aspects such as toppled chimneys and parapets, failure of gables and poorly secured face-loaded walls, and in-plane damage to masonry frames all being extensively documented. This report on the performance of the unreinforced masonry buildings in the 2010 Darfield earthquake provides details on typical building characteristics, a review of damage statistics obtained by interrogating the building assessment database that was compiled in association with post-earthquake building inspections, and a review of the characteristic failure modes that were observed.

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

In the early morning of 4th September 2010 the region of Canterbury, New Zealand, was subjected to a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. The epicentre was located near the town of Darfield, 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. This was the country’s most damaging earthquake since the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake (GeoNet, 2010). Since 4th September 2010 the region has been subjected to thousands of aftershocks, including several more damaging events such as a magnitude 6.3 aftershock on 22nd February 2011. Although of a smaller magnitude, the earthquake on 22nd February produced peak ground accelerations in the Christchurch region three times greater than the 4th September earthquake and in some cases shaking intensities greater than twice the design level (GeoNet, 2011; IPENZ, 2011). While in September 2010 most earthquake shaking damage was limited to unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings, in February all types of buildings sustained damage. Temporary shoring and strengthening techniques applied to buildings following the Darfield earthquake were tested in February 2011. In addition, two large aftershocks occurred on 13th June 2011 (magnitudes 5.7 and 6.2), further damaging many already weakened structures. The damage to unreinforced and retrofitted clay brick masonry buildings in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake has already been reported by Ingham and Griffith (2011) and Dizhur et al. (2010b). A brief review of damage from the 22nd February 2011 earthquake is presented here

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Rock mass defect controlled deep-seated landslides are widespread within the deeply incised landscapes formed in Tertiary soft rock terrain in New Zealand. The basal failure surfaces of deep-seated slope failures are defined by thin, comparatively weak and laterally continuous bedding parallel layers termed critical stratigraphic horizons. These horizons have a sedimentary origin and have typically experienced some prior tectonically induced shear displacement at the time of slope failure. The key controls on the occurrence and form of deep-seated landslides are considered in terms of rock mass defect properties and tectonic and climatic forcing. The selection of two representative catchments (in southern Hawke's Bay and North Canterbury) affected by tectonic and climatic forcing has shown that the spatial and temporal initiation of deep-seated bedrock landslides in New Zealand Tertiary soft rock terrain is a predictable rather than a stochastic process; and that deep-seated landslides as a mass wasting process have a controlling role in landscape evolution in many catchments formed in Tertiary soft rock terrain. The Ella Landslide in North Canterbury is a deep-seated (~85 m) translational block slide that has failed on a 5 - 10 mm thick, kaolinite-rich, pre-sheared critical stratigraphic horizon. The residual strength of this sedimentary horizon, (C'R 2.6 - 2.7 kPa, and Ѳ'R = 16 - 21°), compared to the peak strength of the dominant lithology (C' = 176 kPa, and Ѳ' = 37°) defines a high strength contrast in the succession, and therefore a critical location for the basal failure surface of deep-seated slope failures. The (early to mid Holocene) Ella Landslide debris formed a large landslide dam in the Kate Stream catchment and this has significantly retarded rates of mass wasting in the middle catchment. Numerical stability analysis shows that this slope failure would have most likely required the influence of earthquake induced strong ground motion and the event is tentatively correlated to a Holocene event on the Omihi Fault. The influence of this slope failure is likely to affect the geomorphic development of the catchment on a scale of 10⁴ - 10⁵ years. In deeply incised catchments at the southeastern margin of the Maraetotara Plateau, southern Hawke's Bay, numerous widespread deep-seated landslides have basal failure surfaces defined by critical stratigraphic horizons in the form of thin « 20 mm) tuffaceous beds in the Makara Formation flysch (alternating sandstone and mudstone units). The geometry of deep-seated slope failures is controlled by these regularly spaced (~70 m), very weak critical stratigraphic horizons (C'R 3.8 - 14.2 kPa, and Ѳ'R = 2 - 5°), and regularly spaced (~45 m) and steeply dipping (-50°) critical conjugate joint/fault sets, which act as slide block release surfaces. Numerical stability analysis and historical precedent show that the temporal initiation of deep-seated landslides is directly controlled by short term tectonic forcing in the form of periodic large magnitude earthquakes. Published seismic hazard data shows the recurrence interval of earthquakes producing strong ground motions of 0.35g at the study site is every 150 yrs, however, if subduction thrust events are considered the level of strong ground motion may be much higher. Multiple occurrences of deep-seated slope failure are correlated to failure on the same critical stratigraphic horizon, in some cases in three adjacent catchments. Failure on multiple critical stratigraphic horizons leads to the development of a "stepped" landscape morphology. This slope form will be maintained during successive accelerated stream incision events (controlled by long term tectonic and climatic forcing) for as long as catchments are developing in this specific succession. Rock mass defect controlled deep seated landslides are controlling catchment head progression, landscape evolution and hillslope morphology in the Hawke's Bay study area and this has significant implications for the development of numerical landscape evolution models of landscapes formed in similar strata. Whereas the only known numerical model to consider deep seated landslides as an erosion process (ZSCAPE) considers them as stochastic in time and space, this study shows that this could not be applied to a landscape where the widespread spatial occurrence of deep-seated landslides is controlled by rock mass defects. In both of the study areas for this project, and by implication in many catchments in Tertiary soft rock terrain, deep-seated landslides controlled by rock mass defect strength, spacing and orientation, and tectonic and climatic forcing have an underlying control on landscape evolution. This study quantifies parameters for the development of numerical landscape evolution models that would assess the role of specific parameters, such as uplift rates, incision rates and earthquake recurrence in catchment evolution in Tertiary soft rock terrain.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

INTRODUCTION: Connections between environmental factors and mental health issues have been postulated in many different countries around the world. Previously undertaken research has shown many possible connections between these fields, especially in relation to air quality and extreme weather events. However, research on this subject is lacking in New Zealand, which is difficult to analyse as an overall nation due to its many micro-climates and regional differences.OBJECTIVES: The aim of this study and subsequent analysis is to explore the associations between environmental factors and poor mental health outcomes in New Zealand by region and predict the number of people with mental health-related illnesses corresponding to the environmental influence.METHODS: Data are collected from various public-available sources, e.g., Stats NZ and Coronial services of New Zealand, which comprised four environmental factors of our interest and two mental health indicators data ranging from 2016 up until 2020. The four environmental factors are air pollution, earthquakes, rainfall and temperature. Two mental health indicators include the number of people seen by District Health Boards (DHBs) for mental health reasons and the statistics on suicide deaths. The initial analysis is carried out on which regions were most affected by the chosen environmental factors. Further analysis using Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average(ARIMA) creates a model based on time series of environmental data to generate estimation for the next two years and mental health projected from the ridge regression.RESULTS: In our initial analysis, the environmental data was graphed along with mental health outcomes in regional charts to identify possible associations. Different regions of New Zealand demonstrate quite different relationships between the environmental data and mental health outcomes. The result of later analysis predicts that the suicide rate and DHB mental health visits may increase in Wellington, drop-in Hawke's Bay and slightly increase in Canterbury for the year 2021 and 2022 with different environmental factors considered.CONCLUSION: It is evident that the relationship between environmental and mental health factors is regional and not national due to the many micro-climates that exist around the nation. However, it was observed that not all factors displayed a good relationship between the regions. We conclude that our hypotheses were partially correct, in that increased air pollution was found to correlate to increased mental health-related DHB visits. Rainfall was also highly correlated to some mental health outcomes. Higher levels of rainfall reduced DHB visits and suicide rates in some areas of the country.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Recent surface-rupturing earthquakes in New Zealand have highlighted significant exposure and vulnerability of the road network to fault displacement. Understanding fault displacement hazard and its impact on roads is crucial for mitigating risks and enhancing resilience. There is a need for regional-scale assessments of fault displacement to identify vulnerable areas within the road network for the purposes of planning and prioritising site-specific investigations. This thesis employs updated analysis of data from three historical surface-rupturing earthquakes (Edgecumbe 1987, Darfield 2010, and Kaikoūra 2016) to develop an empirical model that addresses the gap in regional fault displacement hazard analysis. The findings contribute to understanding of • How to use seismic hazard model inputs for regional fault displacement hazard analysis • How faulting type and sediment cover affects the magnitude and spatial distribution of fault displacement • How the distribution of displacement and regional fault displacement hazard is impacted by secondary faulting • The inherent uncertainties and limitations associated with employing an empirical approach at a regional scale • Which sections of New Zealand’s roading network are most susceptible to fault displacement hazard and warrant site-specific investigations • Which regions should prioritise updating emergency management plans to account for post-event disruptions to roading. I used displacement data from the aforementioned historical ruptures to generate displacement versus distance-to-fault curves for various displacement components, fault types, and geological characteristics. Using those relationships and established relationships for along-strike displacement, displacement contours were generated surrounding active faults within the NZ Community Fault Model. Next, I calculated a new measure of 1D strain along roads as well as relative hazard, which integrated 1D strain and normalised slip rate data. Summing these values at the regional level identified areas of heightened relative hazard across New Zealand, and permits an assessment of the susceptibility of road networks using geomorphon land classes as proxies for vulnerability. The results reveal that fault-parallel displacements tend to localise near the fault plane, while vertical and fault-perpendicular displacements sustain over extended distances. Notably, no significant disparities were observed in off-fault displacement between the hanging wall and footwall sides of the fault, or among different surface geology types, potentially attributed to dataset biases. The presence of secondary faulting in the dataset contributes to increased levels of tectonic displacement farther from the fault, highlighting its significance in hazard assessments. Furthermore, fault displacement contours delineate broader zones around dip-slip faults compared to strike-slip faults, with correlations identified between fault length and displacement width. Road ‘strain’ values are higher around dip-slip faults, with notable examples observed in the Westland and Buller Districts. As expected, relative hazard analysis revealed elevated values along faults with high slip rates, notably along the Alpine Fault. A regional-scale analysis of hazard and exposure reveals heightened relative hazard in specific regions, including Wellington, Southern Hawke’s Bay, Central Bay of Plenty, Central West Coast, inland Canterbury, and the Wairau Valley of Marlborough. Notably, the Central West Coast exhibits the highest summed relative hazard value, attributed to the fast-slipping Alpine Fault. The South Island generally experiences greater relative hazard due to larger and faster-slipping faults compared to the North Island, despite having fewer roads. Central regions of New Zealand face heightened risk compared to Southern or Northern regions. Critical road links intersecting high-slipping faults, such as State Highways 6, 73, 1, and 2, necessitate prioritisation for site-specific assessments, emergency management planning and targeted mitigation strategies. Roads intersecting with the Alpine Fault are prone to large parallel displacements, requiring post-quake repair efforts. Mitigation strategies include future road avoidance of nearby faults, modification of road fill and surface material, and acknowledgement of inherent risk, leading to prioritised repair efforts of critical roads post-quake. Implementing these strategies enhances emergency response efforts by improving accessibility to isolated regions following a major surface-rupturing event, facilitating faster supply delivery and evacuation assistance. This thesis contributes to the advancement of understanding fault displacement hazard by introducing a novel regional, empirical approach. The methods and findings highlight the importance of further developing such analyses and extending them to other critical infrastructure types exposed to fault displacement hazard in New Zealand. Enhancing our comprehension of the risks associated with fault displacement hazard offers valuable insights into various mitigation strategies for roading infrastructure and informs emergency response planning, thereby enhancing both national and global infrastructure resilience against geological hazards.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

Questions to Ministers 1. Hon RODNEY HIDE to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: Does she accept her Ministry's advice that the value of New Zealand's onshore minerals excluding hydrocarbons is $194 billion overall with $80 billion estimated in Schedule 4 land; if so, what plans does the Government have to allow their development? 2. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Minister for the Rugby World Cup: What advice has the Prime Minister, the Government or Rugby New Zealand 2011 been given on Christchurch's ability to host Rugby World Cup matches later this year? 3. CHESTER BORROWS to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the economy's prospects after New Zealand meets the immediate challenges of the Christchurch earthquake? 4. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Minister for Communications and Information Technology: Would he indicate his agreement to a further extension, if it were required, to the report back date for the Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband and Other Matters) Amendment Bill? 5. TE URUROA FLAVELL to the Minister of Agriculture: Is he concerned to learn that New Zealand's first majority Māori-owned dairy company, Miraka, has reportedly stated that there is a serious risk that Fonterra's proposed Trading Among Farmers exchange will be illiquid, volatile and unstable; if so, what assurances can he give Miraka and other dairy processors and industry groups, that anti-competitive behaviour will not be tolerated? 6. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Acting Minister for Economic Development: Has he been advised by the Prime Minister whether his appointment as Acting Minister for Economic Development is temporary or expected to carry on to the election? 7. JO GOODHEW to the Minister of Education: What progress has been made on re-opening Christchurch schools and early childhood education centres since the 22 February earthquake? 8. GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister of Health: Does he favour the sale of any public hospitals in New Zealand; if so, which one or ones? 9. SIMON BRIDGES to the Minister for Building and Construction: What advice has he received from the Department of Building and Housing regarding last month's Christchurch earthquake? 10. DARIEN FENTON to the Minister of Labour: What factors did she consider in deciding to increase the minimum wage by 25 cents from 1 April in her latest review? 11. CHRIS TREMAIN to the Minister of Transport: What progress has been made on roading projects in the Hawke's Bay region? 12. GARETH HUGHES to the Minister of Finance: What steps, if any, is he taking to reduce New Zealand's economic vulnerability that stems from dependence on oil? Questions to Members 1. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Chairperson of the Finance and Expenditure Committee: How many submissions have been received so far on the Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband and Other Matters) Amendment Bill? 2. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Chairperson of the Finance and Expenditure Committee: How many submitters on the Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband and Other Matters) Amendment Bill have requested an oral hearing? 3. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Chairperson of the Finance and Expenditure Committee: Is he aware of any complaints about times allocated to submitters on the Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband and Other Matters) Amendment Bill?