In the wake of the Canterbury earthquakes, one of the biggest threats to our heritage buildings is the risk of earthquakes and the associated drive to strengthen or demolish buildings. Can Small Town NZ balance the requirements of the EQPB legislation and economic realities of their places? The government’s priority is on safety of building occupants and citizens in the streets. However, maintaining and strengthening privately-owned heritage buildings is often cost prohibitive. Hence, heritage regulation has frequently been perceived as interfering with private property rights, especially when heritage buildings occupy a special place in the community becoming an important place for people (i.e. public benefits are larger than private). We investigate several case studies where building owners have been given green light to demolish heritage listed buildings to make way for modern developments. In two of the case studies developers provided evidence of unaffordable strengthening costs. A new trend that has emerged is a voluntary offer of contributing to an incentive fund to assist with heritage preservation of other buildings. This is a unique example where private owners offer incentives (via council controlled organisations) instead of it being purely the domain of the central or local governments.
The lived reality of the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes and its implications for the Waimakariri District, a small but rapidly growing district (third tier of government in New Zealand) north of Christchurch, can illustrate how community well-being, community resilience, and community capitals interrelate in practice generating paradoxical results out of what can otherwise be conceived as a textbook ‘best practice’ case of earthquake recovery. The Waimakariri District Council’s integrated community based recovery framework designed and implemented post-earthquakes in the District was built upon strong political, social, and moral capital elements such as: inter-institutional integration and communication, participation, local knowledge, and social justice. This approach enabled very positive community outputs such as artistic community interventions of the urban environment and communal food forests amongst others. Yet, interests responding to broader economic and political processes (continuous central government interventions, insurance and reinsurance processes, changing socio-cultural patterns) produced a significant loss of community capitals (E.g.: social fragmentation, participation exhaustion, economic leakage, etc.) which simultaneously, despite local Council and community efforts, hindered community well-being in the long term. The story of the Waimakariri District helps understand how resilience governance operates in practice where multi-scalar, non-linear, paradoxical, dynamic, and uncertain outcomes appear to be the norm that underpins the construction of equitable, transformative, and sustainable pathways towards the future.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes. The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world. In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison. The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs. After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices. Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.
