Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
Environmental groups say Canterbury's earthquakes are being used as an excuse to weaken the Resource Management Act.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
Disaster recovery is significantly affected by funding availability. The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are not only impacted by the extent of the funding but also the mechanisms with which funding is prioritised, allocated and delivered. This research addresses the impact of funding mechanisms on the effectiveness and efficiency of post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. A qualitative assessment of the impacts on recovery of different funding sources and mechanisms was carried out, using the 2010 Canterbury Earthquake as well as other recent international events as case studies. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness, environmental, economic and social impacts. Of the case studies investigated, the Canterbury Earthquake was the only disaster response to rely solely on a privatised approach to insurance for debris management. Due to the low level of resident displacement and low level of hazard in the waste, this was a satisfactory approach, though not ideal. This approach has led to greater organisational complexity and delays. For many other events, the potential community wide impacts caused by the prolonged presence of disaster debris means that publicly funded and centrally facilitated programmes appear to be the most common and effective method of managing disaster waste.
A photograph of a New Zealand Fire Service Environment Protection Unit truck parked outside Latimer Square.
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 10 October 2011 entitled, "Water Woes".
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 28 October 2011 entitled, "Preserved Puss".
An entry from Ruth Gardner's blog for 24 October 2011 entitled, "Don't ask, don't tell".
The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are impacted by the organisation and human resourcing of the physical works. This research addresses the suitability of different resourcing strategies on post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. This qualitative analysis primarily draws on five international case studies including 2010 Canterbury earthquake, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 2009 Samoan Tsunami, 2009 Victorian Bushfires and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The implementation strategies are divided into two categories: collectively and individually facilitated works. The impacts of the implementation strategies chosen are assessed for all disaster waste management activities including demolition, waste collection, transportation, treatment and waste disposal. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness of projects; and environmental, economic and social impacts. Generally, the case studies demonstrate that detritus waste removal and debris from major repair work is managed at an individual property level. Debris collection, demolition and disposal are generally and most effectively carried out as a collective activity. However, implementation strategies are affected by contextual factors (such as funding and legal constraints) and the nature of the disaster waste (degree of hazardous waste, geographical spread of waste etc.) and need to be designed accordingly. Community involvement in recovery activities such as demolition and debris removal is shown to contribute positively to psychosocial recovery.
The "Lyttelton Review" newsletter for 21 November 2011, produced by the Lyttelton Harbour Information Centre.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event.
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
1. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: Does he have confidence in his Minister of Finance?
2. CRAIG FOSS to the Minister of Finance: How much does the Government expect to spend over the next few years to help rebuild Christchurch in the aftermath of the two earthquakes?
3. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: Does she stand by her statement in regard to hardship assistance that "…I think it proves that the help is there when people need it,"; if so, why?
4. RAHUI KATENE to the Minister of Health: What action, if any, has been taken in light of the study Ethnicity and Management of Colon Cancer in New Zealand: Do Indigenous Patients Get a Worse Deal?, which concluded that Māori New Zealanders with colon cancer were less likely to receive adjuvant chemotherapy and experienced a lower quality of care compared with non-Māori patients?
5. CHRIS AUCHINVOLE to the Minister for the Environment: What steps is the Government taking to increase renewable electricity generation in light of reports that greenhouse gas emissions from this sector have increased by 120 percent, which is more than any other sector since 1990?
6. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister of Finance: Excluding the banks and non-bank financial institutions covered by the deposit guarantee scheme, are there any other companies that might be provided with a government guarantee while the Rt Hon John Key is Prime Minister?
7. JONATHAN YOUNG to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: What is Petrobras able to do under the permit granted to it in the Raukumara Basin?
8. DAVID CLENDON to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: What environmental protection provisions, if any, did the Government include in the permit granted to Petrobras to explore for oil and drill off the East Cape?
9. Hon TREVOR MALLARD to the Prime Minister: Does he have confidence in all Ministers involved in the Mediaworks frequency payment arrangement?
10. AARON GILMORE to the Minister of Revenue: What has Inland Revenue done to assist the people in Christchurch after the February earthquake?
11. GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister responsible for Ministerial Services: Does he stand by his statements in relation to the purchase of 34 BMWs by Ministerial Services, including one with heated seats, that "Yeah I don't know what's in Dunedin" and "It's beyond me, it's not my car anyway"?
12. SHANE ARDERN to the Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture: What has been the result of enforcement action taken by the Ministry of Fisheries under Operation Paid and Taskforce Webb?
