20170509_6305_7D2-62 Remembrance (129/365) Today was the first time I have been to the earthquake memorial since it was completed and opened on 22nd February 2017, six years after the devastating quake that killed the 185 that are named on this wall. I knew two of the people on the list.
Research report N. 2016-2 This report presents the simplified seismic assessment of a case study reinforced concrete (RC) building following the newly developed and refined NZSEE/MBIE guidelines on seismic assessment (NZSEE/MBIE, semi-final draft 26 October 2016). After an overview of the step-by-step ‘diagnostic’ process, including an holistic and qualitative description of the expected vulnerabilities and of the assessment strategy/methodology, focus is given, whilst not limited, to the implementation of a Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA) (NZSEE/MBIE, 2016c). The DSA is intended to provide a more reliable and consistent outcome than what can be provided by an initial seismic assessment (ISA). In fact, while the Initial Seismic Assessment (ISA), of which the Initial Evaluation Procedure is only a part of, is the more natural and still recommended first step in the overall assessment process, it is mostly intended to be a coarse evaluation involving as few resources as reasonably possible. It is thus expected that an ISA will be followed by a Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA) not only where the threshold of 33%NBS is not achieved but also where important decisions are intended that are reliant on the seismic status of the building. The use of %NBS (% New Building Standard) as a capacity/demand ratio to describe the result of the seismic assessment at all levels of assessment procedure (ISA through to DSA) is deliberate by the NZSEE/MBIE guidelines (Part A) (NZSEE/MBIE 2016a). The rating for the building needs only be based on the lowest level of assessment that is warranted for the particular circumstances. Discussion on how the %NBS rating is to be determined can be found in Section A3.3 (NZSEE/MBIE 2016a), and, more specifically, in Part B for the ISA (NZSEE/MBIE 2016b) and Part C for the DSA (NZSEE/MBIE 2016c). As per other international approaches, the DSA can be based on several analysis procedures to assess the structural behaviour (linear, nonlinear, static or dynamic, force or displacement-based). The significantly revamped NZSEE 2016 Seismic Assessment Guidelines strongly recommend the use of an analytical (basically ‘by hand’) method, referred to the Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA) as a first phase of any other numerically-based analysis method. Significant effort has thus been dedicated to provide within the NZSEE 2016 guidelines (NZSEE/MBIE 2016c) a step-by-step description of the procedure, either in general terms (Chapter 2) or with specific reference to Reinforced Concrete Buildings (Chapter 5). More specifically, extract from the guidelines, NZSEE “recommend using the Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA) procedure as a first step in any assessment. While SLaMA is essentially an analysis technique, it enables assessors to investigate (and present in a simple form) the potential contribution and interaction of a number of structural elements and their likely effect on the building’s global capacity. In some cases, the results of a SLaMA will only be indicative. However, it is expected that its use should help assessors achieve a more reliable outcome than if they only carried out a detailed analysis, especially if that analysis is limited to the elastic range For complex structural systems, a 3D dynamic analysis may be necessary to supplement the simplified nonlinear Simple Lateral Mechanism Analysis (SLaMA).” This report presents the development of a full design example for the the implementation of the SLaMA method on a case study buildings and a validation/comparison with a non-linear static (pushover) analysis. The step-by-step-procedure, summarized in Figure 1, will be herein demonstrated from a component level (beams, columns, wall elements) to a subassembly level (hierarchy of strength in a beam-column joint) and to a system level (frame, C-Wall) assuming initially a 2D behaviour of the key structural system, and then incorporating a by-hand 3D behaviour (torsional effects).
This article presents a quantitative case study on the site amplification effect observed at Heathcote Valley, New Zealand, during the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence for 10 events that produced notable ground acceleration amplitudes up to 1.4g and 2.2g in the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. We performed finite element analyses of the dynamic response of the valley, accounting for the realistic basin geometry and the soil non-linear response. The site-specific simulations performed significantly better than both empirical ground motion models and physics based regional-scale ground motion simulations (which empirically accounts for the site effects), reducing the spectral acceleration prediction bias by a factor of two in short vibration periods. However, our validation exercise demonstrated that it was necessary to quantify the level of uncertainty in the estimated bedrock motion using multiple recorded events, to understand how much the simplistic model can over- or under-estimate the ground motion intensities. Inferences from the analyses suggest that the Rayleigh waves generated near the basin edge contributed significantly to the observed high frequency (f>3Hz) amplification, in addition to the amplification caused by the strong soil-rock impedance contrast at the site fundamental frequency. Models with and without considering soil non-linear response illustrate, as expected, that the linear elastic assumption severely overestimates ground motions in high frequencies for strong earthquakes, especially when the contribution of basin edge-generated Rayleigh waves becomes significant. Our analyses also demonstrate that the effect of pressure-dependent soil velocities on the high frequency ground motions is as significant as the amplification caused by the basin edge-generated Rayleigh waves.
The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake ruptured ~200 km at the ground surface across the New Zealand plate boundary zone in the northern South Island. This study was conducted in an area of ~600 km2 in the epicentral region where the faults comprise two main non-coplanar sets that strike E-NE and NNE-NW with mainly steep dips (60о-80°). Analysis of the surface rupture using field and LiDAR data provides new information on the dimensions, geometries and kinematics of these faults which was not previously available from pre-earthquake active faults or bedrock structure. The more northerly striking fault set are sub-parallel to basement bedding and accommodated predominantly left-lateral reverse slip with net slips of ~1 and ~5 m for the Stone Jug and Leader faults, respectively. The E-NE striking Conway-Charwell and The Humps faults accrued right-lateral to oblique reverse with net slips of ~2 and ~3 m, respectively. The faults form a hard-linked system dominated by kinematics consistent with the ~260° trend of the relative plate motion vector and the transpressional structures recorded across the plate boundary in the NE South Island. Interaction and intersection of the main fault sets facilitated propagation of the earthquake and transfer of slip northwards across the plate boundary zone.
Tens of thousands of landslides were generated over 10, 000 km2 of North Canterbury and Marlborough as a consequence of the 14 November 2016, MW7.8 Kaikōura Earthquake. The most intense landslide damage was concentrated in 3500 km2 around the areas of fault rupture. Given the sparsely populated area affected by landslides, only a few homes were impacted and there were no recorded deaths due to landslides. Landslides caused major disruption with all road and rail links with Kaikōura being severed. The landslides affecting State Highway 1 (the main road link in the South Island of New Zealand) and the South Island main trunk railway extended from Ward in Marlborough all the way to the south of Oaro in North Canterbury. The majority of landslides occurred in two geological and geotechnically distinct materials reflective of the dominant rock types in the affected area. In the Neogene sedimentary rocks (sandstones, limestones and siltstones) of the Hurunui District, North Canterbury and around Cape Campbell in Marlborough, first-time and reactivated rock-slides and rock-block slides were the dominant landslide type. These rocks also tend to have rock material strength values in the range of 5-20 MPa. In the Torlesse 'basement' rocks (greywacke sandstones and argillite) of the Kaikōura Ranges, first-time rock and debris avalanches were the dominant landslide type. These rocks tend to have material strength values in the range of 20-50 MPa. A feature of this earthquake is the large number (more than 200) of valley blocking landslides it generated. This was partly due to the steep and confined slopes in the area and the widely distributed strong ground shaking. The largest landslide dam has an approximate volume of 12(±2) M m3 and the debris from this travelled about 2.7 km2 downslope where it formed a dam blocking the Hapuku River. The long-term stability of cracked slopes and landslide dams from future strong earthquakes and large rainstorms are an ongoing concern to central and local government agencies responsible for rebuilding homes and infrastructure. A particular concern is the potential for debris floods to affect downstream assets and infrastructure should some of the landslide dams breach catastrophically. At least twenty-one faults ruptured to the ground surface or sea floor, with these surface ruptures extending from the Emu Plain in North Canterbury to offshore of Cape Campbell in Marlborough. The mapped landslide distribution reflects the complexity of the earthquake rupture. Landslides are distributed across a broad area of intense ground shaking reflective of the elongate area affected by fault rupture, and are not clustered around the earthquake epicentre. The largest landslides triggered by the earthquake are located either on or adjacent to faults that ruptured to the ground surface. Surface faults may provide a plane of weakness or hydrological discontinuity and adversely oriented surface faults may be indicative of the location of future large landslides. Their location appears to have a strong structural geological control. Initial results from our landslide investigations suggest predictive models relying only on ground-shaking estimates underestimate the number and size of the largest landslides that occurred.
Christchurch City Council (Council) is undertaking the Land Drainage Recovery Programme in order to assess the effects of the earthquakes on flood risk to Christchurch. In the course of these investigations it has become better understood that floodplain management should be considered in a multi natural hazards context. Council have therefore engaged the Jacobs, Beca, University of Canterbury, and HR Wallingford project team to investigate the multihazards in eastern areas of Christchurch and develop flood management options which also consider other natural hazards in that context (i.e. how other hazards contribute to flooding both through temporal and spatial coincidence). The study has three stages: Stage 1 Gap Analysis – assessment of information known, identification of gaps and studies required to fill the gaps. Stage 2 Hazard Studies – a gap filling stage with the studies identified in Stage 1. Stage 3 Collating, Optioneering and Reporting – development of options to manage flood risk. This present report is to document findings of Stage 1 and recommends the studies that should be completed for Stage 2. It has also been important to consider how Stage 3 would be delivered and the gaps are prioritised to provide for this. The level of information available and hazards to consider is extensive; requiring this report to be made up of five parts each identifying individual gaps. A process of identifying information for individual hazards in Christchurch has been undertaken and documented (Part 1) followed by assessing the spatial co-location (Part 2) and probabilistic presence of multi hazards using available information. Part 3 considers multi hazard presence both as a temporal coincidence (e.g. an earthquake and flood occurring at one time) and as a cascade sequence (e.g. earthquake followed by a flood at some point in the future). Council have already undertaken a number of options studies for managing flood risk and these are documented in Part 4. Finally Part 5 provides the Gap Analysis Summary and Recommendations to Council. The key findings of Stage 1 gap analysis are: - The spatial analysis showed eastern Christchurch has a large number of hazards present with only 20% of the study area not being affected by any of the hazards mapped. Over 20% of the study area is exposed to four or more hazards at the frequencies and data available. - The majority of the Residential Red Zone is strongly exposed to multiple hazards, with 86% of the area being exposed to 4 or more hazards, and 24% being exposed to 6 or more hazards. - A wide number of gaps are present; however, prioritisation needs to consider the level of benefit and risks associated with not undertaking the studies. In light of this 10 studies ranging in scale are recommended to be done for the project team to complete the present scope of Stage 3. - Stage 3 will need to consider a number of engineering options to address hazards and compare with policy options; however, Council have not established a consistent policy on managed retreat that can be applied for equal comparison; without which substantial assumptions are required. We recommend Council undertake a study to define a managed retreat framework as an option for the city. - In undertaking Stage 1 with floodplain management as the focal point in a multi hazards context we have identified that Stage 3 requires consideration of options in the context of economics, implementation and residual risk. Presently the scope of work will provide a level of definition for floodplain options; however, this will not be at equal levels of detail for other hazard management options. Therefore, we recommend Council considers undertaking other studies with those key hazards (e.g. Coastal Hazards) as a focal point and identifies the engineering options to address such hazards. Doing so will provide equal levels of information for Council to make an informed and defendable decision on which options are progressed following Stage 3.