1. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: Does he have confidence in his Minister of Finance? 2. CRAIG FOSS to the Minister of Finance: How much does the Government expect to spend over the next few years to help rebuild Christchurch in the aftermath of the two earthquakes? 3. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: Does she stand by her statement in regard to hardship assistance that "…I think it proves that the help is there when people need it,"; if so, why? 4. RAHUI KATENE to the Minister of Health: What action, if any, has been taken in light of the study Ethnicity and Management of Colon Cancer in New Zealand: Do Indigenous Patients Get a Worse Deal?, which concluded that Māori New Zealanders with colon cancer were less likely to receive adjuvant chemotherapy and experienced a lower quality of care compared with non-Māori patients? 5. CHRIS AUCHINVOLE to the Minister for the Environment: What steps is the Government taking to increase renewable electricity generation in light of reports that greenhouse gas emissions from this sector have increased by 120 percent, which is more than any other sector since 1990? 6. Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister of Finance: Excluding the banks and non-bank financial institutions covered by the deposit guarantee scheme, are there any other companies that might be provided with a government guarantee while the Rt Hon John Key is Prime Minister? 7. JONATHAN YOUNG to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: What is Petrobras able to do under the permit granted to it in the Raukumara Basin? 8. DAVID CLENDON to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: What environmental protection provisions, if any, did the Government include in the permit granted to Petrobras to explore for oil and drill off the East Cape? 9. Hon TREVOR MALLARD to the Prime Minister: Does he have confidence in all Ministers involved in the Mediaworks frequency payment arrangement? 10. AARON GILMORE to the Minister of Revenue: What has Inland Revenue done to assist the people in Christchurch after the February earthquake? 11. GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister responsible for Ministerial Services: Does he stand by his statements in relation to the purchase of 34 BMWs by Ministerial Services, including one with heated seats, that "Yeah I don't know what's in Dunedin" and "It's beyond me, it's not my car anyway"? 12. SHANE ARDERN to the Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture: What has been the result of enforcement action taken by the Ministry of Fisheries under Operation Paid and Taskforce Webb?
Hon PHIL HEATLEY to the Minister of Finance: What reports has he received on the economy – and especially on further signs of economic momentum in the regions and among manufacturers? Dr RUSSEL NORMAN to the Minister of Finance: How much did the Government's share sales in Mighty River Power, Meridian, and Air New Zealand raise, given that the Supplement to the 2010 Investment Statement of the Government of New Zealand projected that those sales would raise $5.18 billion? Hon DAVID PARKER to the Minister for ACC: How much did ACC invest in Pike River Coal Limited and in New Zealand Oil and Gas Limited over the last eight years, and how much has it made or lost in total on its investment in each company, taking into account share purchases, subscriptions and sales, dividends, and current share prices? Rt Hon WINSTON PETERS to the Minister of Māori Affairs: Does he stand by his statement "I know Māori want to talk about the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in our constitution, and how our legal and political systems can reflect tikanga Māori."; if so, why? Hon SHANE JONES to the Associate Minister of Finance: Is he satisfied with his performance in regard to his delegations as Associate Minister of Finance? JONATHAN YOUNG to the Minister for Building and Construction: What reports has he received regarding the state of the building and construction sector? GARETH HUGHES to the Minister for the Environment: Did the Environmental Protection Authority assess the full version of Anadarko's Discharge Management Plan and Emergency Response Plan as part of its evaluation of the company's Environmental Impact Assessment for the Deepwater Taranaki Well; if not, why not? Hon CLAYTON COSGROVE to the Minister of Finance: When, if at all, did Cabinet approve the timing of the Air New Zealand sell-down and what directions did Cabinet give the shareholding Ministers? NICKY WAGNER to the Minister of Housing: What steps is the Government taking to rebuild Christchurch's housing stock damaged or destroyed by the earthquakes? Hon DAMIEN O'CONNOR to the Minister for Primary Industries: Does he stand by his statement "The opportunity, and challenge, for our meat producers now is to add value to different cuts of meat and continue to sell the New Zealand story"; if so, why? IAN McKELVIE to the Minister of Local Government: How is the Government improving councils' financial reporting? DARIEN FENTON to the Minister of Labour: Does he stand by his statement that "I am especially keen to hear what affected parties have to say on the Part 6A proposals in the Bill, and will carefully consider their submissions and the recommendations of the select committee"?
Brooklands Lagoon / Te Riu o Te Aika Kawa (‘Brooklands’) is an important wetland and estuarine ecosystem in Canterbury. It is a site of cultural significance to Ngāi Tūāhuriri, and is also valued by the wider community. Home to an array of life, it is connected to the Pūharakekenui/Styx and Waimakariri rivers, and is part of a wetland landscape complex that includes the Avon-Heathcote / Ihutai estuary to the south and the Ashley / Rakahuri estuary to the north. Notionally situated within the territorial boundary of Christchurch City Council and jurisdictionally encompassed by the regional council Environment Canterbury, it has been legally determined to be part of the coastal marine area. The complicated administrative arrangements for the lagoon mirror the biophysical and human challenges to this surprisingly young ecosystem since its formation in 1940. Here we present a synthesis of the historical events and environmental influences that have shaped Brooklands Lagoon. Before existing as an intertidal ecosystem, the Waimakariri river mouth was situated in what is now the southern end of the lagoon. A summary timeline of key events is set out in the table below. These included the diversion of the Waimakariri River mouth via the construction of Wrights Cut in the 1930s, which influenced the way that the lower reaches of the river interacted with the land and sea. A large flood in 1940 shifted the river mouth ~2 to 3 kilometres north, that created the landscape that we see today. However, this has not remained stable, as the earthquake sequence in 2010 and 2011 subsided the bed of the estuary. The changes are ongoing, as sea level rise and coastal inundation will place ongoing pressure on the aquatic ecosystem and surrounding land. How to provide accommodation space for Brooklands as an estuary will be a key planning and community challenge, as Environment Canterbury begins the engagement for the review of its Regional Coastal Plan. There is also a requirement to safeguard its ecological health under the 2020 National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management. This will necessitate an integrated mountains to sea (ki uta ki tai) management approach as the lagoon is affected by wider catchment activities. We hope that this report will contribute to, and inform these processes by providing a comprehensive historical synthesis, and by identifying considerations for the future collaborative management of Brooklands Lagoon, and protection of its values. In essence, we suggest that Te Riu o Te Aika Kawa deserves some sustained aroha.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch was shaken by a series of strong earthquakes including the MW7.1 4 September 2010, Mw 6.2 22 February 2011, MW6.2 13 June 2011 and MW6.0 23 December 2011 earthquakes. These earthquakes produced very strong ground motions throughout the city and surrounding areas that resulted in soil liquefaction and lateral spreading causing substantial damage to buildings, infrastructure and the community. The stopbank network along the Kaiapoi and Avon River suffered extensive damage with repairs projected to take several years to complete. This presented an opportunity to undertake a case-study on a regional scale of the effects of liquefaction on a stopbank system. Ultimately, this information can be used to determine simple performance-based concepts that can be applied in practice to improve the resilience of river protection works. The research presented in this thesis draws from data collected following the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes. The stopbank damage is categorised into seven key deformation modes that were interpreted from aerial photographs, consultant reports, damage photographs and site visits. Each deformation mode provides an assessment of the observed mechanism of failure behind liquefaction-induced stopbank damage and the factors that influence a particular style of deformation. The deformation modes have been used to create a severity classification for the whole stopbank system, being ‘no or low damage’ and ‘major or severe damage’, in order to discriminate the indicators and factors that contribute to ‘major to severe damage’ from the factors that contribute to all levels of damage a number of calculated, land damage, stopbank damage and geomorphological parameters were analysed and compared at 178 locations along the Kaiapoi and Avon River stopbank systems. A critical liquefiable layer was present at every location with relatively consistent geotechnical parameters (cone resistance (qc), soil behaviour type (Ic) and Factor of Safety (FoS)) across the study site. In 95% of the cases the critical layer occurred within two times the Height of the Free Face (HFF,). A statistical analysis of the geotechnical factors relating to the critical layer was undertaken in order to find correlations between specific deformation modes and geotechnical factors. It was found that each individual deformation mode involves a complex interplay of factors that are difficult to represent through correlative analysis. There was, however, sufficient data to derive the key factors that have affected the severity of deformation. It was concluded that stopbank damage is directly related to the presence of liquefaction in the ground materials beneath the stopbanks, but is not critical in determining the type or severity of damage, instead it is merely the triggering mechanism. Once liquefaction is triggered it is the gravity-induced deformation that causes the damage rather than the shaking duration. Lateral spreading and specifically the depositional setting was found to be the key aspect in determining the severity and type of deformation along the stopbank system. The presence or absence of abandoned or old river channels and point bar deposits was found to significantly influence the severity and type of deformation. A review of digital elevation models and old maps along the Kaiapoi River found that all of the ‘major to severe’ damage observed occurred within or directly adjacent to an abandoned river channel. Whilst a review of the geomorphology along the Avon River showed that every location within a point bar deposit suffered some form of damage, due to the depositional environment creating a deposit highly susceptible to liquefaction.
Landslides are significant hazards, especially in seismically-active mountainous regions, where shaking amplified by steep topography can result in widespread landsliding. These landslides present not only an acute hazard, but a chronic hazard that can last years-to-decades after the initial earthquake, causing recurring impacts. The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused more than 20,000 landslides throughout North Canterbury and resulted in significant damage to nationally significant infrastructure in the coastal transport corridor (CTC), isolating Kaikōura from the rest of New Zealand. In the years following, ongoing landsliding triggered by intense rainfall exacerbated the impacts and slowed the recovery process. However, while there is significant research on co-seismic landslides and their initial impacts in New Zealand, little research has explored the evolution of co-seismic landslides and how this hazard changes over time. This research maps landslides annually between 2013 and 2021 to evaluate the changes in pre-earthquake, co-seismic and post-earthquake rates of landsliding to determine how landslide hazard has changed over this time. In particular, the research explores how the number, area, and spatial distribution of landslides has changed since the earthquake, and whether post-earthquake mitigation works have in any way affected the long-term landslide hazard. Mapping of landslides was undertaken using open-source, medium resolution Landsat-8 and Sentinel-2 satellite imagery, with landslides identified visually and mapped as single polygons that capture both the source zone and deposit. Three study areas with differing levels of post-earthquake mitigation are compared: (i) the northern CTC, where the majority of mitigation was in the form of active debris removal; (ii) the southern CTC, where mitigation was primarily via passive protection measures; and (iii) Mount Fyffe, which has had no mitigation works since the earthquake. The results show that despite similar initial impacts during the earthquake, the rate of recovery in terms of landslide rates varies substantially across the three study areas. In Mount Fyffe, the number and area of landslides could take 45 and 22 years from 2021 respectively to return to pre-earthquake levels at the current rate. Comparatively, in the CTC, it could take just 5 years and 3-4 years from 2021 respectively. Notably, the fastest recovery in terms of landslide rates in the CTC was primarily located directly along the transport network, whereas what little recovery did occur in Mount Fyffe appeared to follow no particular pattern. Importantly, recovery rates in the northern CTC were notably higher than in the southern CTC, despite greater co-seismic impacts in the former. Combined, these results suggest the active, debris removal mitigation undertaken in the northern CTC may have had the effect of dramatically reducing the time for landslide rates to return to pre-earthquake levels. The role of slope angle and slope aspect were explored to evaluate if these observations could be driven by local differences in topography. The Mount Fyffe study area has higher slope angles than the CTC as a whole and landslides predominantly occurred on slightly steeper slopes than in the CTC. This may have contributed to the longer recovery times for landsliding in Mount Fyffe due to greater gravitational instability, however the observed variations are minor compared to the differences in recovery rates. In terms of slope aspect, landslides in Mount Fyffe preferentially occurred on north- and south-facing slopes whereas landslides in the CTC preferred the east- and south-facing slopes. The potential role of these differences in landslide recovery remains unclear but may be related to the propagation direction of the earthquake and the tracking direction of post-earthquake ex-tropical cyclones. Finally, landslides in the CTC are observed to be moving further away from the transport network and the number of landslides impacting the CTC decreased significantly since the earthquake. Nevertheless, the potential for further landslide reactivation remains. Therefore, despite the recovery in the CTC, it is clear that there is still risk of the transport network being impacted by further landsliding, at least for the next 3-5 yrs.