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Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team in the hanger of a Royal New Zealand Air Force Hercules. The ERT members are travelling to Christchurch to help out in the emergency response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Blankets, tent poles, and other supplies have been stacked in the centre of the hanger.

Research papers, The University of Auckland Library

The sequence of earthquakes that has affected Christchurch and Canterbury since September 2010 has caused damage to a great number of buildings of all construction types. Following post-event damage surveys performed between April 2011 and June 2011, the damage suffered by unreinforced stone masonry buildings is reported and different types of observed failures are described. A detailed technical description of the most prevalently observed failure mechanisms is provided, with reference to recognised failure modes for unreinforced masonry structures. The observed performance of existing seismic retrofit interventions is also provided, as an understanding of the seismic response of these interventions is of fundamental importance for assessing the vulnerability of similar strengthening techniques when applied to unreinforced stone masonry structures.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

A Christchurch couple locked in an ongoing legal battle with state-owned quake insurer Southern Response says it is sobering for a Court of Appeal decision to go their way, one decade on from the harrowing earthquakes. An earlier High Court decision found Southern Response guilty of misleading and deceptive behaviour when it short-changed Karl and Alison Dodds tens of thousands of dollars after their quake damaged house was written off. The Dodds say they were tricked into accepting a lower offer from Southern Response only to later discover the insurer had kept secret from them a second higher estimate to rebuild their damaged house, a so-called second secret detailed repair and rebuild analysis (DRA). The High Court ordered Southern Response to pay the Dodds almost $180,000 in damages, plus costs. But the government appealed the decision, saying it needed clarity, because of the thousands of similar cases it could be liable for. The Court of Appeal reduced the damages Southern Response has to pay $10,656.44 due to an earlier error in calculations. The Minister responsible Grant Robertson has declined to be interviewed. Southern Response also declined to be interviewed. Neither have ruled out appealing the decision in the Supreme Court.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of members of the Wellington Emergency Management Office Emergency Response Team walking through Latimer Square. In the background there are members from other emergency management teams including the China USAR team, the Tauranga Response Team, and the Red Cross.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of an ICOM IDAS Repeater next to the information for the Civil Defence Response Team networks. The IDAS is a digital land mobile radio system which retransmits radio signals. It was used by the Civil Defence to extend the range of their digital radios during the emergency response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.