A poster created by Empowered Christchurch to advertise their submission to the CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan on social media.The poster reads, "Submission, CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan. Risk Acceptance. It is the role of insurance companies, the EQC included, to accept the risks covered under their terms of reference/policies and compensate policyholders when such risks eventuate. However, many policyholders in Christchurch have not been compensated for the damage to their homes and their lives. These responsibilities need to be faced by the entities responsible. An equitable solution needs to be found for properties with hazards such as flooding that are a direct result of the earthquakes. In tandem with this, every effort must be made to protect residents from the risks posed by climate change. We need a city that is driven by the people that live in it, and enabled by a bureaucracy that accepts and mitigates risks, rather than transferring them to the most vulnerable residents".
A map showing proposed cycling and walking routes in the central city.
An incomplete graphic listing revelations from a book written by Christchurch Mayor Bob Parker.
Health officials in Christchurch have today begun work on a recovery plan for how they will replace hundreds of beds lost in rest homes because of the recent earthquake.
The front page graphic for the Mainlander section of The Press, featuring an article about the retail precinct.
The Earthquake Recovery Minister has given the Christchurch City Council until this morning to approve a development plan, or else he says he'll do it for them.
The Christchurch City Council says it has reached a compromise with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister, Gerry Brownlee, and voted unanimously to support a plan to intensify housing in the city.
A map showing proposed changes to speed limits on roads in the central city.
Since September 2010 Christchurch, New Zealand, has experienced a number of significant earthquakes. In addition to loss of life, this has resulted in significant destruction to infrastructure, including road corridors; and buildings, especially in the central city, where it has been estimated that 60% of buildings will need to be rebuilt. The rebuild and renewal of Christchurch has initially focused on the central city under the direction of the Christchurch City Council. This has seen the development of a draft Central City Plan that includes a number of initiatives that should encourage the use of the bicycle as a mode of transport. The rebuild and renewal of the remainder of the city is under the jurisdiction of a specially set up authority, the Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). CERA reports to an appointed Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, who is responsible for coordinating the planning, spending, and actual rebuilding work needed for the recovery. Their plans for the renewal and rebuild of the remainder of the city are not yet known. This presentation will examine the potential role of the bicycle as a mode of transport in a rebuilt Christchurch. The presentation will start by describing the nature of damage to Christchurch as a result of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. It will then review the Central City Plan (the plan for the rebuild and renewal for central Christchurch) focusing particularly on those aspects that affect the role of the bicycle. The potential for the success of this plan will be assessed. It will specifically reflect on this in light of some recent research in Christchurch that examined the importance of getting infrastructure right if an aim of transport planning is to attract new people to cycle for utilitarian reasons.
The National Science Challenge ‘Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities’ is currently undertaking work that, in part, identifies and analyses the Waimakariri District Council’s (WMK/Council) organisational practices and process tools. The focus is on determining the processes that made the Residential Red Zone Recovery Plan, 2016 (RRZRP) collaboration process so effective and compares it to the processes used to inform the current Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan - 2028 and Beyond (KTC Plan). This research aims to explore ‘what travelled’ in terms of values, principles, methods, processes and personnel from the RRZRP to the KTC planning process. My research will add depth to this research by examining more closely the KTC Plan’s hearings process, reviewing submissions made, analysing background documents and by conducting five semi-structured interviews with a selection of people who made submissions on the KTC Plan. The link between community involvement and best recovery outcomes has been acknowledged in literature as well as by humanitarian agencies (Lawther, 2009; Sullivan, 2003). My research has documented WMK’s post-quake community engagement strategy by focusing on their initial response to the earthquake of 2010 and the two-formal plan (RRZRP and KTC Plan) making procedures that succeeded this response. My research has led me to conclude that WMK was committed to collaborating with their constituents right through the extended post-quake sequence. Iterative face to face or ‘think communications’ combined with the accessibility of all levels of Council staff – including senior management and elected members - gave interested community members the opportunity to discuss and deliberate the proposed plans with the people tasked with preparing them. WMK’s commitment to collaborate is illustrated by the methods they employed to inform their post-quake efforts and plans and by the logic behind the selected methods. Combined the Council’s logic and methods best describe the ‘Waimakariri Way’. My research suggests that collaborative planning is iterative in nature. It is therefore difficult to establish a specific starting point where collaboration begins as the relationships needed for the collaborative process constantly (re)emerge out of pre-existing relationships. Collaboration seems to be based on an attitude, which means there is no starting ‘point’ as such, rather an amplification for a time of a basic attitude towards the public.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event. One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
Donations to the Canterbury earthquake fund now total about $11 million. It comes as the Government announced early details of a recovery plan for people wanting money to fix their damaged homes or start rebuilding.
Cantabrians are still surrounded broken buildings and empty spaces on the 10th anniversary of the devastating 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The disaster forced 70 percent of the CBD to be demolished. The Government launched an ambitious recovery plan to help it recover in 2012. The Christchurch Central Recovery Plan, dubbed the "blueprint" would dictate the rebuild of the central city. To support it, the Government would complete a series of "anchor projects", to encourage investment in the city and make it a more attractive place to live in. As Anan Zaki reports, the anchor projects appeared to weigh down the progress of the rebuild.
This study explores the role and value of urban community gardens following a major crisis: the 2010/11 earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand.
A video of Principal Toni Simpson telling the students and teachers of Phillipstown School about the plan to merge their school with Woolston School. Phillipstown is one of twelve schools which is set to merge in the Education Renewal Recovery Programme. The programme was created by the Minister of Education in the wake of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes.
Farming and urban regions are impacted by earthquake disasters in different ways, and feature a range of often different recovery requirements. In New Zealand, and elsewhere, most earthquake impact and recovery research is urban focused. This creates a research deficit that can lead to the application of well-researched urban recovery strategies in rural areas to suboptimal effect. To begin to reduce this deficit, in-depth case studies of the earthquake impacts and recovery of three New Zealand farms severely impacted by the 14th November 2016, M7.8 Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake were conducted. The initial earthquake, its aftershocks and coseismic hazards (e.g., landslides, liquefaction, surface rupture) affected much of North Canterbury, Marlborough and the Wellington area. The three case study farms were chosen to broadly represent the main types of farming and topography in the Hurunui District in North Canterbury. The farms were directly and indirectly impacted by earthquakes and related hazards. On-farm infrastructure (e.g., woolsheds, homesteads) and essential services (e.g., water, power), frequently sourced from distributed networks, were severely impacted. The earthquake occurred after two years of regional drought had already stressed farm systems and farmers to restructuring or breaking point. Cascading interlinked hazards stemming from the earthquakes and coseismic hazards continued to disrupt earthquake recovery over a year after the initial earthquake. Semi-structured interviews with the farmers were conducted nine and fourteen months after the initial earthquake to capture the timeline of on-going impacts and recovery. Analysis of both geological hazard data and interview data resulted in the identification of key factors influencing farm level earthquake impact and recovery. These include pre-existing conditions (e.g., drought); farm-specific variations in recovery timelines; and resilience strategies for farm recovery resources. The earthquake recovery process presented all three farms with opportunities to change their business plans and adapt to mitigate on-going and future risk.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately 35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0 respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global insurance event of all time. These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond. Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local government landscape. This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them to their own planning. It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the lessons from WDC.
A prominent Christchurch property investor says the Government's anchor projects meant to help rebuild the city faster, has instead slowed it down. After the 2011 earthquake, the Government launched a recovery plan for the CBD, which had 16 anchor projects designed to spur on the rebuild. However, many have been plagued by delays and are still unfinished. Property investor Antony Gough told RNZ reporter Anan Zaki that unlike the Government, it was the private sector which ploughed ahead with the rebuild.
Disaster recovery involves the restoration, repair and rejuvenation of both hard and soft infrastructure. In this report we present observationsfrom seven case studies of collaborative planning from post-earthquake Canterbury, each of which was selected as a means of better understanding ‘soft infrastructure for hard times’. Though our investigation is located within a disaster recovery context, we argue that the lessons learned are widely applicable. Our seven case studies highlighted that the nature of the planning process or journey is as important as the planning objective or destination. A focus on the journey can promote positive outcomes in and of itself through building enduring relationships, fostering diverse leaders, developing new skills and capabilities, and supporting translation and navigation. Collaborative planning depends as much upon emotional intelligence as it does technical competence, and we argue that having a collaborative attitude is more important than following prescriptive collaborative planning formulae. Being present and allowing plenty of time are also key. Although deliberation is often seen as an improvement on technocratic and expertdominated decision-making models, we suggest that the focus in the academic literature on communicative rationality and discursive democracy has led us to overlook other more active forms of planning that occur in various sites and settings. Instead, we offer an expanded understanding of what planning is, where it happens and who is involved. We also suggest more attention be given to values, particularly in terms of their role as a compass for navigating the terrain of decision-making in the collaborative planning process. We conclude with a revised model of a (collaborative) decision-making cycle that we suggest may be more appropriate when (re)building better homes, towns and cities.
Text reads 'What??... Is it another quake?.. No, it's just Gerry Brownlee rushing the CERA bill through'. The cartoon shows the huge back of Minister for Christchurch Recovery Gerry Brownlee moving energetically and forcefully to get the CERA bill past its third reading. Context - The bill establishes the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (Cera) and empowers it to lead reconstruction efforts in Christchurch. It gives Cera specific powers to get information from any source, to requisition and build on land and to carry out demolitions. It can also take over local authorities if they are not working effectively on recovery work. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
The Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by major earthquakes on the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011. The quakes caused 185 fatalities and extensive land, infrastructure and building damage, particularly in the Eastern suburbs of Christchurch city. Almost 450 ha of residential and public land was designated as a ‘Red Zone’ unsuitable for residential redevelopment because land damage was so significant, engineering solutions were uncertain, and repairs would be protracted. Subsequent demolition of all housing and infrastructure in the area has left a blank canvas of land stretching along the Avon River corridor from the CBD to the sea. Initially the Government’s official – but enormously controversial – position was that this land would be cleared and lie fallow until engineering solutions could be found that enabled residential redevelopment. This paper presents an application of a choice experiment (CE) that identified and assessed Christchurch residents’ preferences for different land use options of this Red Zone. Results demonstrated strong public support for the development of a recreational reserve comprising a unique natural environment with native fauna and flora, healthy wetlands and rivers, and recreational opportunities that align with this vision. By highlighting the value of a range of alternatives, the CE provided a platform for public participation and expanded the conversational terrain upon which redevelopment policy took place. We conclude the method has value for land use decision-making beyond the disaster recovery context.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.On 2 March 1987 the Bay of Plenty region suffered an earthquake of magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale, centred at Edgecumbe. Severe damage to personal and industrial property and drainage systems occurred. In hindsight, although much of the damage was covered by insurance, loans, public and government contributions, the continuing reconstruction costs have had a tremendous impact financially on individuals and the District as a whole. By highlighting some of these ongoing costs and suggestions of alternatives other Rural communities may be better prepared to lessen the effect of a natural disaster such as the Edgecumbe Earthquake of 1987.
A map showing the location of properties being purchased by the Crown for the frame and bus interchange.
The city of Ōtautahi/Christchurch experienced a series of earthquakes that began on September 4th, 2010. The most damaging event occurred on February 22nd, 2011 but significant earthquakes also occurred on June 13th and December 23rd with aftershocks still occurring well into 2012. The resulting disaster is the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history with 185 deaths. During 2011 the Canterbury earthquakes were one of the costliest disasters worldwide with an expected cost of up to $NZ30 billion. Hundreds of commercial buildings and thousands of houses have been destroyed or are to be demolished and extensive repairs are needed for infrastructure to over 100,000 homes. As many as 8,900 people simply abandoned their homes and left the city in the first few months after the February event (Newell, 2012), and as many as 50,000 may leave during 2012. In particular, young whānau and single young women comprised a disproportionate number of these migrants, with evidence of a general movement to the North Island. Te Puni Kōkiri sought a mix of quantitative and qualitative research to examine the social and economic impacts of the Christchurch earthquakes on Māori and their whānau. The result of this work will be a collection of evidence to inform policy to support and assist Māori and their whānau during the recovery/rebuild phases. To that end, this report triangulates available statistical and geographical information with qualitative data gathered over 2010 and 2011 by a series of interviews conducted with Māori who experienced the dramatic events associated with the earthquakes. A Māori research team at Lincoln University was commissioned to undertake the research as they were already engaged in transdisciplinary research (began in the May 2010), that focused on quickly gathering data from a range of Māori who experienced the disaster, including relevant economic, environmental, social and cultural factors in the response and recovery of Māori to these events. Participants for the qualitative research were drawn from Māori whānau who both stayed and left the city. Further data was available from ongoing projects and networks that the Lincoln research team was already involved in, including interviews with Māori first responders and managers operating in the CBD on the day of the February event. Some limited data is also available from younger members of affected whānau. Māori in Ōtautahi/Christchurch City have exhibited their own culturally-attuned collective responses to the disaster. However, it is difficult to ascertain Māori demographic changes due to a lack of robust statistical frameworks but Māori outward migration from the city is estimated to range between 560 and 1,100 people. The mobility displayed by Māori demonstrates an important but unquantified response by whānau to this disaster, with emigration to Australia presenting an attractive option for young Māori, an entrenched phenomenon that correlates to cyclical downturns and the long-term decline of the New Zealand economy. It is estimated that at least 315 Māori have emigrated from the Canterbury region to Australia post-quake, although the disaster itself may be only one of a series of events that has prompted such a decision. Māori children made up more than one in four of the net loss of children aged 6 to 15 years enrolled in schools in Greater Christchurch over the year to June 2011. Research literature identifies depression affecting a small but significant number of children one to two years post-disaster and points to increasing clinical and organisational demands for Māori and other residents of the city. For those residents in the eastern or coastal suburbs – home to many of the city’s Māori population - severe damage to housing, schools, shops, infrastructure, and streets has meant disruption to their lives, children’s schooling, employment, and community functioning. Ongoing abandonment of homes by many has meant a growing sense of unease and loss of security, exacerbated by arson, burglaries, increased drinking, a stalled local and national economy, and general confusion about the city’s future. Māori cultural resilience has enabled a considerable network of people, institutions, and resources being available to Māori , most noticeably through marae and their integral roles of housing, as a coordinating hub, and their arguing for the wider affected communities of Christchurch. Relevant disaster responses need to be discussed within whānau, kōhanga, kura, businesses, communities, and wider neighbourhoods. Comprehensive disaster management plans need to be drafted for all iwi in collaboration with central government, regional, and city or town councils. Overall, Māori are remarkably philosophical about the effects of the disaster, with many proudly relishing their roles in what is clearly a historic event of great significance to the city and country. Most believe that ‘being Māori’ has helped cope with the disaster, although for some this draws on a collective history of poverty and marginalisation, features that contribute to the vulnerability of Māori to such events. While the recovery and rebuild phases offer considerable options for Māori and iwi, with Ngāi Tahu set to play an important stakeholder in infrastructural, residential, and commercial developments, some risk and considerable unknowns are evident. Considerable numbers of Māori may migrate into the Canterbury region for employment in the rebuild, and trades training strategies have already been established. With many iwi now increasingly investing in property, the risks from significant earthquakes are now more transparent, not least to insurers and the reinsurance sector. Iwi authorities need to be appraised of insurance issues and ensure sufficient coverage exists and investments and developments are undertaken with a clear understanding of the risks from natural hazards and exposure to future disasters.
Orientation: Large-scale events such as disasters, wars and pandemics disrupt the economy by diverging resource allocation, which could alter employment growth within the economy during recovery. Research purpose: The literature on the disaster–economic nexus predominantly considers the aggregate performance of the economy, including the stimulus injection. This research assesses the employment transition following a disaster by removing this stimulus injection and evaluating the economy’s performance during recovery. Motivation for the study: The underlying economy’s performance without the stimulus’ benefit remains primarily unanswered. A single disaster event is used to assess the employment transition to guide future stimulus response for disasters. Research approach/design and method: Canterbury, New Zealand, was affected by a series of earthquakes in 2010–2011 and is used as a single case study. Applying the historical construction–economic relationship, a counterfactual level of economic activity is quantified and compared with official results. Using an input–output model to remove the economy-wide impact from the elevated activity reveals the performance of the underlying economy and employment transition during recovery. Main findings: The results indicate a return to a demand-driven level of building activity 10 years after the disaster. Employment transition is characterised by two distinct periods. The first 5 years are stimulus-driven, while the 5 years that follow are demand-driven from the underlying economy. After the initial period of elevated building activity, construction repositioned to its long-term level near 5% of value add. Practical/managerial implications: The level of building activity could be used to confidently assess the performance of regional economies following a destructive disaster. The study results argue for an incentive to redevelop the affected area as quickly as possible to mitigate the negative effect of the destruction and provide a stimulus for the economy. Contribution/value-add: This study contributes to a growing stream of regional disaster economics research that assesses the economic effect using a single case study.
Insurance is widely acknowledged as a key component in an organisation's disaster preparedness and resilience. But how effective is insurance in aiding business recovery following a major disaster? The aim of this research was to summarise the experiences of both the insurance industry and businesses dealing with commercial insurance claims following the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes.
There has not been substantial research conducted in the area of fraud and natural disasters. Therefore, this study sought to examine the perceptions of Canterbury residents toward the recovery process following the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes and whether residents felt as though contractor fraud occurs in Canterbury. A questionnaire was developed to gauge information about Canterbury residents’ self-reports involving the earthquakes, specific contractors involved, parties involved with the recovery process in general, and demographic information. Participants included a total of 213 residents from the Canterbury region who had been involved with contractors and/or insurance companies due to the recovery process. Results indicated that a high percentage of the participants were not satisfied with the recovery process and that almost half of the participants reported feeling scammed by contractors in Canterbury after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Moreover, the results indicate that participants neither agreed with the assessments made about their property losses nor the plans made to recover their properties. In many cases, participants felt pressured and even reluctant to accept these assessments and/or plans. The present study does not seek to explain why contractor fraud exists or what motivates scammers. Conversely, it attempts to demonstrate the perceptions of contractor fraud and satisfaction that have taken place in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes.
Minister for Christchurch Recovery, Gerry Brownlee drives a huge tractor among debris that spells out 'Due Process' and says 'In order to get Christchurch back on its feet again we have to bring parliament to its knees. Context - The minister says he is happy with the speed of the work being done, as he wants tomake sure those involved in the rebuild portion of the recovery effort are well prepared. The bill establishes the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (Cera) and empowers it to lead reconstruction efforts in Christchurch. It gives Cera specific powers to get information from any source, to requisition and build on land and to carry out demolitions. It can also take over local authorities if they are not working effectively on recovery work. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
Disaster recovery involves the restoration, repair and rejuvenation of both hard and soft infrastructure. In this report we present observations from seven case studies of collaborative planning from post-earthquake Canterbury, each of which was selected as a means of better understanding ‘soft infrastructure for hard times’. Though our investigation is located within a disaster recovery context, we argue that the lessons learned are widely applicable. Our seven case studies highlighted that the nature of the planning process or journey is as important as the planning objective or destination. A focus on the journey can promote positive outcomes in and of itself through building enduring relationships, fostering diverse leaders, developing new skills and capabilities, and supporting translation and navigation. Collaborative planning depends as much upon emotional intelligence as it does technical competence, and we argue that having a collaborative attitude is more important than following prescriptive collaborative planning formulae. Being present and allowing plenty of time are also key. Although deliberation is often seen as an improvement on technocratic and expert dominated decision-making models, we suggest that the focus in the academic literature on communicative rationality and discursive democracy has led us to overlook other more active forms of planning that occur in various sites and settings. Instead, we offer an expanded understanding of what planning is, where it happens and who is involved. We also suggest more attention be given to values, particularly in terms of their role as a compass for navigating the terrain of decision-making in the collaborative planning process. We conclude with a revised model of a (collaborative) decision-making cycle that we suggest may be more appropriate when (re)building better homes, towns and cities.
The Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage in the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch central business district (CBD), presented decision-makers with many recovery challenges. This paper identifies major government decisions, challenges, and lessons in the early recovery of Christchurch based on 23 key-informant interviews conducted 15 months after the February 2011 earthquake. It then focuses on one of the most important decisions – maintaining the cordon around the heavily damaged CBD – and investigates its impacts. The cordon displaced 50,000 central city jobs, raised questions about (and provided new opportunities for) the long-term viability of downtown, influenced the number and practice of building demolitions, and affected debris management; despite being associated with substantial losses, the cordon was commonly viewed as necessary, and provided some benefits in facilitating recovery. Management of the cordon poses important lessons for planning for catastrophic urban earthquakes around the world.