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Images, Alexander Turnbull Library

Text reads 'The new liquefaction?...' and the cartoon depicts a huge mass of 'insurance red tape' inside which is a man with a spade. Two people stare despairingly at the red tape and the man says 'How are we EVER gonna rebuild with this stuff bubbling up!' Context: The people are trying to rebuild their house after the Christchurch earthquakes and are having trouble with their insurance company. The Press has been contacted by people unable to get insurance to buy new homes, construct buildings or start businesses. Business leaders have called insurance delays a "cancer" eating away at the city's recovery, and Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee has acknowledged insurance is an "ongoing problem". (The Press - 24 August 2011) Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).

Audio, Radio New Zealand

Thousands of people are making insurance claims after heavy rain and flooding in the north of New Zealand, especially in Auckland. Insurance lawyer Peter Woods has worked on property claims for earthquake damage in Canterbury and Marlborough.. He has also been an Independent Specialist Adviser to the government. Peter talks to Lisa Owen.

Images, Alexander Turnbull Library

A rat in a business suit representing 'insurance companies' carries a briefcase labelled 'Total replacement policies' and follows a fellow rat into a large hole 'loop holes' that leads into a collapsed building. The rat says 'Woo-hoo! Home sweet home!' Context - Problems for people whose houses were damaged in the Christchurch earthquakes. One of the options presented to residents in the red zone, ideal for people with replacement policies, was the government bought your land, and you dealt directly with your insurers about your house. However they got a shock when insurers told them they won't replace their homes, they'll only repair them, even though they're earmarked for certain demolition. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).

Audio, Radio New Zealand

As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Christchurch earthquake there are renewed calls for an inquiry into how Southern Response dealt with Canterbury earthquake claimants. Last year the government set up a support package for those who were short changed by Southern Response for their earthquake repairs. It came after a landmark High Court case found Southern Response misled and deceived Karl and Alison Dodds. Insurance claimants advocate, Ali Jones, says ten years on, lessons haven't been learned from how people were treated by Southern Response. She told RNZ reporter Sally Murphy that dealing with them is hell.

Other, National Library of New Zealand

Blog in which Sarah Miles comments on the post-earthquake reconstruction of Christchurch, critiquing the profit-driven model of private insurance and how it fails to protect citizens in times of disaster. Includes comment on the political situation and some guest posts.

Research papers, Victoria University of Wellington

The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes.  The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world.  In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison.  The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs.  After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices.  Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

A Christchurch earthquake insurance specialist says a critical report of the Earthquake Commission is a good start but doesn't go far enough. The report by an independent ministerial advisor says EQC staff have no confidence in their own data, and that the organisation needs to dramatically improve the way it communicates with claimants. The advisor, Christine Stevenson, said EQC was unable even to tell her how many claims it's still dealing with from the Canterbury earthquakes. Dean Lester is a Christchurch insurance advocate and claims preparer. He talks to Susie Ferguson.