At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
Today there is interest in building resilient communities. Identifying and managing the risks of natural hazards with communities who face compounding hazards is challenging. Alpine ski areas provide a unique context to study this challenging and complex process. The traditional approach taken to manage natural hazards is discipline-centric and focuses on common (e.g. high probability low consequence) natural hazards such as avalanches. While this thesis acknowledges that the common approach is rational, it argues that we can extend our communities of practice to include rare (e.g. low probability / high consequence) natural hazards such as earthquakes. The dynamically complex nature of these ‘rare’ hazards limits our understanding about them, but by seeking and using the lived experiences of people in mountain communities some knowledge can be gained to help improve our understanding of how to adapt. This study focuses on such an approach in the context of alpine ski areas prone to earthquakes as a first step toward identifying key policy opportunities for hazard mitigation in general. The contributions can be broken down into methodological, contextual, and theoretical pursuits, as well as opportunities for improving future research. A development mixed method triangulated approach was justified because the research problem (i.e. earthquakes in ski areas) has had little consideration. The context provided the opportunity to test the integration of methods while dealing with the challenges of research in a novel context. Advancement to fuzzy cognitive mapping was achieved through the use of unsupervised neural networks (Self-organizing Maps or Kohonen Maps). The framework applied in the multi-site case study required a synthesis of current approaches, advances to methods and a functional use of cultural theory. Different approaches to participatory policy development were reviewed to develop a research protocol that was accessible. Cultural theory was selected as a foundation for the thesis because of its’ preference for plural rationalities from five ways of organizing. Moreover, the study undertook a shift away from the dichotomy of ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘methodological collectivism’ and instead chose the dividual (i.e. social solidarities that consist of culural biases, behavioral strategies and social relations) as a consistent unit of analysis despite three different methodologies including: field studies, qualitative interviews, and fuzzy cognitive maps. In this sense, the thesis sought to move away from ‘elegant solutions’ from singular solidarities or methods toward a research philosophy that sustains requisite variety and clumsy solutions. Overall the approach was a trandisciplinary framework that is a step toward sustainable hazards mitigation. The results indicate that the selections of risks and adaptation strategies associated with the in-situ hazards are driven by roles that managers, workers, and riders play in the context. Additionally, fuzzy cognitive maps were used as an extension of qualitative interviews and demonstrated the potential for power struggles that may arise between participant groups when considering strategies for preparation, response and recovery. Moreover, the results stress that prolonged engagement with stakeholders is necessary to improve the policy development process. Some comments are made on the compatibility condition of congruence between cultural biases, behavioural strategies, and social relations. As well, inclusion of the hermit/autonomous solidarities is stressed as a necessary component of future applications of cultural theory. The transdisciplinary mixed-method framework is an approach that can be transferred to many other vital areas of research where integration is desirable.