The performance of buildings in recent New Zealand earthquakes (Canterbury, Seddon and Kaikōura), delivered stark lessons on seismic resilience. Most of our buildings, with a few notable exceptions, performed as our Codes intended them to, that is, to safeguard people from injury. Many buildings only suffered minor structural damage but were unable to be reused and occupied for significant periods of time due to the damage and failure of non-structural elements. This resulted in substantial economic losses and major disruptions to our businesses and communities. Research has attributed the damage to poor overall design coordination, inadequate or lack of seismic restraints for non structural elements and insufficient clearances between building components to cater for the interaction of non structural elements under seismic actions. Investigations have found a clear connection between the poor performance of non-structural elements and the issues causing pain in the industry (procurement methods, risk aversion, the lack of clear understanding of design and inspection responsibility and the need for better alignment of the design codes to enable a consistent integrated design approach). The challenge to improve the seismic performance of non structural elements in New Zealand is a complex one that cuts across a diverse construction industry. Adopting the key steps as recommended in this paper is expected to have significant co-benefits to the New Zealand construction industry, with improvements in productivity alongside reductions in costs and waste, as the rework which plagues the industry decreases.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence in New Zealand’s South Island induced widespread liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area on four occasions (4 Sept 2010; 22 Feb; 13 June; 23 Dec 2011), that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand. This impacted transport networks as well as infiltrated and contaminated the damaged storm water system, making rapid clean-up an immediate post-earthquake priority. In some places the ejecta was contaminated by raw sewage and was readily remobilised in dry windy conditions, creating a long-term health risk to the population. Thousands of residential properties were inundated with liquefaction ejecta, however residents typically lacked the capacity (time or resources) to clean-up without external assistance. The liquefaction silt clean-up response was co-ordinated by the Christchurch City Council and executed by a network of contractors and volunteer groups, including the ‘Farmy-Army’ and the ‘Student-Army’. The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately 2 months for each of the 3 main liquefaction inducing earthquakes; despite each event producing different volumes of ejecta. Preliminary cost estimates indicate total clean-up costs will be over NZ$25 million. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill since the beginning of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence. The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as a valuable case study to support further analysis and research on the coordination, management and costs of large volume deposition of fine grained sediment in urban areas.
Peri-urban environments are critical to the connections between urban and rural ecosystems and their respective communities. Lowland floodplains are important examples that are attractive for urbanisation and often associated with the loss of rural lands and resources. In Christchurch, New Zealand, damage from major earthquakes led to the large-scale abandonment of urban residential properties in former floodplain areas creating a rare opportunity to re-imagine the future of these lands. This has posed a unique governance challenge involving the reassessment of land-use options and a renewed focus on disaster risk and climate change adaptation. Urban-rural tensions have emerged through decisions on relocating residential development, alternative proposals for land uses, and an unprecedented opportunity for redress of degraded traditional values for indigenous (Māori) people. Immediately following the earthquakes, existing statutory arrangements applied to many recovery needs and identified institutional responsibilities. Bespoke legislation was also created to address the scale of impacts. Characteristics of the approach have included attention to information acquisition, iterative assessment of land - use options, and a wide variety of opportunities for community participation. Challenges have included a protracted decision-making process with accompanying transaction costs, and a high requirement for coordination. The case typifies the challenges of achieving ecosystem governance where both urban and rural stakeholders have strong desires and an opportunity to exert influence. It presents a unique context for applying the latest thinking on ecosystem management, adaptation, and resilience, and offers transferable learning for the governance of peri-urban floodplains worldwide.
Hon JUDITH COLLINS to the Prime Minister: Does she stand by all her Government’s statements and actions?
HELEN WHITE to the Minister of Finance: What recent reports has he seen on the New Zealand economy?
Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH to the Minister of Education: Does he stand by all his statements and policies on education?
GINNY ANDERSEN to the Minister of Housing: What recent announcements has she made about the Government’s transitional housing programme?
NICOLA WILLIS to the Minister of Housing: Has the Government kept the commitment made in the 2017 Speech from the Throne to develop a ‘Rent to Own’ scheme; if so, how many families has the scheme helped into houses since then?
ANAHILA KANONGATA'A-SUISUIKI to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: What support has the Ministry of Social Development provided to people and families affected by recent COVID-19 restrictions?
NICOLE McKEE to the Minister of Police: Will Government actions reduce gang crime and gang numbers this year?
IBRAHIM OMER to the Lead Coordination Minister for the Government's Response to the Royal Commission's Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques: What recent engagement has there been with the Muslim and other ethnic communities on the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain?
SIMEON BROWN to the Minister of Police: Does she stand by her commitment to achieve the Striving Towards 1800 New Police initiative; if so, when will she achieve this initiative?
TEANAU TUIONO to the Minister for Economic and Regional Development: What advice, if any, has he received about the upcoming launch in New Zealand of a satellite that includes the “Gunsmoke-J” payload from the United States Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command?
MARJA LUBECK to the Minister for Workplace Relations and Safety: What recent announcements has he made about improving the Holidays Act 2003?
TIM VAN DE MOLEN to the Minister for Building and Construction: How many applications has the Residential Earthquake-Prone Building Financial Assistance Scheme had since its inception in September last year, and how much has been appropriated for the scheme?
Disasters, either man-made or natural, are characterised by a multiplicity of factors including loss of property, life, environmental degradation, and psychosocial malfunction of the affected community. Although much research has been undertaken on proactive disaster management to help reduce the impacts of natural and man-made disasters, many challenges still remain. In particular, the desire to re-house the affected as quickly as possible can affect long-term recovery if a considered approach is not adopted. Promoting recovery activities, coordination, and information sharing at national and international levels are crucial to avoid duplication. Mannakkara and Wilkinson’s (2014) modified “Build Back Better” (BBB) concept aims for better resilience by incorporating key resilience elements in post-disaster restoration. This research conducted an investigation into the effectiveness of BBB in the recovery process after the 2010–2011 earthquakes in greater Christchurch, New Zealand. The BBB’s impact was assessed in terms of its five key components: built environment, natural environment, social environment, economic environment, and implementation process. This research identified how the modified BBB propositions can assist in disaster risk reduction in the future, and used both qualitative and quantitative data from both the Christchurch and Waimakariri recovery processes. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key officials from the Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority, and city councils, and supplemented by reviewing of the relevant literature. Collecting data from both qualitative and quantitative sources enabled triangulation of the data. The interviewees had directly participated in all phases of the recovery, which helped the researcher gain a clear understanding of the recovery process. The findings led to the identification of best practices from the Christchurch and Waimakariri recovery processes and underlined the effectiveness of the BBB approach for all recovery efforts. This study contributed an assessment tool to aid the measurement of resilience achieved through BBB indicators. This tool provides systematic and structured approach to measure the performance of ongoing recovery.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
Observations made in past earthquakes, in New Zealand and around the world, have highlighted the vulnerability of non-structural elements such as facades, ceilings, partitions and services. Damage to these elements can be life-threatening or jeopardise egress routes but typically, the main concern is the cost and time associated with repair works. The Insurance Council of New Zealand highlighted the substantial economic losses in recent earthquakes due to poor performance of non-structural elements. Previous inspections and research have attributed the damage to non-structural elements principally to poor coordination, inadequate or lack of seismic restraints and insufficient clearances to cater for seismic actions. Secondary issues of design responsibility, procurement and the need for better alignment of the various Standards have been identified. In addition to the compliance issues, researchers have also demonstrated that current code provisions for non-structural elements, both in New Zealand and abroad, may be inadequate. This paper first reviews the damage observed against the requirements of relevant Standards and the New Zealand Building Code, and it appears that, had the installations been compliant, the cost of repair and business interruption would have been substantially less. The second part of the paper highlights some of the apparent shortcomings with the current design process for non-structural elements, points towards possible alternative strategies and identifies areas where more research is deemed necessary. The challenge of improving the seismic performance of non-structural elements is a complex one across a diverse construction industry. Indications are that the New Zealand construction industry needs to completely rethink the delivery approach to ensure an integrated design, construction and certification process. The industry, QuakeCentre, QuakeCoRE and the University of Canterbury are presently working together to progress solutions. Indications are that if new processes can be initiated, better performance during earthquakes will be achieved while delivering enhanced building and business resilience.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.
Questions to Ministers
1. PESETA SAM LOTU-IIGA to the Minister of Finance: What are some of the issues the Government will consider to meet the expected fiscal cost of the Christchurch earthquake?
2. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by his statement that, in Christchurch, "up to 10,000 houses will need to be demolished and over 100,000 more could be damaged?
3. Hon JOHN BOSCAWEN to the Attorney-General: What changes, if any, is he proposing to the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill, and why?
4. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Minister of Finance: How much of the cumulative $15 billion drop in GDP over the next 4 years, as identified in the Treasury's February Monthly Economic Indicators report, is a result of the "weaker [economic] outlook we were seeing prior to the February earthquake" in Christchurch?
5. Dr KENNEDY GRAHAM to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Is he satisfied that there is enough coordination between central government agencies, local council, and non-government organisations in the response to the earthquake?
6. Hon DAVID PARKER to the Attorney-General: Is it his intention to further progress the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill this week?
7. NICKY WAGNER to the Minister for the Environment: What changes has the Government made under the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act to facilitate recovery and the processing of resource consents to enable Christchurch to rebuild as quickly as possible?
8. Hon JIM ANDERTON to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Does he stand by his comment in the House yesterday that "there is a period in which insurance companies will not provide cover", and if so, what will the Government do to assist people who have already signed purchase contracts and are seeking insurance cover?
9. JACQUI DEAN to the Minister of Police: What has been the response of the New Zealand Police and their counterparts in other countries to the Christchurch earthquake?
10. GRANT ROBERTSON to the Minister of Health: Is he satisfied with the cost of after-hours medical treatment?
11. TIM MACINDOE to the Minister of Housing: What assistance is available for people who require emergency housing following the earthquake on 22 February?
12. Hon TREVOR MALLARD to the Minister for Communications and Information Technology: Who made the decision to defer MediaWorks' payment of $43 million to the Crown?
A video of the keynote presentation by Sir John Holmes, during the first plenary of the 2016 People in Disasters Conference. Holmes is the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the current Director of Ditchley Foundation, and the chair of the Board of the International Rescue Committee in the UK. The presentation is titled, "The Politics of Humanity: Reflections on international aid in disasters".The abstract for this presentation reads as follows: As United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinate from 2007-2010, Sir John Holmes was heavily involved in the coordination of air provision to countries struck by natural and man-made disasters, raising the necessary funds, and the elaboration of humanitarian policy. The international humanitarian system is fragmented and struggling to cope with rising demands from both conflicts such as that in Syria, and the growing effects of climate change. Sir John will talk about what humanitarian aid can and cannot achieve, the frustrations of getting aid through when access may be difficult or denied, and the need to ensure that assistance encompasses protection of civilians and efforts to get them back on their feet, as well as the delivery of essential short term items such as food, water, medical care and shelter. He will discuss the challenges involved in trying to make the different agencies - UN United Nations, non-government organisations and the International Red Cross/Crescent movement - work together effectively. He will reveal some of the problems in dealing with donor and recipient governments who often have their own political and security agendas, and may be little interested in the necessary neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid. He will illustrate these points by practical examples of political and other dilemmas from aid provision in natural disasters such as Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2009, and the Haiti earthquake of 2010, and in conflict situations such as Darfur, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka in the past, and Syria today. He will also draw conclusions and make recommendations about how humanitarian aid might work better, and why politicians and others need to understand more clearly the impartial space required by humanitarian agencies to operate properly.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.
