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Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The Eastern Humps and Leader faults, situated in the Mount Stewart Range in North Canterbury, are two of the ≥17 faults which ruptured during the 2016 MW7.8 Kaikōura Earthquake. The earthquake produced complex, intersecting ground ruptures of these faults and the co-seismic uplift of the Mount Stewart Range. This thesis aims to determine how these two faults accommodated deformation during the 2016 earthquake and how they interact with each other and with pre-existing geological structures. In addition, it aims to establish the most likely subsurface geometry of the fault complex across the Mount Stewart Range, and to investigate the paleoseismic history of the Leader Fault. The Eastern Humps Fault strikes ~240° and dips 80° to 60° to the northwest and accommodated right- lateral – reverse-slip, with up to 4 m horizontal and 2 m vertical displacement in the 2016 earthquake. The strike of the Leader Fault varies from ~155 to ~300°, and dips ~30 to ~80° to the west/northwest, and mainly accommodated left-lateral – reverse-slip of up to 3.5 m horizontal and 3.5 m vertical slip in the 2016 earthquake. On both the Eastern Humps and Leader faults the slip is variable along strike, with areas of low total displacement and areas where horizontal and vertical displacement are negatively correlated. Fault traces with low total displacement reflect the presence of off-fault (distributed) displacement which is not being captured with field measurements. The negative correlation of horizontal and vertical displacement likely indicates a degree of slip partitioning during the 2016 earthquake on both the Eastern Humps and Leader faults. The Eastern Humps and Leader faults have a complex, interdependent relationship with the local bedrock geology. The Humps Fault appears to be a primary driver of ongoing folding and deformation of the local Mendip Syncline and folding of the Mount Stewart Range, which probably began prior to, or synchronous with, initial rupture of The Humps Fault. The Leader Fault appears to use existing lithological weaknesses in the Cretaceous-Cenozoic bedrock stratigraphy to rupture to the surface. This largely accounts for the strong variability on the strike and dip of the Leader Fault, as the geometry of the surface ruptures tend to reflect the strike and dip of the geological strata which it is rupturing through. The Leader Fault may also accommodate some degree of flexural slip in the Cenozoic cover sequence of the Mendip Syncline, contributing to the ongoing growth of the fold. The similarity between topography and uplift profiles from the 2016 earthquake suggest that growth of the Mount Stewart Range has been primarily driven by multiple (>500) discrete earthquakes that rupture The Humps and Leader faults. The spatial distribution of surface displacements across the Mount Stewart Range is more symmetrical than would be expected if uplift is driven primarily by The Humps and Leader faults alone. Elastic dislocation forward models were used to model potential sub-surface geometries and the resulting patterns of deformation compared to photogrammetry-derived surface displacements. Results show a slight preference for models with a steeply southeast-dipping blind fault, coincident with a zone of seismicity at depth, as a ‘backthrust’ to The Humps and Leader faults. This inferred Mount Stewart Fault accommodated contractional strain during the 2016 earthquake and contributes to the ongoing uplift of the Mount Stewart Range with a component of folding. Right-lateral and reverse shear stress change on the Hope Fault was also modelled using Coulomb 3.3 software to examine whether slip on The Humps and Leader faults could transfer enough stress onto the Hope Fault to trigger through-going rupture. Results indicate that during the 2016 earthquake right-lateral shear and reverse stress only increased on the Hope Fault in small areas to the west of the Leader Fault, and similar ruptures would be unlikely to trigger eastward propagating rupture unless the Hope Fault was close to failure prior to the earthquake. Paleoseismic trenches were excavated on the Leader Fault at four locations from 2018 to 2020, revealing near surface (< 4m depth) contractional deformation of Holocene stratigraphy. Three of the trench locations uncovered clear evidence for rupture of the Leader Fault prior to 2016, with fault displacement of near surface stratigraphy being greater than displacement recorded during the 2016 earthquake. Radiocarbon dating of in-situ organic material from two trenches indicate a date of the penultimate earthquake on the Leader Fault within the past 1000 years. This date is consistent with The Humps and Leader faults having ruptured simultaneously in the past, and with multi-fault ruptures involving The Humps, Leader, Hundalee and Stone Jug faults having occurred prior to the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Overall, the results contribute to an improved understanding of the Kaikōura earthquake and highlight the importance of detailed structural and paleoseismic investigations in determining controls on earthquake ‘complexity’.

Audio, Radio New Zealand

Questions to Ministers 1. Hon PHIL GOFF to the Prime Minister: In stating that "this Government introduced a balanced package of tax cuts" was he saying that his tax changes and the tax system are fair to all New Zealanders? 2. LOUISE UPSTON to the Minister of Finance: What will be the main objectives of Budget 2011 tomorrow? 3. Hon ANNETTE KING to the Prime Minister: When he said "in most cases the tax switch more than compensated people for the increase in GST", in which cases hadn't people been fully compensated? 4. JOHN BOSCAWEN to the Prime Minister: Does he stand by the statement he made in his post-Cabinet press conference on Monday that "Everyone needs to understand that what Don Brash is talking about is hardcore"; if so why? 5. Hon DAVID CUNLIFFE to the Minister of Finance: What is the total impact on the operating balance, over the forecast period, of the fiscal impact of the tax changes in Budget 2010 according to page 70 of the 2010 Budget and Economic Fiscal Update, and how does he reconcile that with the Prime Minister's statement in the House yesterday that "National's tax plan 2010…was fiscally neutral"? 6. ALLAN PEACHEY to the Minister of Corrections: What reports has she received about the first year of container units being used in New Zealand prisons? 7. RAHUI KATENE to the Minister for Communications and Information Technology: What was the motivation behind the decision to remove regulatory forbearance from the Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill? 8. JACINDA ARDERN to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Does he stand by the Prime Minister's statement in relation to Christchurch that "it looks like the residential rebuild alone will require up to 12,500 full-time workers", if not, how many full-time workers does he believe will now be needed? 9. Hon TAU HENARE to the Minister for Social Development and Employment: What recent announcements has she made to support community social services? 10. CLARE CURRAN to the Minister for Communications and Information Technology: What is the best estimate of the additional cost to the Crown of the change he announced to the ultrafast broadband network this morning? 11. TIM MACINDOE to the Minister of Housing: What recent announcements has he made regarding the Government's Housing Innovation Fund? 12. GARETH HUGHES to the Acting Minister of Energy and Resources: What is her response to the statement of leading scientist and NASA director Dr James Hansen, currently touring New Zealand, that "coal is the single greatest threat to civilisation and all life on our planet" and we should leave it in the ground?

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The increase of the world's population located near areas prone to natural disasters has given rise to new ‘mega risks’; the rebuild after disasters will test the governments’ capabilities to provide appropriate responses to protect the people and businesses. During the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes (2010-2012) that destroyed much of the inner city, the government of New Zealand set up a new partnership between the public and private sector to rebuild the city’s infrastructure. The new alliance, called SCIRT, used traditional risk management methods in the many construction projects. And, in hindsight, this was seen as one of the causes for some of the unanticipated problems. This study investigated the risk management practices in the post-disaster recovery to produce a specific risk management model that can be used effectively during future post-disaster situations. The aim was to develop a risk management guideline for more integrated risk management and fill the gap that arises when the traditional risk management framework is used in post-disaster situations. The study used the SCIRT alliance as a case study. The findings of the study are based on time and financial data from 100 rebuild projects, and from surveying and interviewing risk management professionals connected to the infrastructure recovery programme. The study focussed on post-disaster risk management in construction as a whole. It took into consideration the changes that happened to the people, the work and the environment due to the disaster. System thinking, and system dynamics techniques have been used due to the complexity of the recovery and to minimise the effect of unforeseen consequences. Based on an extensive literature review, the following methods were used to produce the model. The analytical hierarchical process and the relative importance index have been used to identify the critical risks inside the recovery project. System theory methods and quantitative graph theory have been used to investigate the dynamics of risks between the different management levels. Qualitative comparative analysis has been used to explore the critical success factors. And finally, causal loop diagrams combined with the grounded theory approach has been used to develop the model itself. The study identified that inexperienced staff, low management competency, poor communication, scope uncertainty, and non-alignment of the timing of strategic decisions with schedule demands, were the key risk factors in recovery projects. Among the critical risk groups, it was found that at a strategic management level, financial risks attracted the highest level of interest, as the client needs to secure funding. At both alliance-management and alliance-execution levels, the safety and environmental risks were given top priority due to a combination of high levels of emotional, reputational and media stresses. Risks arising from a lack of resources combined with the high volume of work and the concern that the cost could go out of control, alongside the aforementioned funding issues encouraged the client to create the recovery alliance model with large reputable construction organisations to lock in the recovery cost, at a time when the scope was still uncertain. This study found that building trust between all parties, clearer communication and a constant interactive flow of information, established a more working environment. Competent and clear allocation of risk management responsibilities, cultural shift, risk prioritisation, and staff training were crucial factors. Finally, the post-disaster risk management (PDRM) model can be described as an integrated risk management model that considers how the changes which happened to the environment, the people and their work, caused them to think differently to ease the complexity of the recovery projects. The model should be used as a guideline for recovery systems, especially after an earthquake, looking in detail at all the attributes and the concepts, which influence the risk management for more effective PDRM. The PDRM model is represented in Causal Loops Diagrams (CLD) in Figure 8.31 and based on 10 principles (Figure 8.32) and 26 concepts (Table 8.1) with its attributes.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

The Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010-2011, in particular the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake and the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, produced severe and widespread liquefaction in Christchurch and surrounding areas. The scale of the liquefaction was unprecedented, and caused extensive damage to a variety of man-made structures, including residential houses. Around 20,000 residential houses suffered serious damage as a direct result of the effects of liquefaction, and this resulted in approximately 7000 houses in the worst-hit areas being abandoned. Despite the good performance of light timber-framed houses under the inertial loads of the earthquake, these structures could not withstand the large loads and deformations associated with liquefaction, resulting in significant damage. The key structural component of houses subjected to liquefaction effects was found to be their foundations, as these are in direct contact with the ground. The performance of house foundations directly influenced the performance of the structure as a whole. Because of this, and due to the lack of research in this area, it was decided to investigate the performance of houses and in particular their foundations when subjected to the effects of liquefaction. The data from the inspections of approximately 500 houses conducted by a University of Canterbury summer research team following the 4th September 2010 earthquake in the worst-hit areas of Christchurch were analysed to determine the general performance of residential houses when subjected to high liquefaction loads. This was followed by the detailed inspection of around 170 houses with four different foundation types common to Christchurch and New Zealand: Concrete perimeter with short piers constructed to NZS3604, concrete slab-on-grade also to NZS3604, RibRaft slabs designed by Firth Industries and driven pile foundations. With a focus on foundations, floor levels and slopes were measured, and the damage to all areas of the house and property were recorded. Seven invasive inspections were also conducted on houses being demolished, to examine in more detail the deformation modes and the causes of damage in severely affected houses. The simplified modelling of concrete perimeter sections subjected to a variety of liquefaction-related scenarios was also performed, to examine the comparative performance of foundations built in different periods, and the loads generated under various bearing loss and lateral spreading cases. It was found that the level of foundation damage is directly related to the level of liquefaction experienced, and that foundation damage and liquefaction severity in turn influence the performance of the superstructure. Concrete perimeter foundations were found to have performed most poorly, suffering high local floor slopes and being likely to require foundation repairs even when liquefaction was low enough that no surface ejecta was seen. This was due to their weak, flexible foundation structure, which cannot withstand liquefaction loads without deforming. The vulnerability of concrete perimeter foundations was confirmed through modelling. Slab-on-grade foundations performed better, and were unlikely to require repairs at low levels of liquefaction. Ribraft and piled foundations performed the best, with repairs unlikely up to moderate levels of liquefaction. However, all foundation types were susceptible to significant damage at higher levels of liquefaction, with maximum differential settlements of 474mm, 202mm, 182mm and 250mm found for concrete perimeter, slab-on-grade, ribraft and piled foundations respectively when subjected to significant lateral spreading, the most severe loading scenario caused by liquefaction. It was found through the analysis of the data that the type of exterior wall cladding, either heavy or light, and the number of storeys, did not affect the performance of foundations. This was also shown through modelling for concrete perimeter foundations, and is due to the increased foundation strengths provided for heavily cladded and two-storey houses. Heavy roof claddings were found to increase the demands on foundations, worsening their performance. Pre-1930 concrete perimeter foundations were also found to be very vulnerable to damage under liquefaction loads, due to their weak and brittle construction.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.