Summary of oral history interview with Mary Hobbs about her experiences of the Canterbury earthquakes.
A video of an interview with Tom Thomson, Managing Director of Elastomer Products, about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Thomson talks about the importance of focussing on people, diversifying infrastructure, and informing customers after the earthquakes. He also talks about the need for businesses to understand their insurance policies and to have building and service fall-back plans. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.
Topics - Would you like a pay rise of $10,000 a year? That's what the lowest paid Auckland Council staff will get if a plan to implement a minimum wage of $18.40 an hour goes through. The Insurance Council has received a briefing today after a report revealed hundreds of properties on Christchurch's Port Hills are on unsafe land. The GNS Science report released yesterday shows a major rain or snow storm could cause land already loosened by the earthquakes to move.
An edited copy of the pdf transcript of Caroline Murray's second earthquake story, captured by the UC QuakeBox Take 2 project. At the participant's request, parts of this transcript have been redacted. Interviewer: Paul Millar. Transcriber: Maggie Blackwood.
A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.
A man sits in an armchair in the ruins of his house with his wife beside him. A man carrying a briefcase marked 'EQC' has come to make an insurance assessment and says 'Unfortunately, this is a North Canterbury collapse - so you'll only get your first $100,000 back'. Context; the Christchurch earthquake of 4th September and the collapse of the South Canterbury Finance Company. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
Shows an egg that represents '2012' with a chick beginning to peck its way out. In the background storms rage. Someone hopes that it will 'be softer and fuzzier than the last one!' Context: Refers to the difficulties and disasters of 2011 in New Zealand. Christchurch earthquakes and aftershocks continue with complicating rebuilding and insurance issues, the wreck of the Rena, and various weather events and political issues. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
A Christchurch man with terminal cancer is using his final days to battle his insurance company, a decade on from the deadly earthquakes. Brian Shaw owns an apartment that's in a block of 11. They were all damaged in 2011. Shaw is a building consent officer. He says getting technical reports and chasing a settlement with insurer Vero has already cost the unit owners about $400,000, and they still have not even made it to court. On Friday morning he will be protesting outside Vero's Christchurch office, along with other unhappy customers.
A scathing inquiry into the Earthquake Commission's handling of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes could mean huge change for how it handles claims. The Government says it's committed to implementing all of the recommendations from the inquiry, including improving its communication, planning and preparedness and dispute resolution. John Goddard, an insurance and employment law barrister who dealt with more than 4000 claims at the time, says repairs were handled poorly and the new recommendations won't cover all the bases. John Goddard and Melanie Bourke of EQC Fix speak to Corin Dann.
A video of an interview with Peter Townsend, Chief Executive of Canterbury Employers' Chamber of Commerce about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Townsend talks about business collaboration in Christchurch, the need for businesses to have a back-up plans, the increase in people working from home, and the importance of businesses understanding their insurance. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.
Topics - it's been described as the 'Downton Effect' - a revival of more formal dinner parties as the British try to bring back fine dining. Today we learned that insurance companies have completed just 15 per cent of rebuilds and 10 per cent of over-cap repairs more than three years after the Canterbury earthquakes. A series of rallies are being held in five Australian cities today by New Zealanders protesting against legislation which denies them rights to welfare. Commuters are cautiously optimistic about a radical revamp proposed for Wellington's rush-hour rail service.
The cartoon shows a desperate man representing 'Christchurch' who is clutching the end of a broken plank that protrudes from a crumbling cliff-face. He says 'Who said we're living ON the edge?!' Context - the man is suggesting that they are not On the edge but OVER it. Refers to the continuing hardships facing many Christchurch residents as earthquakes and aftershocks continue and many face large financial losses because of insurance problems. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), induced extensive damage in residential buildings and led to over NZ$40 billion in total economic losses. Due to the unique insurance setting in New Zealand, up to 80% of the financial losses were insured. Over the CES, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) received more than 412,000 insurance claims for residential buildings. The 4 September 2010 earthquake is the event for which most of the claims have been lodged with more than 138,000 residential claims for this event only. This research project uses EQC claim database to develop a seismic loss prediction model for residential buildings in Christchurch. It uses machine learning to create a procedure capable of highlighting critical features that affected the most buildings loss. A future study of those features enables the generation of insights that can be used by various stakeholders, for example, to better understand the influence of a structural system on the building loss or to select appropriate risk mitigation measures. Previous to the training of the machine learning model, the claim dataset was supplemented with additional data sourced from private and open access databases giving complementary information related to the building characteristics, seismic demand, liquefaction occurrence and soil conditions. This poster presents results of a machine learning model trained on a merged dataset using residential claims from the 4 September 2010.
A video of André Lovatt, Chair of Regenerate Christchurch, Hugh Cowan, General Manager of Reinsurance, Research and Education at EQC, and developer Antony Gough responding to questions from the floor during a panel at the 2016 Seismics in the City Conference. The panel has three themes:A City on the Move: Collaboration and Regeneration: "'Christchurch is now moving rapidly from the recovery phase into a regeneration stage with Central and Local Government working with the wider community, including the business community to ensure we get optimal outcomes for greater Christchurch' (CECC)."Looking Back: Remembering and Learning: "What are the milestones? What are the millstones? What have we learnt? What have we applied?"Looking Forward: Visioning and Building: "What do we aspire to? What are the roadblocks? What is the way forward?"
A video of an interview with Rick Hellings, Managing Director of Smiths City Group, about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Hellings talks about the changes in regulation and geography in Christchurch after the earthquakes and the importance of managing risks, understanding insurance, and being prepared for change. He also talks about the importance of keeping customers and business partners informed, looking after staff and customers, and reducing costs to offset the increases in rent. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.
A digitally manipulated image of liquefaction around a house in Avondale. The photographer comments, "The bottom of the gates were swallowed up by liquefaction, but the house still looked in good condition, which was confirmed by builders just going in to work on the property. It is in the Christchurch red zone, which after testing has been deemed unsuitable for houses to be built on. All the land will be bought by the Government and they would also buy any properties that could be repaired. The remaining insured property owners will get a payment from the insurance company. All the buildings are condemned to be knocked down".
More than 600 Christchurch home-owners face a wait of up to 18 months before its decided who foots the bill for earthquake repairs that could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The problem - first revealed on Checkpoint in March - is that owners bought homes thinking all quake damage had been identified and fixed - only to find more problems that weren't addressed. The people affected cannot claim on their insurance - because the damage pre-dates them buying the house - and any grant from the Earthquake Commission is capped. EQC has publicly apologised to those affected but the Minster, Megan Woods, says it's unclear who will pay for the needed repairs.
"Prior to the devastating 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes, the city of Christchurch was already exhibiting signs of a housing affordability crisis. The causes and symptoms were similar to those being experienced in Auckland, but the substantial damage to the housing stock caused by the earthquakes added new dimensions and impetus to the problem. Large swathes of the most affordable housing stock in the east of the city were effectively destroyed by the earthquakes. In itself this would have pushed the mean house price upwards, but compounding problems exacerbated the situation. These include the price effects of reduced supply of both rented and owned housing and increased demand from both displaced residents and an influx of rebuild workers. The need for additional temporary housing while repairs were undertaken and the associated insurance pay-outs bidding up rents with improved rental returns leading to increased interest in property investment. Land supply constraints and consenting issues inhibiting the build of new housing and political infighting and uncertainty regarding the future of parts of the city leading to a flight of development activity to peripheral locations and adjoining local authorities. Concerns that the erosion of the city council rating base combined with inadequacy of insurance cover for infrastructure will lead to large rates increases, increased development costs and reduced amenities and services in future years. These and other issuers will be elaborated on in this paper with a view to exploring the way forward for affordable housing Christchurch City."
A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.
A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.
A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
In this thesis, focus is given to develop methodologies for rapidly estimating specific components of loss and downtime functions. The thesis proposes methodologies for deriving loss functions by (i) considering individual component performance; (ii) grouping them as per their performance characteristics; and (iii) applying them to similar building usage categories. The degree of variation in building stock and understanding their characteristics are important factors to be considered in the loss estimation methodology and the field surveys carried out to collect data add value to the study. To facilitate developing ‘downtime’ functions, this study investigates two key components of downtime: (i) time delay from post-event damage assessment of properties; and (ii) time delay in settling the insurance claims lodged. In these two areas, this research enables understanding of critical factors that influence certain aspects of downtime and suggests approaches to quantify those factors. By scrutinising the residential damage insurance claims data provided by the Earthquake Commission (EQC) for the 2010- 2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), this work provides insights into various processes of claims settlement, the time taken to complete them and the EQC loss contributions to building stock in Christchurch city and Canterbury region. The study has shown diligence in investigating the EQC insurance claim data obtained from the CES to get new insights and build confidence in the models developed and the results generated. The first stage of this research develops contribution functions (probabilistic relationships between the expected losses for a wide range of building components and the building’s maximum response) for common types of claddings used in New Zealand buildings combining the probabilistic density functions (developed using the quantity of claddings measured from Christchurch buildings), fragility functions (obtained from the published literature) and cost functions (developed based on inputs from builders) through Monte Carlo simulations. From the developed contribution functions, glazing, masonry veneer, monolithic and precast concrete cladding systems are found to incur 50% loss at inter-storey drift levels equal to 0.027, 0.003, 0.005 and 0.011, respectively. Further, the maximum expected cladding loss for glazing, masonry veneer, monolithic, precast concrete cladding systems are found to be 368.2, 331.9, 365.0, and 136.2 NZD per square meter of floor area, respectively. In the second stage of this research, a detailed cost breakdown of typical buildings designed and built for different purposes is conducted. The contributions of structural and non- structural components to the total building cost are compared for buildings of different usages, and based on the similar ratios of non-structural performance group costs to the structural performance group cost, four-building groups are identified; (i) Structural components dominant group: outdoor sports, stadiums, parkings and long-span warehouses, (ii) non- structural drift-sensitive components dominant group: houses, single-storey suburban buildings (all usages), theatres/halls, workshops and clubhouses, (iii) non-structural acceleration- sensitive components dominant group: hospitals, research labs, museums and retail/cold stores, and (iv) apartments, hotels, offices, industrials, indoor sports, classrooms, devotionals and aquariums. By statistically analysing the cost breakdowns, performance group weighting factors are proposed for structural, and acceleration-sensitive and drift-sensitive non-structural components for all four building groups. Thus proposed building usage groupings and corresponding weighting factors facilitate rapid seismic loss estimation of any type of building given the EDPs at storey levels are known. A model for the quantification of post-earthquake inspection duration is developed in the third stage of this research. Herein, phase durations for the three assessment phases (one rapid impact and two rapid building) are computed using the number of buildings needing inspections, the number of engineers involved in inspections and a phase duration coefficient (which considers the median building inspection time, efficiency of engineer and the number of engineers involved in each assessment teams). The proposed model can be used: (i) by national/regional authorities to decide the length of the emergency period following a major earthquake, and estimate the number of engineers required to conduct a post-earthquake inspection within the desired emergency period, and (ii) to quantify the delay due to inspection for the downtime modelling framework. The final stage of this research investigates the repair costs and insurance claim settlement time for damaged residential buildings in the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. Based on the EQC claim settlement process, claims are categorized into three groups; (i) Small Claims: claims less than NZD15,000 which were settled through cash payment, (ii) Medium Claims: claims less than NZD100,000 which were managed through Canterbury Home Repair Programme (CHRP), and (iii) Large Claims: claims above NZD100,000 which were managed by an insurance provider. The regional loss ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch for three events inducing shakings of approximate seismic intensities 6, 7, and 8 are found to be 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, the claim duration (time between an event and the claim lodgement date), assessment duration (time between the claim lodgement day and the most recent assessment day), and repair duration (time between the most recent assessment day and the repair completion day) for the insured residential buildings in the region affected by the Canterbury earthquake sequence is found to be in the range of 0.5-4 weeks, 1.5- 5 months, and 1-3 years, respectively. The results of this phase will provide useful information to earthquake engineering researchers working on seismic risk/loss and insurance modelling.
It could be up to 18 months before 660 Christchurch homeowners know who will pay for earthquake damage repairs with a $1 billion price tag. The bill to fix houses in Christchurch that weren't repaired properly the first time round, or have suffered more damage in aftershocks, is climbing - and the government can't say who's liable. The problem is the homes have new owners who can't claim on theri insurance because the damage pre-dates them owning the home. Earlier Greater Christchurch Regeneration Minister Megan Woods told us the previous National government put no plan in place, and the current government is being left to pick up the pieces. Former Christchurch earthquake recovery minister Gerry Brownlee disputes the issue.
After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner’s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from StatNZ, this project empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and what were the implications of these choices for the owners’ wealth and income.
The use of post-earthquake cordons as a tool to support emergency managers after an event has been documented around the world. However, there is limited research that attempts to understand the use, effectiveness, inherent complexities, impacts and subsequent consequences of cordoning once applied. This research aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed understanding of first, the cordons and associated processes, and their implications in a post-earthquake scenario. We use a qualitative method to understand cordons through case studies of two cities where it was used in different temporal and spatial scales: Christchurch (2011) and Wellington (Kaikōura earthquake 2016), New Zealand. Data was collected through 21 expert interviews obtained through purposive and snowball sampling of key informants who were directly or indirectly involved in a decision-making role and/or had influence in relation to the cordoning process. The participants were from varying backgrounds and roles i.e. emergency managers, council members, business representatives, insurance representatives, police and communication managers. The data was transcribed, coded in Nvivo and then grouped based on underlying themes and concepts and then analyzed inductively. It is found that cordons are used primarily as a tool to control access for the purpose of life safety and security. But cordons can also be adapted to support recovery. Broadly, it can be synthesized and viewed based on two key aspects, ‘decision-making’ and ‘operations and management’, which overlap and interact as part of a complex system. The underlying complexity arises in large part due to the multitude of sectors it transcends such as housing, socio-cultural requirements, economics, law, governance, insurance, evacuation, available resources etc. The complexity further increases as the duration of cordon is extended.
A video of a press conference with Christchurch Mayor Lianne Dalziel and Raf Manji, Chair of the Christchurch City Council Finance Committee, about the KordaMentha report. KordaMentha is an independent auditing firm which specialises in insolvencies and corporate recovery. The report analysed the Christchurch City Council's three year budgeting plan and the financial strategies that lay behind it. Much of this budget dealt with the challenges in Christchurch caused by the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Dalziel talks about the cost of mending Christchurch's infrastructure, the Council's insurance settlement, and the need to address the findings in the report. Manji talks about the Council's financial options following the report.
Prime Minister John Key sits on a huge crushing ball that represents the 'IRB' (International Rugby Board) and says 'Don't listen to rumour. It's not a fait accompli yet!' The ball swings towards crumbling land which represents 'Christchurch World Cup Rights'. Context - The Government has repeatedly said its preference is to keep cup games in Christchurch and Mr Key said yesterday that it would send a "powerful message" about Christchurch, although the Government had to be realistic. "The IRB are the ultimate arbiter ... they hold their own insurance policies and they'll have their own discussions with their insurers. There's only so far New Zealand can take this." (Stuff 12 March 2011) Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
A review of the week's news including... Relief after cyclone Cook passes quickly down the North Island with limited damage, questions about what was known about the increasing risk of Edgecumbe stop banks bursting, the man who gave us Fred Dagg has died suddenly, three more former CERA staffers are being investigated after conflict of interests prompted calls for a wider inquiry, a warning more homeless families will be sleeping in cars parks and garages in Auckland this winter, the High Court rules excessive defamation damages against Colin Craig constitute a miscarriage of justice, a verdict in a defamation against the Labour leader Andrew Little, relatives of New Zealand soldiers killed on duty in South East Asia are relieved their family members will be finally returned home, US consumer campaigner Erin Brockovich visits Christchurch homeowners who are trying to settle earthquake insurance claims six years on, three teams have been cut from the Super Rugby competition and a more than 50 year old copper time capsule has been cracked open.
A poster created by Empowered Christchurch to advertise their submission to the CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan on social media.The poster reads, "Submission, CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan. Risk Acceptance. It is the role of insurance companies, the EQC included, to accept the risks covered under their terms of reference/policies and compensate policyholders when such risks eventuate. However, many policyholders in Christchurch have not been compensated for the damage to their homes and their lives. These responsibilities need to be faced by the entities responsible. An equitable solution needs to be found for properties with hazards such as flooding that are a direct result of the earthquakes. In tandem with this, every effort must be made to protect residents from the risks posed by climate change. We need a city that is driven by the people that live in it, and enabled by a bureaucracy that accepts and mitigates risks, rather than transferring them to the most vulnerable residents".