A video of an interview with Mayor Bob Parker, recorded at the Civil Defence Headquarters in the Christchurch Art Gallery on the evening of the 22 February 2011. Parker talks about the fatalities and damage caused by the 22 February 2011 earthquake.
When the 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch at 2:20 on Monday afternoon Barry Ross was outside his home at Godley Head on the Port Hills, where is he is the Department of Conservation caretaker. Barry's house is thought to be the closest to the epicentre that day and such was the force of the quake he was thrown to the ground and some of the cliff nearby fell away. He lost power and water for a few days but now he's back home, clearing up and determined to get on with life.
A Christchurch primary school is moving into its permanent new home today, nine years after cliffs behind it collapsed during the city's earthquakes. Redcliffs School subsequently moved to a temporary location in the suburb of Sumner, but the new location will mean the school will return home to Redcliffs, after a land swap with the local park. The move comes after in 2016, the then National Government, overturned its own decision to close the school. Christchurch reporter Anan Zaki spoke to principal Rose McInerney ahead of today's move.
A video of an interview with Laurence Mote about the wall of containers in Sumner. Shipping containers line the south side of Main Road in Sumner, protecting road users from potential rock fall from the cliffs above. Mote bikes past the containers every day on his way to work. He talks about the risks facing cyclists along Main Road and in greater Christchurch, including pot holes and narrow roads. He advises cyclists to wear bright clothing and lights, and for cars to slow down and give cyclists room.
Christchurch Mayor Bob Parker smiles smugly from the top of a cliff while Jim Anderton, his chief rival for mayor in the local body elections to be held on 9th October 2010, lands with a bump as the ground on which he was standing, collapses. Refers to the unexpected and advantageous public exposure gained by the incumbent mayor because of the Christchurch earthquake of the 4th September. Quantity: 2 digital cartoon(s).
The cartoon shows a desperate man representing 'Christchurch' who is clutching the end of a broken plank that protrudes from a crumbling cliff-face. He says 'Who said we're living ON the edge?!' Context - the man is suggesting that they are not On the edge but OVER it. Refers to the continuing hardships facing many Christchurch residents as earthquakes and aftershocks continue and many face large financial losses because of insurance problems. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
A man representing 'Chch' (Christchurch) walks a tightrope between two cliffs. Suddenly below there are piles of dollar notes from the 'AMI' and he says 'A safety net at last!' Context - Christchurch earthquake problems with insurance. Insurers are saying that they will only pay for repairs for houses in the Red zone that are destined for demolition but that are relatively undamaged. Maybe the cartoon is expressing an ironic response to AMI's 'total replacement' policy. Quantity: 1 digital cartoon(s).
In this episode of the influential New Zealand architecture series, dapper tour guide David Mitchell looks at the 'Christchurch Style'. He begins with the humble baches on Taylor's Mistake's cliffs, before focusing on the Euro-influenced brutalism of Miles Warren and the "flamboyant" practice of Peter Beaven (earthquake victims SBS House, and Lyttelton Tunnel's "fifth ship" are featured); and the cottage's modern descendent: Don Donnithorne's post-war home. Warren intriguingly compares his process designing Christchurch Town Hall with Jørn Utzon's Sydney Opera House.
Aerial footage of Christchurch recorded the day after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The footage shows damage to the Smith City car park, the Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament, the CTV Building, the PGC Building, the Durham Street Methodist Church, the Lyttelton Timeball Station, the roads alongside the Avon River, and the ChristChurch Cathedral. It also shows New Zealand Army road blocks outside the hospital, crushed buses on Colombo Street, a Royal New Zealand Navy vessel in Lyttelton Harbour, rock fall on the Summit Road, collapsed cliffs in Sumner and Redcliffs, tents set up in a park, flooding in New Brighton, and liquefaction in QEII Park.
A major hazard accompanying earthquake shaking in areas of steep topography is the detachment of rocks from bedrock outcrops that subsequently slide, roll, or bounce downslope (i.e. rockfalls). The 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused recurrent and severe rockfall in parts of southern Christchurch. Coseismic rockfall caused five fatalities and significant infrastructural damage during the 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake. Here we examine a rockfall site in southern Christchurch in detail using geomorphic mapping, lidar analysis, geochronology (cosmogenic 3He dating, radiocarbon dating, optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) from quartz, infrared stimulated luminescence from K-feldspar), numerical modeling of rockfall boulder trajectories, and ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs). Rocks fell from the source cliff only in earthquakes with interpolated peak ground velocities exceeding ~10 cm/s; hundreds of smaller earthquakes did not produce rockfall. On the basis of empirical observations, GMPEs and age chronologies we attribute paleo-rockfalls to strong shaking in prehistoric earthquakes. We conclude that earthquake shaking of comparable intensity to the strongest contemporary earthquakes in Christchurch last occurred at this site approximately 5000 to 7000 years ago, and that in some settings, rockfall deposits provide useful proxies for past strong ground motions.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
The Lake Coleridge Rock Avalanche Deposits (LCRADs) are located on Ryton Station in the middle Rakaia Valley, approximately 80 km west of Christchurch. Torlesse Supergroup greywacke is the basement material and has been significantly influenced by both active tectonics and glaciation. Both glacial and post-glacial processes have produced large volumes of material which blanket the bedrock on slopes and in the valley floors. The LCRADs were part of a regional study of rock avalanches by WHITEHOUSE (1981, 1983) and WHITEHOUSE and GRIFFITHS (1983), and a single rock avalanche event was recognised with a weathering rind age of 120 years B.P. that was later modified to 150 ± 40 years B.P. The present study has refined details of both the age and the sequence of events at the site, by identifying three separate rock avalanche deposits (termed the LCRA1, LCRA2 and LCRA3 deposits), which are all sourced from near the summit of Carriage Drive. The LCRA1 deposit is lobate in shape and had an estimated original deposit volume of 12.5 x 10⁶ m³, although erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the present day debris volume to 5.1 x 10⁶ m³. An optically stimulated luminescence date taken from sandy loess immediately beneath the LCRA1 deposit provided a maximum age for the rock avalanche event of 9,720 ± 750 years B.P., which is believed to be realistic given that this is shortly after the retreat of Acheron 3 ice from this part of the valley. Emplacement of rock avalanche material into an ancestral Ryton riverbed created a natural dam with a ~17 M m³ lake upstream. The river is thought to have created a natural spillway over the dam structure at ~557 m (a.s.l), and to have existed for a number of years before any significant downcutting occurred. Although a triggering mechanism for the LCRA1 deposit was poorly constrained, it is thought that stress rebound after glacial ice removal may have initiated failure. Due to the event occurring c.10,000 years ago, there was a lack of definition for a possible earthquake trigger, though the possibility is obvious. The LCRA₂ event had an original deposit volume of 0.66 x 10⁶ m³, and was constrained to the low-lying area adjacent to the Ryton River that had been created by river erosion of the LCRA1 deposit. Further erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the deposit volume to 0.4 x 10⁶ m³. A radiocarbon date from a piece of mānuka found within the LCRA2 deposit provided an age of 668 ± 36 years B.P., and this is thought to reliably date the event. The LCRA2 event also dammed the Ryton River, and the preservation of dam-break outwash terraces downstream from the deposit provides clear evidence of rapid dam erosion and flooding after overtopping, and breaching by the Ryton River. Based on the mean annual flow of the Ryton River, the LCRA2 lake would have taken approximately two weeks to fill assuming that there were no preferred breach paths and the material was relatively impermeable. The LCRA2 event is thought to have been coseismic with a fault rupture along the western segment of the PPAFZ, which has been dated at 600 ± 100 years B.P. by SMITH (2003). The small LCRA3 event was not able to be dated, but it is believed to have failed shortly after the LCRA2 event and it may in fact be a lag deposit of the second rock avalanche event possibly triggered by an aftershock. The deposit is only visible at one locality within the cliffs that line the Ryton River, and its lack of geomorphic expression is attributed to it occurring closely after the LCRA2 event, while the Ryton River was still dammed from the second rock avalanche event. A wedge-block of some 35,000 m³ of source material for a future rock avalanche was identified at the summit of Carriage Drive. The dilation of the rock mass, combined with unfavourably oriented sub-vertical bedding in the Torlesse Supergroup bedrock, has allowed toppling-style failure on both of the main ridge lines around the source area for the LCRADs. In the event of a future rock avalanche occurring within the Ryton riverbed an emergency response plan has been developed to provide a staged response, especially in relation to the camping ground located at the mouth of the Ryton River. A long-term management plan has also been developed for mitigation measures for the Ryton riverbed and adjacent floodplain areas downstream of a future rock avalanche at the LCRAD site.