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Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of a presentation by Dr Duncan Webb, Partner at Lane Neave, during the third plenary of the 2016 People in Disasters Conference. The presentation is titled, "Loss of Trust and other Earthquake Damage".The abstract for this presentation reads as follows: It was predictable that the earthquakes which hit the Canterbury region in 2010 and 2011 caused trauma. However, it was assumed that recovery would be significantly assisted by governmental agencies and private insurers. The expectation was that these organisations would relieve the financial pressures and associated anxiety caused by damage to property. Some initiatives did exactly that. However, there are many instances where difficulties with insurance and related issues have exacerbated the adverse effects of the earthquakes on people's wellness. In some cases, stresses around property issues have become and independent source of extreme anxiety and have had significant impacts on the quality of people's lives. Underlying this problem is a breakdown in trust between citizen and state, and insurer and insured. This has led to a pervading concern that entitlements are being denied. While such concerns are sometimes well founded, an approach which is premised on mistrust is frequently highly conflicted, costly, and often leads to worse outcomes. Professor Webb will discuss the nature and causes of these difficulties including: the complexity of insurance and repair issues, the organisational ethos of the relevant agencies, the hopes of homeowners and the practical gap which commonly arises between homeowner expectation and agency response. Observations will be offered on how the adverse effects of these issues can be overcome in dealing with claimants, and how such matters can be managed in a way which promotes the wellness of individuals.

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of a presentation by Hugh Cowan, General Manager of Reinsurance, Research and Education at EQC, at the 2016 Seismics in the City Conference. The presentation is titled, "Working Together Strengthens Understanding".The abstract for the presentation reads, "Hear how EQC led a collaborative research project in Canterbury that involved diverse stakeholders from government, council officials and insurers to homeowners, and why collaboration means that Canterbury's geotechnical data is now helping to inform research locally, nationally and around the world."

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of an interview with Tom Thomson, Managing Director of Elastomer Products, about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Thomson talks about the importance of focussing on people, diversifying infrastructure, and informing customers after the earthquakes. He also talks about the need for businesses to understand their insurance policies and to have building and service fall-back plans. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of an interview with Peter Townsend, Chief Executive of Canterbury Employers' Chamber of Commerce about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Townsend talks about business collaboration in Christchurch, the need for businesses to have a back-up plans, the increase in people working from home, and the importance of businesses understanding their insurance. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of an interview with Rick Hellings, Managing Director of Smiths City Group, about the experiences of businesses in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Hellings talks about the changes in regulation and geography in Christchurch after the earthquakes and the importance of managing risks, understanding insurance, and being prepared for change. He also talks about the importance of keeping customers and business partners informed, looking after staff and customers, and reducing costs to offset the increases in rent. This video is part of a series about businesses in Christchurch after the earthquakes.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A digitally manipulated image of liquefaction around a house in Avondale. The photographer comments, "The bottom of the gates were swallowed up by liquefaction, but the house still looked in good condition, which was confirmed by builders just going in to work on the property. It is in the Christchurch red zone, which after testing has been deemed unsuitable for houses to be built on. All the land will be bought by the Government and they would also buy any properties that could be repaired. The remaining insured property owners will get a payment from the insurance company. All the buildings are condemned to be knocked down".

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of André Lovatt, Chair of Regenerate Christchurch, Hugh Cowan, General Manager of Reinsurance, Research and Education at EQC, and developer Antony Gough responding to questions from the floor during a panel at the 2016 Seismics in the City Conference. The panel has three themes:A City on the Move: Collaboration and Regeneration: "'Christchurch is now moving rapidly from the recovery phase into a regeneration stage with Central and Local Government working with the wider community, including the business community to ensure we get optimal outcomes for greater Christchurch' (CECC)."Looking Back: Remembering and Learning: "What are the milestones? What are the millstones? What have we learnt? What have we applied?"Looking Forward: Visioning and Building: "What do we aspire to? What are the roadblocks? What is the way forward?"

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A photograph of graffiti on one of the walls of the kitchen in Donna Allfrey's house at 406 Oxford Terrace. Parts of the graffiti read, "Quakes, a national disaster", "Recovery, a national disgrace", "'It's been a lot of fun' - John Key, yeah right!", "Brownlee sucks, "Ring fn EQC, ring fn insurance", "Useless fn council", "Sideshow Bob is an idiot", "Don't let the bastards get you down", "Avon Loop - park or developers fodder?", and "Never trust a Carter". There are also shopping and to-do lists scrawled amongst these messages.

Videos, UC QuakeStudies

A video of a press conference with Christchurch Mayor Lianne Dalziel and Raf Manji, Chair of the Christchurch City Council Finance Committee, about the KordaMentha report. KordaMentha is an independent auditing firm which specialises in insolvencies and corporate recovery. The report analysed the Christchurch City Council's three year budgeting plan and the financial strategies that lay behind it. Much of this budget dealt with the challenges in Christchurch caused by the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Dalziel talks about the cost of mending Christchurch's infrastructure, the Council's insurance settlement, and the need to address the findings in the report. Manji talks about the Council's financial options following the report.

Research papers, Victoria University of Wellington

Earthquakes are insured only with public sector involvement in high-income countries where the risk of earthquakes is perceived to be high. The proto-typical examples of this public sector involvement are the public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand (NZ). Each of these insurance programs is structured differently, and the purpose of this paper is to examine these differences using a concrete case-study, the sequence of earthquakes that occurred in the Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2011. This event turned out to have been the most heavily insured earthquake event in history. We examine what would have been the outcome of the earthquakes had the system of insurance in NZ been different. In particular, we focus on the public earthquake insurance programs in California (the California Earthquake Authority - CEA), and in Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance - JER). Overall, the aggregate cost to the public insurer in NZ was $NZ 11.1 billion in its response to the earthquakes. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received $NZ 2.5 billion and $NZ 1.4 billion from the JER and CEA, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive patterns of these different scenarios.

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A poster created by Empowered Christchurch to advertise their submission to the CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan on social media.The poster reads, "Submission, CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan. Risk Acceptance. It is the role of insurance companies, the EQC included, to accept the risks covered under their terms of reference/policies and compensate policyholders when such risks eventuate. However, many policyholders in Christchurch have not been compensated for the damage to their homes and their lives. These responsibilities need to be faced by the entities responsible. An equitable solution needs to be found for properties with hazards such as flooding that are a direct result of the earthquakes. In tandem with this, every effort must be made to protect residents from the risks posed by climate change. We need a city that is driven by the people that live in it, and enabled by a bureaucracy that accepts and mitigates risks, rather than transferring them to the most vulnerable residents".

Images, UC QuakeStudies

A poster created by Empowered Christchurch to advertise their submission to the CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan on social media.The poster reads, "Submission. CERA Draft Transition Recovery Plan. 5. In your opinion, is there a better way to report on these recovery issues? Looking at the recovery from the perspective of the eastern suburbs, it is impossible to avoid thinking of phenomenon referred to as 'Disaster Capitalism' and considering the aspects that have already become evident in the recovery process. Loss of equity and quality of life, risk transfer and other substantial shifts are taking place. We suggest that a regular mini-census should be conducted through the remainder of the recovery at intervals of 6-12 months to monitor deprivation, insurance cover (or lack of it), mortgage, home equity, and rental status. If unexpected changes identified, investigation and correction measures should be implemented. We need a city that is driven by the people that live in it, and enabled by a bureaucracy that accepts and mitigates risks, rather than transferring them to the most vulnerable residents ."

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This study analyses the Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) insurance claims database to investigate the influence of seismic intensity and property damage resulting from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) on the repair costs and claim settlement duration for residential buildings. Firstly, the ratio of building repair cost to its replacement cost was expressed as a Building Loss Ratio (BLR), which was further extended to Regional Loss Ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch by multiplying the average of all building loss ratios with the proportion of building stock that lodged an insurance claim. Secondly, the total time required to settle the claim and the time taken to complete each phase of the claim settlement process were obtained. Based on the database, the regional loss ratio for greater Christchurch for three events producing shakings of intensities 6, 7, and 8 on the modified Mercalli intensity scale were 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, small (less than NZD15,000), medium (between NZD15,000 and NZD100,000), and large (more than NZD100,000) claims took 0.35-0.55, 1.95-2.45, and 3.35-3.85 years to settle regardless of the building’s construction period and earthquake intensities. The number of claims was also disaggregated by various building characteristics to evaluate their relative contribution to the damage and repair costs.

Research papers, University of Canterbury Library

This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.

Research papers, Victoria University of Wellington

The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes.  The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world.  In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison.  The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs.  After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices.  Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.