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These cracks would worry me but apparently the building is generally Ok.
Now demolished
This corner building ( Askos)has been demolished and the ones attached soon to ne
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A view after the 7.1 magnitude earthquake in Christchurch.
The standard way in which disaster damages are measured involves examining separately the number of fatalities, of injuries, of people otherwise affected, and the financial damage that natural disasters cause. Here, we implement a novel way to aggregate these separate measures of disaster impact and apply it to two recent catastrophic events: the Christchurch (New Zealand) earthquakes and the Greater Bangkok (Thailand) floods of 2011. This new measure, which is similar to the World Health Organization’s calculation of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost from the burden of diseases and injuries, is described in detail in Noy (2014). It allows us to conclude that New Zealand lost 180 thousand lifeyears as a result of the 2011 events, and Thailand lost 2,644 thousand years. In per capita terms, the loss is similar, with both countries losing about 15 days per person due to the 2011 catastrophic events in these two countries. We also compare these events to other potentially similar events.
We examine the role of business interruption insurance in business recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 in the short- and medium-term. In the short-term analysis, we ask whether insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the aftermath of a disaster. We find only weak evidence that those firms that had incurred damage, but were covered by business interruption insurance, had higher likelihood of survival post-quake compared with those firms that did not have insurance. This absence of evidence may reflect the high degree of uncertainty in the months following the 2011 earthquake and the multiplicity of severe aftershocks. For the medium-term, our results show a more explicit role for insurance in the aftermath of a disaster. Firms with business interruption insurance have a higher probability of increasing productivity and improved performance following a catastrophe. Furthermore, our results show that those organisations that receive prompt and full payments of their claims have a better recovery, in terms of profitability and a subjective ‘”better off” measure’ than those that had protracted or inadequate claim payments (less than 80% of the claim paid within 2.5 years). Interestingly, the latter group does worse than those organisations that had damage but no insurance coverage. This analysis strongly indicates the importance not only of good insurance coverage, but of an insurance system that also delivers prompt claim payments. As a first paper attempting to empirically identify a causal effect of insurance on business recovery, we also emphasize some caveats to our analysis.
Earthquakes are insured only with public sector involvement in high-income countries where the risk of earthquakes is perceived to be high. The proto-typical examples of this public sector involvement are the public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand (NZ). Each of these insurance programs is structured differently, and the purpose of this paper is to examine these differences using a concrete case-study, the sequence of earthquakes that occurred in the Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2011. This event turned out to have been the most heavily insured earthquake event in history. We examine what would have been the outcome of the earthquakes had the system of insurance in NZ been different. In particular, we focus on the public earthquake insurance programs in California (the California Earthquake Authority - CEA), and in Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance - JER). Overall, the aggregate cost to the public insurer in NZ was $NZ 11.1 billion in its response to the earthquakes. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received $NZ 2.5 billion and $NZ 1.4 billion from the JER and CEA, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive patterns of these different scenarios.
We measure the longer-term effect of a major earthquake on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and investigate whether insurance claim payments for damaged residential property affected the local recovery process. We focus on the destructive Christchurch earthquake of 2011 as our case study. In this event more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance, but insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery and describe the recovery’s determinants. We also find that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of economic recovery after the earthquake, but delayed payments were less affective and cash settlement of claims were more affective in contributing to local recovery than insurance-managed rebuilding.
We estimate the causal effects of a large unanticipated natural disaster on high schoolers’ university enrolment decisions and subsequent medium-term labour market outcomes. Using national administrative data after a destructive earthquake in New Zealand, we estimate that the disaster raises tertiary education enrolment of recent high school graduates by 6.1 percentage points. The effects are most pronounced for males, students who are academically weak relative to their peers, and students from schools directly damaged by the disaster. As relatively low ability males are overrepresented in sectors of the labour market helped by the earthquake, greater demand for university may stem from permanent changes in deeper behavioural parameters such as risk aversion or time preference, rather than as a coping response to poor economic opportunities.
This thesis focuses on the role of legal preparedness for managing large-scale urban disasters in Aotearoa New Zealand. It uses the Auckland Volcanic Field as a case study to answer the question: ‘is New Zealand’s current legal framework prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster?’. The Auckland Volcanic Field was chosen as the main case study because a future eruption is a low likelihood, high-impact event that New Zealand is going to have to manage in the future. Case studies are a key feature of this thesis as both New Zealand based and overseas examples are used to explore the role of legal preparedness by identifying and investigating a range of legal issues that need to be addressed in advance of a future Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Of particular interest is the impact of legal preparedness for the recovery phase. The New Zealand case studies include; Canterbury earthquake sequence 2010-2011, the Kaikōura earthquake 2016, the Auckland flooding 2018, and the North Island Severe Weather event 2023, which encompasses both the Auckland Anniversary weekend flooding and Cyclone Gabrielle. As New Zealand has not experienced a large-scale urban volcanic eruption, overseas examples are explored to provide insights into the legal issues that are volcano specific. The overseas volcanic case studies cover eruptions in Heimaey (Iceland), the Soufrière Hills (Montserrat and the Grenadines), La Soufrière (St Vincent) and Tungurahua (Ecuador). New Zealand’s past experiences highlight a trend for introducing post-event legal frameworks to manage recovery. Consequently, the current disaster management system is not prioritising legal preparedness and instead is choosing to rely on exceptional powers. Unsurprisingly, the introduction of new post-event recovery frameworks has repercussions. In New Zealand, new post-event legal frameworks are introduced swiftly under urgency, they contain broad unstructured decision-making powers, and are often flawed. As these exceptional new frameworks sit outside the ‘normal’ legal frameworks, they in effect create a parallel “shadow system”. Based on the evidence explored in this thesis it does not appear that Auckland’s current disaster management framework is prepared to deal with a large-scale urban event caused by an Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Following this conclusion, it is the submission of this thesis that New Zealand’s current legal framework is not prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster. To become legally prepared, New Zealand needs to consider the legal tools required to manage large-scale urban disasters in advance. This will prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the aftermath of disasters and the need for new recovery frameworks. Adopting a new attitude will require a change in approach towards legal preparedness which prioritises it, rather than sidelining it. This may also require changes within New Zealand’s disaster management system including the introduction of a formal monitoring mechanism, which will support and prioritise legal preparedness. This thesis has shown that not legally preparing for future disasters is a choice which carries significant consequences. None of these consequences are inevitable when managing large-scale disasters, however they are inevitable when frameworks are not legally prepared in advance. To not legally prepare, is to prepare to fail and thus create a disaster by choice.