The purpose of this assessment is to compare records of known inanga spawning sites in the waterways of Ōtautahi Christchurch from before and after the Canterbury earthquakes, with particular emphasis on information used in the design of planning methods for spawning site protection.
Nowadays the telecommunication systems’ performance has a substantial impact on our lifestyle. Their operationality becomes even more substantial in a post-disaster scenario when these services are used in civil protection and emergency plans, as well as for the restoration of all the other critical infrastructure. Despite the relevance of loss of functionality of telecommunication networks on seismic resilience, studies on their performance assessment are few in the literature. The telecommunication system is a distributed network made up of several components (i.e. ducts, utility holes, cabinets, major and local exchanges). Given that these networks cover a large geographical area, they can be easily subjected to the effects of a seismic event, either the ground shaking itself, or co-seismic events such as liquefaction and landslides. In this paper, an analysis of the data collected after the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) and the 2016 Kaikoura Earthquake in New Zealand is conducted. Analysing these data, information gaps are critically identified regarding physical and functional failures of the telecommunication components, the timeline of repair/reconstruction activities and service recovery, geotechnical tests and land planning maps. Indeed, if these missing data were presented, they could aid the assessment of the seismic resilience. Thus, practical improvements in the post-disaster collection from both a network and organisational viewpoints are proposed through consultation of national and international researchers and highly experienced asset managers from Chorus. Finally, an outline of future studies which could guide towards a more resilient seismic performance of the telecommunication network is presented.
The 14 November 2016 Kaikōura earthquake had major impacts on New Zealand's transport system. Road, rail and port infrastructure was damaged, creating substantial disruption for transport operators, residents, tourists, and business owners in the Canterbury, Marlborough and Wellington regions, with knock-on consequences elsewhere. During both the response and recovery phases, a large amount of information and data relating to the transport system was generated, managed, analysed, and exchanged within and between organisations to assist decision making. To improve information and data exchanges and related decision making in the transport sector during future events and guide new resilience strategies, we present key findings from a recent post-earthquake assessment. The research involved 35 different stakeholder groups and was conducted for the Ministry of Transport. We consider what transport information was available, its usefulness, where it was sourced from, mechanisms for data transfer between organisations, and suggested approaches for continued monitoring.
The operation of telecommunication networks is critical during business as usual times, and becomes most vital in post-disaster scenarios, when the services are most needed for restoring other critical lifelines, due to inherent interdependencies, and for supporting emergency and relief management tasks. In spite of the recognized critical importance, the assessment of the seismic performance for the telecommunication infrastructure appears to be underrepresented in the literature. The FP6 QuakeCoRE project “Performance of the Telecommunication Network during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence” will provide a critical contribution to bridge this gap. Thanks to an unprecedented collaboration between national and international researchers and highly experienced asset managers from Chorus, data and evidences on the physical and functional performance of the telecommunication network after the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011 have been collected and collated. The data will be processed and interpreted aiming to reveal fragilities and resilience of the telecommunication networks to seismic events
Validation is an essential step to assess the applicability of simulated ground motions for utilization in engineering practice, and a comprehensive analysis should include both simple intensity measures (PGA, SA, etc), as well as the seismic response of a range of complex systems obtained by response history analysis. In order to enable a spectrum of complex structural systems to be considered in systematic validation of ground motion simulations in a routine fashion, an automated workflow was developed. Such a workflow enables validation of simulated ground motions in terms of different complex model responses by considering various ground motion sets and different ground motion simulation methods. The automated workflow converts the complex validation process into a routine one by providing a platform to perform the validation process promptly as a built-in process of simulation post-processing. As a case study, validation of simulated ground motions was investigated via the automated workflow by comparing the dynamic responses of three steel special moment frame (SMRF) subjected to the 40 observed and 40 simulated ground motions of 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The seismic responses of the structures are principally quantified via the peak floor acceleration and maximum inter-storey drift ratio. Overall, the results indicate a general agreement in seismic demands obtained using the recorded and simulated ensembles of ground motions and provide further evidence that simulated ground motions can be used in code-based structural performance assessments in-place of, or in combination with, ensembles of recorded ground motions.